The social construction and the behavior of organization transform continuously, and the relative prices keep changing. When the relative prices changing will cause the negotiating power of the organization to change and further affects institutional evolution? "The Remedial Institution of Soil and Groundwater Pollution¡¨ had passed through successively institutional evolution during 10 years, how does the pollutant and interest group affect the institutional evolution. Through Douglass C. North¡¦s view of the institutional evolution, I collected many different Taiwanese articles of evolvement policy and rules of soil and groundwater pollution to understand the relationship between the lawmaking of "The remedial institution of soil and groundwater pollution" and the organization of behavior. Besides that, using ¡§The Remedial Fee of Soil and Groundwater Pollution," the subsidiary bill of ¡§The Remedial Institution of Soil and Groundwater Pollution" as a case study. Deeply understand the North¡¦s Theories of institutional evolution in formal rule, informal rule and enforce characteristic and their relationship. According to the analysis of the interaction between institutions and organizations, it explained that the formal rule, The Remedial Institution of Soil and Groundwater Pollution, cause it 10 years for revising. Under such structure of the institutions, the network of the administration, legislative agency and different ideology, had affected the actors who take the action regulate the transaction costs and caused new arrangement of the institution to generate stable and slow changes. It proves that our notion of the behavior of organizations exists transaction cost and has interacted effect on the construction of institutional evolution to be right, and also proves that under North's theory of institutional evolution, provided a good explanation for "The Remedial Institution of Soil and Groundwater Pollution¡¨ can't quickly revise in Taiwan¡¦s current institutions. At the same time, this statement has enhanced the explanation capability of the theories toward the environment policies of Taiwan.

The aim of this thesis is to assess the real position of the European Union in the global economy and to evaluate its ability to present common interests, priorities and objectives of the Member States and achieve its acceptance on the international scene. The thesis is divided into three chapters. The first one deals with global and economic governance and G20, a forum for international cooperation in the field of economic and financial problems. The second chapter is focused on the European Union, one of the twenty members of G20, and macroeconomic position of the EU in G20. There are also mentiond economic, fiscal and trade policy of the European Union. The last part is devoted to the Union's negotiating power within the G20. Negotiating power is evaluated on the basis of EU's common position on the G20 agenda compared with the G20 summit declarations. In conclusion of this thesis is evaluated the strength and position of the Union within the framework of the G20.