The paper investigates the role of central bank communication for monetary policy implementation. Firstly, we use a multi-disciplinary approach to disentangle several problematic contingencies of central bank communication, analyzing from this perspective the role of complex phenomena such as public opinion, perceptions, beliefs, framing, subjective probability, rhetoric, persuasion, cognitive limits and distortions, psychological and cultural biases etc. The result is a comprehensive survey of theory and practice in central bank communication, from the perspective of political science, social-psychology and media studies. Secondly, we attempt to draw on more psychological realism to central bank communication in the context of financial crises, using a parallel with risk management in the case of natural disasters. Thirdly, we conceive central bank information as a public good, thereby we construct a novel schematic model of supply and demand based on two respective behavioral logistic functions, in order to derive central bank informational equilibrium.

The dissertation studies a model of an economy which produces and exports durable goods. It analyzes the optimal monetary policy for such a country. Generally, monetary policy has a bigger economic effect on durable goods relative to non-durable goods because durable goods can be stored and households get utility from the stock of durable goods. This dissertation shows that, in Nash equilibrium, the central bank of a durable goods producing country can control changes of the price level with smaller changes in the monetary policy instrument. In the cooperative equilibrium, the monetary authority of the country which imports non-durable goods and exports durable goods should raise the interest rate by more, relative to the Nash case, in response to a rise in foreign inflation. On the other hand, the monetary authority of the country which imports durable goods and exports non-durable goods should raise the interest rate by less than the other country.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 185-190).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Queensland, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.S. in Econ.)--School of Economics, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2004. Directed by Willie J. Belton. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 30-31).

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This dissertation is entitled "Essays in the International Economics of Credit and Banking". It comprises three essays. The first essay develops an empirical model of international credit with moral hazard and the risk of repudiation to examine (i) the determinants of the intertemporal and cross-national variations in credit ceilings and (ii) the channels through which output attracts foreign credit. It reports that productivity is the most important variable in attracting credit, followed by education, and then physical capital. Furthermore, international trade, country financial risk ratings, and geography explain more than 60% of the cross-national variations in credit ceiling. Therefore, international relations and investment in education and productivity-enhancing institutions are crucial in attracting foreign credit. / The second essay develops open-economy variants of the old Friedman-Schwartz and the new Lucas-Sargent-Wallace monetarist models to investigate the puzzle of monetary neutrality. The essay further introduces financial aggregation theories into the models. It studies the theoretical and business-cycle relationships between real output and financial aggregates, interest rates, exchange rate, and prices using Canadian quarterly data for the period 1959: 1 to 2002: 1. It reports that the open-economy variants of the monetarist models with aggregation-theoretic financial aggregates perform the best in producing significant sign patterns that are predicted by theory. Furthermore, Monte Carlo experiments show that large percentage of real output variance is explained by shocks to aggregation-theoretic financial aggregates relative to other variables. Thus, there is no difference between the effects of anticipated and unanticipated monetary shocks. / The third essay examines the appropriate formulation of the monetary aggregate for the Nigerian economy for the period 1970:1-2000:4 for the determination of real output. This examination covers simple sum, variable elasticity of substitution (ves), and divisia (dv) aggregation over currency, demand deposits, and savings deposits. The user cost of liquid assets is employed in the construction of both the dv and the yes aggregates. Using maximum likelihood estimation technique, the essay reports that, for the Nigerian economy, currency does as well as or better than any narrow- or broad-money measure in explaining industrial production. Further, the simple sum m1 and m2 outperformed both the yes and dv aggregates. Therefore, monetary policy in Nigeria should focus on the supply of currency and/or of narrow money, rather than on broad money or the divisia aggregates.

There has been a great deal written about monetary policy, and about concepts which are, or seem to be, associated with monetary policy. The literature is broad and the opinions and views expressed are almost as large a variety as there are writers and scholars dealing with the subject. [...]

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This dissertation states that the behavior of banks and investors varies according to the rules of the game and demonstrates that the level of institutional development may have an important role on the effectiveness of monetary policies. The level of institutional development is measured by the quality of contract enforcement, the level of corruption, the extent of political stability, the level of government's transparency and accountability and the quality of the implemented policies and regulations. This research presents a framework to explain how the traditional channels of monetary policy transmission are altered by the level of institutional development, allowing the construction of three hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that institutional development matters for the effects of monetary policies on output. The second hypothesis is that contractionary policies have more adverse effects on output in countries with low institutional development than in countries with high institutional development. The third hypothesis is that expansionary policies are more effective in terms of output promotion in countries with high institutional development than in countries with low institutional development. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that research has established a relationship between the level of institutional development and the asymmetric effects of monetary policies on output. Two country examples are presented: the case of Nigeria illustrates the third hypothesis and the case of Brazil illustrates the second hypothesis. Several econometric models and six institutional development indicators are used to evaluate the three hypotheses. This dissertation provides strong empirical support for the hypotheses 1 and 2, sustaining the argument that the asymmetric effects of monetary policies on output may have deep institutional causes. Rule of law and government effectiveness are the indicators that matter most for the effectiveness of monetary policies. Particular consideration should be given to the rule of law indicator because of its clear connection with the theoretical arguments and country examples, suggesting that fundamental institutional improvements should be focused on the efficiency of the judiciary system and the quality of law enforcement.