Using a qualitative multiple case study methodology, this study explores the relationship between government funding and INGO autonomy in three INGOs through resource dependence and tool choice frameworks. Adapting Verhoest, Peters et al.'s (2004) conceptualization of organizational autonomy as the extent of an organization's decision making capacity in matters concerning agency operations and human resource and financial management; this research regards the authors second definition of financial, structural, legal, and interventional constraints not as types of autonomy per se, but as the mechanisms through which INGOs' actual use of their decision making competencies is constrained. The findings in this research suggest that relative to other funding sources, government funding disproportionately impacts INGOs' operational and managerial autonomy. This is largely accomplished through various ex ante and ex post constraints such as, rules and regulations on inputs allocation and use, performance controls and evaluation requirements attached to government funding. This research also finds that the tool of choice used by government to finance INGO activities also steer, direct and influence INGO grantees' decisions thus positioning INGOs to incorporate government policy interests, preferences and priorities. However, INGOs can exercise their autonomy through various strategies ranging from program design, contract negotiation, and participation in advisory groups.

Using a qualitative multiple case study methodology, this study explores the relationship between government funding and INGO autonomy in three INGOs through resource dependence and tool choice frameworks. Adapting Verhoest, Peters et al.'s (2004) conceptualization of organizational autonomy as the extent of an organization's decision making capacity in matters concerning agency operations and human resource and financial management; this research regards the authors second definition of financial, structural, legal, and interventional constraints not as types of autonomy per se, but as the mechanisms through which INGOs' actual use of their decision making competencies is constrained. The findings in this research suggest that relative to other funding sources, government funding disproportionately impacts INGOs' operational and managerial autonomy. This is largely accomplished through various ex ante and ex post constraints such as, rules and regulations on inputs allocation and use, performance controls and evaluation requirements attached to government funding. This research also finds that the tool of choice used by government to finance INGO activities also steer, direct and influence INGO grantees' decisions thus positioning INGOs to incorporate government policy interests, preferences and priorities. However, INGOs can exercise their autonomy through various strategies ranging from program design, contract negotiation, and participation in advisory groups.

The pattern of American institution building through private funding began in metropolises of all sizes soon after the nation's founding. But by 1840, Manhattan's geographical location and great natural harbor had made it America's preeminent commercial and communications center and the undisputed capital of finance. Thus, as the largest and richest city in the United States, unsurprisingly, some of the most ambitious cultural institutions would rise there, and would lead the way in the creation of a distinctly American model of high culture. This dissertation describes New York City's cultural transformation between 1840 and 1940, and focuses on three of its enduring monuments, the New York Public Library, the Metropolitan Museum of Art, and the Metropolitan Opera. It seeks to demonstrate how trustees and financial supporters drove the foundational ideas, day-to-day operations, and self-conceptions of the organizations, even as their institutional agendas enhanced and galvanized the inherently boosterish spirit of the Empire City. Many board members were animated by the dual impulses of charity and obligation, and by their own lofty edifying ambitions for their philanthropies, their metropolis, and their country. Others also combined their cultural interests with more vain desires for social status. Although cohesive, often overlapping social groups founded and led most elite institutions, important moments of change in leadership in the twentieth century often were precipitated by the breakdown of a social order once restricted to Protestant white males. By the 1920s and 1930s, the old culture of exclusion--of Jews, of women, of ethnic minorities in general--was no longer an accepted assumption, nor was it necessarily good business. In general, institutions that embraced the notion of diversity and adapted to forces of historical change tended to thrive. Those that held fast to the paradigms of the past did not. Typically, when we consider the history and development of such major institutions, the focus often has been on the personalities and plans of the paid directors and curatorial programs. This study, however, redirects some of the attention towards those who created the institutions and hired and fired the leaders. While a common view is that membership on a board was coveted for social status, many persons who led these efforts had little abiding interest in Manhattan's social scene. Rather, they demanded more of their boards and expected their fellow-trustees to participate in more ways than financially. As the twentieth century beckoned, rising diversity in the population mirrored the emerging multiplicity in thought and culture; boards of trustees were hardly exempt from this progression. This dissertation also examines the subtle interplay of the multi-valenced definition of "public" along with the contrasting notion of "private." In the early 1800s, a public institution was not typically government funded, and more often functioned independent of the state, supported by private individuals. "Public," instead, meant for the people. Long before the income tax and charitable deductions for donations, there was a full range of voluntary organizations supported by private contributions in the United States. This dissertation argues that in a privatist spirit, New York elites seized a leadership role, both individually and collectively, to become cultural arbiters for the city and the nation.

This thesis reconstructs the concept of International Non-Governmental Organization (INGO) accountability to beneficiaries through the development of a strategic model for INGO accountability to beneficiaries. It works through the history and arguments surrounding the rise of the debate around whether INGOs should be held accountable to their beneficiary populations. Unique definitions are developed for the terms and concepts related to this topic and a framework for understanding the strategic model for INGO accountability to beneficiaries is outlined: Accountable to whom? Accountable for what? Accountable how? A practical example of an internal assessment for measuring an INGO's accountability to beneficiaries is examined, analyzing data from Mercy Corps' internal accountability to beneficiaries survey conducted in 2010. This thesis defines accountability to beneficiaries as the process of justifying and being responsible for the manner and results of one's actions to any individual or group who is a member of the society whose interests the project or program is intended to promote. The main conclusions from this thesis are that the traditional model should be expanded to be more strategic and include a) a broader beneficiary and stakeholder population who may be affected, either positively or negatively, by the actions of an INGO, b) the actions of all members of the organization, and c) the enduring impacts of their work over time. Accountability to beneficiaries is a concept that can be applied to all INGO projects in a way that requires minimal resources and will ultimately improve the quality of the services delivered.

Thesis (M Social Work (Social Work))--University of Stellenbosch, 2007. / This research addresses the problem of how formal organisations can assist on building the capacity of informal community based organisations (CBO’s). Although informal CBO’s are being regarded as valuable resources rendering much needed services to marginalized communities, they are at present still exclude from governmental funding, because they do not meet the requirements prescribed by the state. To obtain the funds which will enable informal CBO’s to render effective and sustainable services to marginalized and poor vulnerable communities, it is from the developmental perspective in welfare crucial to build the capacity of these informal CBO’s. As a point of departure the researcher provides a general picture of the current structure of social service providers in South Africa. This is done, first of all, by conceptualizing “social service providers” within the context of general concepts such as “social welfare” and “social work”. In this respect a schematic representation provides a general picture of the various categories of social service providers involved, followed by a concise description of each, including their focuses, roles and responsibilities. This necessitates that a distinction should be drawn between the government sector, parastatal organisations, profit-yielding non-governmental organisations and non-governmental organisations without a profit-seeking motive. The concept “capacity building” is explored in accordance with the policy and legislative framework applicable to the capacity building of informal CBO’s by formal welfare organisations. This framework is supplemented by a description of other key concepts which have a bearing on the capacity building of informal CBO’s by formal welfare organisations, such as “empowerment” and “development”. Emanating from this an attempt is made to formulate the objective of the capacity building of informal CBO’s by formal welfare organisations. From the diversity of the developmental requirements and the obstacles informal CBO’s experience, aims for obtaining capacity building are deduced.