According to the Electricity act, an owner of a production facility should get financial compensation from the grid owner for the benefits it has on the grid. The compensation for the grid benefit should correspond to the reduced costs of fees and reduced costs of losses. The Swedish Energy Markets Inspectorate (Ei) uses a method called Method 2020 for calculating grid benefit compensation when there is a disagreement between a grid owner and the owner of a production facility. The method should be objective, non-discriminatory, and transparent. The aim was to analyse how Method 2020 meets the requirements of the Electricity act regarding objectivity and non-discrimination as well as being compatible with efficient grid utilization and effective production. The goal was to analyse if the method creates incentives for efficient grid utilization and make suggestions for improving the method. The thesis explored how different actors perceive Method 2020 through interviews with Ei, DSOs, and the Swedish TSO. The perception mainly differs regarding whether the reduced costs and how they are calculated in Method 2020 should correspond to forecasts or actual outcomes. The opinions differ concerning guaranteed power and if it should be part of the grid benefit compensation, which is also related to the time perspective. Furthermore, the thesis explored if all energy sources receive the same compensation and if it is possible to use a generalised compensation for all energy sources. This was executed by combining different grid characteristics, production units, and grid fees in Method 2020. There is significant variation in compensation for hydro, wind, and CHP units in grids dominated by production, consumption, or a mix of both, so that no general compensation is possible. However, compensation for PV units vary very little and should therefore be possible to have a standardised compensation, preferably based on time of use. The compensation will differ geographically due to grid fees. The results showed that Method 2020 is unjust towards production units that are large compared to the grid's transmitted energy. It is therefore suggested that impact of the production unit should be removed from the interconnection point. This will create better incentives for efficient grid utilisation.