Accounting regulators are concerned about the potential threat of long-term auditor-client relationships on auditor independence, leading to lower audit quality. The main objective of this study is to examine the association between auditor tenure and an important feature of accounting, namely conservatism. Following Basu (1997) and Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000), I define conservatism as the quicker recognition in earnings of bad news about expected future cash flows. I investigate whether long-term auditor-client relationships are associated with less timely recognition of earnings to bad news, and a lower rate of reversal of negative earnings changes. The overall results strongly show that conservatism decreases as auditor tenure lengthens. The results are robust across various measures of conservatism and a series of sensitivity tests. However, auditors¡¯ litigation exposure appears to be able to mitigate the adverse impact of auditor tenure. In additional tests, I find that the reduced conservatism is not driven by the larger clients that auditors have incentives to retain. Moreover, I find that even industry specialists could not avoid the negative impact of longer auditor-client relationships on conservatism. The study provides some support to the regulators who are concerned about the potential negative impact of auditor tenure on audit quality and the rule of mandatory audit firm rotation.

This diploma paper is amed on the area of external audit and it's purpose is to present audit profession from theoretical and practical side. The paper is divided into three parts, where the first two parts introduce theoretical background, historical development of audit profession, relation of external and internal audit and the most important legal rules and regulations, which concern the area of audit. Besides this basic information is also mentioned the new bill about auditors, which has to implement European Commission Directive, considerating compulsory audit of final account, into Czech system of law. The third part is practical, and shows how audit works on particular contract.

Through the audit of annual reports, auditors contribute to the credibility of financial information. To ensure trustworthiness, the auditor has to be independent from the audited company. Auditors’ independence has been a very broadly discussed topic for many years. The most discussed threat to auditors’ independence is the provision of non-audit services by audit firms. But there are other threats to auditors’ independence besides the provision of non-audit services, which are not that frequently discussed so far. There is a tendency that companies hire employees of their current audit firm, which can imply a threat to auditors’ independence. This threat is addressed in the present research paper. The purpose of this paper is to examine if banks, as important capital providers, are aware of the threat to auditors’ independence through the client employment of previous auditors. This study uses qualitative data, collected by a web-based self-completion questionnaire with open questions. This questionnaire was sent out to corporate account officers in German banks via email. The analysis of these results shows that banks perceive the client employment of previous auditors as a threat to auditors’ independence. But even though banks perceive this as a threat, most of the respondents do not see any possibility to counteract the dangers posed by such a move. The main reason is the missing capability to gather knowledge about the employment behavior of a company. Hence, the client employment of previous auditors often stays undetected. Such a move may affect the mind-set of the bankers in a theoretical way, but has no influence regarding their daily business with the customer firms. Different measures exist to counteract the threat to auditors’ independence as well as the negative impacts caused by the client employment of previous auditors. These countermeasures refer to all three parties – (I) the company, (II) the audit service providers and (III) the bank. Especially regulation, both of the audit and the bank, but as well voluntary acting can be consulted. Further research needs to be done in order to proof the results of this study preferably in a quantitative way. An extension to how banks act instead on looking how they perceive the client employment would be interesting in order to draw more conclusions and develop further countermeasures.

This thesis first builds a framework to impose professional liability on Chinese auditors for misstatements and then tests the framework by field work. Auditor liability has been a recurring puzzle. This thesis intends to analyze the complex legal relationships among the players in typical auditing litigations, dissect the arguments from both the auditors and plaintiffs, and develop doctrines and check points that could help the litigation parties to evaluate the merits of their claims, to predict the litigation outcomes, and to mitigate litigation risks in the Chinese setting. The author adopts a utilitarianism perspective and utilizes the theory of “contract and status”. The main methodologies employed include: case report analysis, legal reasoning, interviews, and questionnaire survey. Comparison across jurisdictions and interdisciplinary perspectives have been utilized all through the thesis. In the first part, the author draws a portrait of the Chinese auditing profession, and then moves to synthesize the previous literature on audit liability from both accounting and legal perspectives. After this, a significant part of the thesis is devoted to analyzing the typical UK reported cases since the late 19th century including the Caparo case, Bannerman case and others to discover the UK laws regulating auditor liability. In the following chapter, the recent trends of legislation in the UK and the company law harmonization practice of the EU are reviewed. Then, based on a survey on current Chinese law and an analysis on the feasibility of transplanting the UK and EU practice into China, the author develops a proposed framework integrating doctrines and practical checking points about eligible plaintiffs, duty of care, wrongdoings, standards of care, and damage calculation and allocation in typical litigations. In the second part, the proposed framework is dissected into questions, which are examined through 38 interviews with auditors, regulators, financial statements preparers, and lawyers, and 470 survey questionnaires completed by auditors and members of the financial community, along with questions about responsibility and the technical abilities of auditors. The data from the field produces a cross-section picture of the perceptions of stakeholders on auditor liability. Statistical analysis shows there are significant differences between the auditor and non-auditor on the majority of the related issues, such as auditor’s responsibility, eligible plaintiff, and others. The empirical analysis gives general support for the proposed framework.

The purposes of this study were to examine the effects of six variables on auditor independence and the reliability of financial statements as perceived within the Irish commercial environment and to explore the reasons underlying these perceptions. The six variables comprised of audit firm size, audit market competition, audit committees, audit tenure, provision of nonaudit services (NAS) and client employment. From a combination of questionnaire and interview approaches, the study sought to obtain supportable and useful insight as to the perceptions held. The approach builds on and develops previous research conducted outside the Irish market. The results of the study showed that auditor independence and the reliability of financial statements were perceived to be significantly impaired when the audit was performed by a non-Big Six firm, the audit environment was highly competitive, no audit committee existed, audit tenure was long, NAS were provided by audit personnel to audit clients, and the auditor took up an employment position with a former audit client. Some of the reasons underlying these perceptions were as follows. The importance of reputation to, and. the international profile of, the Big Six firms allowed interviewees to have greater confidence in their independence. A highly competitive audit market was perceived to impair auditor independence by encouraging auditors to cut back on the amount of audit work performed in order to maintain audit fee income. Audit committees were perceived to enhance auditor independence by reducing the power that management could exert over the auditor. Long audit tenure was perceived to impair auditor independence by encouraging auditors to become cosy in their relationships with their clients. The lack of confidence as a result of NAS provision was associated with the audit firm's dependency on such services for fee income. Client employment was perceived to provide the ex-auditor with power to influence auditor-client relationships.

Diplomová práce je zaměřena na současnou problematiku auditu účetní závěrky v českém prostředí. Cílem práce je, na základě získaných poznatků o auditorských postupech a komplexním procesu auditu, identifikovat významné změny, nové postupy a požadavky při provádění auditu po přijetí Mezinárodních auditorských standardů jako základních profesních předpisů auditorské praxe v České republice. Práci tvoří tři věcně ucelené části, v první části je pojednáno o původu auditorské profese, jejím vývoji v celosvětovém aspektu a následně také v České republice, pojetí a významu auditu, profesní legislativě a organizaci a profesních předpisech. Druhá část práce se zabývá detailními postupy auditorské společnosti při provádění auditu, ve kterých jsou aplikovány požadavky Mezinárodních auditorských standardů. V závěrečné části práce jsou uvedeny identifikované významné změny v přístupu a procedurách auditorské společnosti vyplývající z aplikace uvedených standardů.

Recent accounting research suggests that auditor identification or familiarity with their clients may be an additional threat to auditor independence, which may be mitigated by a strong professional identity (King 2002; Bamber and Iyer 2007). However, social identity theory suggests that a strong professional identity will only be effective if it is highly salient and thus readily activated. Yet, professional identity salience is argued to have diminished in recent years (Warren and Alzola 2009). I examine if the level of professional identity salience moderates the positive association between auditor agreement with the client and client identity strength, or the negative association between auditor agreement with the client and professional identity strength. I address these research questions using two experiments completed by experienced professional auditors. In the first experiment with an ambiguous audit judgment task, I examine client identity strength and professional identity salience at two levels each and measure professional identity strength. Results show that auditors with stronger client identities agree more with the client, but only when professional identity salience is not heightened. I do not find that auditors with stronger professional identities agree less with the client, even when professional identity salience is heightened. In the second experiment with an unambiguous audit judgment task, I examine client identity strength at two levels when professional identity salience is not heightened. Results are inconclusive as to whether auditors with strong client identities differ in their agreement with the client, relative to auditors with weak client identities. My research contributes to literature on auditor identification and independence by demonstrating the importance of professional identity salience, not just professional identity strength, on auditor judgments. I also show that threats to auditor objectivity can arise from client identity that develops even without a familiar client relationship.

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Recent accounting research suggests that auditor identification or familiarity with their clients may be an additional threat to auditor independence, which may be mitigated by a strong professional identity (King 2002; Bamber and Iyer 2007). However, social identity theory suggests that a strong professional identity will only be effective if it is highly salient and thus readily activated. Yet, professional identity salience is argued to have diminished in recent years (Warren and Alzola 2009). I examine if the level of professional identity salience moderates the positive association between auditor agreement with the client and client identity strength, or the negative association between auditor agreement with the client and professional identity strength. I address these research questions using two experiments completed by experienced professional auditors. In the first experiment with an ambiguous audit judgment task, I examine client identity strength and professional identity salience at two levels each and measure professional identity strength. Results show that auditors with stronger client identities agree more with the client, but only when professional identity salience is not heightened. I do not find that auditors with stronger professional identities agree less with the client, even when professional identity salience is heightened. In the second experiment with an unambiguous audit judgment task, I examine client identity strength at two levels when professional identity salience is not heightened. Results are inconclusive as to whether auditors with strong client identities differ in their agreement with the client, relative to auditors with weak client identities. My research contributes to literature on auditor identification and independence by demonstrating the importance of professional identity salience, not just professional identity strength, on auditor judgments. I also show that threats to auditor objectivity can arise from client identity that develops even without a familiar client relationship.