India's nonalignment policy attracted the attention of many newly independent countries for it provided an alternative to the existing American and Russian views of the world. This dissertation is an examination of both India's nonalignment policy and the official American reaction to it during the Truman-Eisenhower years. Indian nonalignment should be defined as a policy of noncommitment towards rival power blocs adopted with a view of retaining freedom of action in international affairs and thereby influencing the issue of war and peace to India's advantage. India maintained that the Cold War was essentially a European problem. Adherence to military allliances , it believed, would increase domestic tensions and add to chances of involvement in international war, thus destroying hopes of socio-economic reconstruction of India. The official American reaction was not consistent. It varied from president to president, from issue to issue, and from time to time. India's stand on various issues of international import and interest to the United States such as recognition of the People's Republic of China, the Korean War, the Japanese peace treaty of 1951, and the Hungarian revolt of 1956, increased American concern about and dislike of nonalignment. Many Americans in high places regraded India's nonalignment policy as pro-Communist and as one that sought to undermine Western collective security measures. Consequently, during the Truman and Eisenhower presidencies the United States took a series of diplomatic, military, and economic measures to counter India's neutralism. America refused to treat India as a major power and attempted to contain its influence on the international plane by excluding it from international conferences and from assuming international responsibilities. The Russian efforts to woo India and other nonaligned countries with trade and aid softened America's open resistance to India's nonalignment. As a result, although tactical, a new trend in America's dealings with India was visible during the closing years of Eisenhower's presidency. Therefore, America sought to keep nonaligned India at least nonaligned by extending economic aid.

This thesis examines how the parliamentary debate in Sweden saw the consequences of Swedenas a nation were to join the European Union. The nation is defined as a state based on nationalself-determination. The EU is regarded as a supra-state organisation and one of the moreextensive efforts of its kind. I specifically examine two themes in Swedish foreign policy. Theseare the nonalignment policy and migration policy. Through a discourse analysis I show that allpolitical parties perceive consequences for the self-determination and all argue selfdeterminationwill be lost in the event of membership. However, they are divided in what theybelieved this would lead to. Some parties support EU whereas others are sceptical of EU. Partiesthat support an EU-membership argue that it is inevitable to join and Sweden will lose selfdeterminationanyway. A membership opens the possibility to influence and participate, but anabstaining will lead forced acceptance of policies. Many of the supporters are even positive ofbeing a member in EU. Sceptics, on the other hand believe Sweden will lack influence and loseall self-determination. The organisation itself is against Sweden as it is a supra-stateorganisation, which may reduce the role of single member-states. For the nonalignment policy,the government initially use it as an argument against EU, but later support membership if thenonalignment policy can be kept. The other supporters acknowledge the nonalignment policy,but nevertheless assert that EU is compatible with the nonalignment policy. This is because ofthe changes in the geopolitical situation. Sceptics believe the nonalignment policy rejectmembership, mostly due to the still uncertain geopolitical situation and the suspicion EU willdeprive Sweden of its decision-making. Sometimes they suggest the self-determination andnonalignment policy are prerequisites for each other. In the migration policy, all parties supportgenerous migration policy, but