Univ., Diss.--Utrecht, 2005.

Sedan attacken på USA 11 september 2001 har åtskilliga rapporter skrivits om Talibanernaför att skapa underlag för styrkorna som bekämpar dem. Syftet med uppsatsen är att försökaåskådliggöra en struktur på styret av talibanernas organisation 2009 och förklara varför dehade denna struktur på styret med utgångspunkt i den religiösa utbildningen. Och i och meddetta bidra till forskningsläget om talibanerna. Frågeställningen som besvaras i uppsatsen är:Vilken struktur hade styret av talibanernas organisation 2009 och varför hade styret dennastruktur? Denna frågeställning löses ut av följande 2 frågor: Fråga 1 - Kan strukturen påstyret av talibanernas organisation 2009 beskrivas med hjälp av en strukturellorganisationsteori? Fråga 2 - Kan den religiösa utbildningen vara en förklaring till dennastruktur på styret?Med hjälp av en strukturell teori om organisationers form och två sociologiska teorier sombehandlar varför människor och grupper handlar som de gör utifrån deras bakgrund ska jagförsöka uppfylla uppsatsens syfte och beskriva hur strukturen på styret av talibanernasorganisation såg ut 2009 och förklara varför den såg ut så.Uppsatsen använder en kvalitativ metod där divisionaliserad organisation, habitus och dendolda läroplanen används som teorier. I den första analysen som svarar på den första frågangörs en fallstudie på ett dokument som beskriver regler och förhållningssätt för talibanernaunder Mullah Omar med hjälp av divisionaliserad organisation. Därefter för att svara påuppsatsens andra fråga analyseras talibanernas habitus utifrån den religiösa utbildningen föratt sedan analyseras med hjälp av Pierre Bourdieus habitusteori och Donald Broadys dendolda läroplanen.Resultatet av analyserna visar att strukturen på styret av talibanernas organisation 2009 tillstor del kan beskrivas med teorin om divisionaliserad organisation och att habitusteorin medstöd av den dolda läroplanen kan ge en förklaring till varför deras styre hade denna struktur2009 utifrån de enskilda individernas religiösa utbildning i södra Afghanistan och Pakistan. / Since the attack on The United States of America September 11 2001 numerous reports hasbeen written about the Taleban to provide information to the forces fighting them. Thepurpose of my thesis is to try to illustrate a structure on the rule of the Taliban organisation2009 and explain why they had this structure on their rule based on religious education. Andby this contribute to the current research about the Taliban. To fulfil this purpose I willanswers the following question in the thesis: What structure did the Taliban have on the ruleof their organisation in 2009 and why did the rule have this structure? This main questionwill be answered through two sub questions: Question 1 – Can the structure of the rule of theTaliban organisation 2009 be described by using a structural theory about organisations?Question 2 – Can the religious education be an explanation to this structure of their rule?With the help of one structural theory about organisations and two sociological theory’sthat concerns why people and groups act the way they do based of their background I will tryto fulfil the purpose of the thesis and describe the structure of the rule of the Talibanorganisation 2009 and explain why the rule had this structure.The thesis uses a qualitative method and divisionaliserad organisation, habitus and thehidden curriculum as theories. In the first analyse that answers to the first question I make acase study on a document that describes rules and regulations for the Taliban’s under MullahOmar using Henry Mintzbergs theory of divisionaliserad organisation. Thereafter to answerthe second question I first analyse the Taliban habitus based on their religious education.Then I continue the analysis using Pierre Bourdieus theory of habitus and Donald Broadysthe hidden curriculum.The result of the two analyses shows that the structure of the rule of the Talibanorganisation 2009 can be described fairly well using the theory of divisionaliseradorganisation. It also shows that the theory of habitus with the support of the hiddencurriculum can give an explanation to why their rule had this structure 2009 based on theindividual’s religious education in southern Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Al Qaeda s’est fait connaître grâce à quelques attentats pionniers symboliques dont le plus spectaculaire a eu lieu le 11 septembre 2001. L’étude du profil complexe d’Al Qaeda, avec ses racines profondes ancrées dans l’histoire, la politique et la société du monde islamique, puis de son évolution, permet de comprendre que la véritable menace ne vient pas d’un seul homme ni même d’un groupe, mais d’une idéologie plus large dédiée au djihad défensif, l’Al Qaedisme. Cette idéologie construite sur des piliers solides et cohérents, prône une guerre sainte planétaire contre l’Occident. Des réseaux fondamentalistes ad hoc et des groupes terroristes locaux se sont greffés autour des objectifs et stratégies d’un Al Qaedisme codifié commun diffusé dans le cyberespace et ont amplifié la menace en touchant toutes les sphères de la communauté internationale. L’approche politique conservatrice dominante a tenté de mettre un frein aux attentats en instituant toute une série de mesures exceptionnelles plus répressives les unes que les autres. Pourtant, le phénomène croissant de radicalisation et la multiplication des attentats terroristes depuis 2001, démontrent que les modèles occidentaux appliqués par des Occidentaux à des sociétés établies sur d’autres fondamentaux n’ont pas permis de trouver de solution durable contre l’Al Qaedisme et même aggravé la menace. Des réponses adaptées à la véritable menace renforcées par le respect des droits de l’homme, sont à mettre en œuvre au travers de nouvelles stratégies multidisciplinaires et synchronisées de déradicalisation qui passent par la guerre des idées pour dépolariser les relations entre les musulmans et non-musulmans. L’adoption de mesures préventives, proactives et réactives qui trouvent un équilibre entre les besoins de la lutte contre le terrorisme et les valeurs démocratiques fondamentales devra en tout premier lieu viser à gagner les cœurs et les esprits de toutes les parties et à former une alliance des civilisations. / Al Qaeda has become renowned thanks to a few symbolic pioneering terrorist attacks among which the most spectacular ones took place on 11 September 2001. The study of Al Qaeda’s complex profile with deep roots in history, politics and the society of the Islamic world, and of its evolution, helps to understand that the real menace comes not from one man, nor from a group, but from an overarching ideology dedicated to a defensive jihad, Al Qaedism. This radical ideology, built upon strong and coherent pillars, preaches a holy global war against the West. Radical fundamentalist ad hoc networks and local terrorist groups have amalgamated around the objectives and strategies of a common, codified Al Qaedism disseminated in cyberspace and have magnified the menace by reaching all the spheres of the international community. The dominating conservative political approach attempted in vain to prevent further terrorist attacks by putting in place a series of exceptional measures more repressive one than another. However, the growing radicalization and the unprecedented multiplication of terrorist attacks since 2001 demonstrate that the western models applied as such by Westerners to societies established on other fundamentals have not allowed to find a longstanding solution against Al Qaedism and rather increased the menace. Responses adjusted to the real menace, reinforced by the respect to human rights, have to be introduced by new multidisciplinary and synchronized strategies of deradicalization that take into account the war on ideas in order to depolarize the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in the world. The adoption of preventive, proactive and reactive measures that find a balance between the needs of the fight against terrorism and the fundamental democratic values will have to aim first at gaining the hearts and minds of all the parties involved and to foster an alliance of civilizations.

The purpose of this thesis is to assess Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan before and after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. I argue that the nature of the relationship was transformed by the region becoming the centre of Cold War conflict, and show how Pakistan’s role affected the development of the mujahidin insurgency against Soviet occupation. My inquiry begins by assessing the historical determinants of the relationship, arising from the colonial legacy and local interpretations of the contested spheres of legitimacy proffered by state, tribe and Islam. I then map the trajectory of the relationship from Pakistan’s independence in 1947, showing how the retreat of great power rivalry following British withdrawal from the subcontinent allowed for the framing of the relationship in primarily bilateral terms. The ascendance of bilateral factors opened greater possibilities for accommodation than had previously existed, though the relationship struggled to free itself of inherited colonial disputes, represented by the Pashtunistan issue. The most promising attempt to resolve the dispute came to an end with the communist coup and subsequent Soviet invasion, which subsumed bilateral concerns under the framework of Cold War confrontation. Viewing the invasion as a major threat, Pakistan pursued negotiations for Soviet withdrawal, aligned itself with the US and gave clandestine support to the mujahidin insurgency. External support enhanced mujahidin military viability while exacerbating weaknesses in political organization and ideology. Soviet withdrawal in 1989 left an unresolved conflict. Faced with state collapse and turmoil across the border, heightened security concerns following loss of US support, and intensified links among non-state actors on both sides of the frontier, the Pakistan government drew on its recently gained experience of working through non-state actors to attempt to maintain its influence in Afghanistan. There would be no return to the relatively stable state-state ties prevailing before 1979.