This dissertation examines whether a nonconscious goal can change preferences between binary options, one favoring a conscious goal (e.g., undiluted but non-healthy iced tea) and the other a nonconscious goal (e.g., diluted but healthy iced tea). Across four laboratory experiments, we demonstrate that when participants are only given a conscious goal (e.g., to choose the tastier drink), the majority of them seek the alternative that is more instrumental to this goal. However, when a nonconscious goal is also primed (e.g., to be healthy), their preferences can shift to the alternative that is perceived to be instrumental to this goal but is inferior from the conscious goal standpoint. We propose a two-stage model to explain these findings. In the first stage, when a nonconscious goal is primed, individuals attend to goal-relevant cues (e.g., health-signaling label) and automatically form a positive evaluation toward the option that facilitates the nonconscious goal relative to the option that does not satisfy the goal. In the second stage, the positive automatic evaluation is then used to distort perceptions of the option’s conscious goal instrumentality such that the option is perceived as having a more favorable taste compared to when the goal is not primed. While the positive automatic evaluation influences the option’s taste, it does not affect the evaluation of the option’s other attributes (e.g., scent, color). By manipulating the timing of nonconscious goal activation and by adopting an evaluative conditioning task, we find support for our conceptual model while ruling out alternative explanations and identifying a boundary condition of task difficulty. The findings of the experiments contribute to the literature on nonconscious goals 1) by showing that these goals can play a central role in decision making when choice options pit them against conscious goals, and 2) by identifying a mechanism (i.e., attribute distortion) that can resolve goal competition in choice.

This dissertation examines whether a nonconscious goal can change preferences between binary options, one favoring a conscious goal (e.g., undiluted but non-healthy iced tea) and the other a nonconscious goal (e.g., diluted but healthy iced tea). Across four laboratory experiments, we demonstrate that when participants are only given a conscious goal (e.g., to choose the tastier drink), the majority of them seek the alternative that is more instrumental to this goal. However, when a nonconscious goal is also primed (e.g., to be healthy), their preferences can shift to the alternative that is perceived to be instrumental to this goal but is inferior from the conscious goal standpoint. We propose a two-stage model to explain these findings. In the first stage, when a nonconscious goal is primed, individuals attend to goal-relevant cues (e.g., health-signaling label) and automatically form a positive evaluation toward the option that facilitates the nonconscious goal relative to the option that does not satisfy the goal. In the second stage, the positive automatic evaluation is then used to distort perceptions of the option’s conscious goal instrumentality such that the option is perceived as having a more favorable taste compared to when the goal is not primed. While the positive automatic evaluation influences the option’s taste, it does not affect the evaluation of the option’s other attributes (e.g., scent, color). By manipulating the timing of nonconscious goal activation and by adopting an evaluative conditioning task, we find support for our conceptual model while ruling out alternative explanations and identifying a boundary condition of task difficulty. The findings of the experiments contribute to the literature on nonconscious goals 1) by showing that these goals can play a central role in decision making when choice options pit them against conscious goals, and 2) by identifying a mechanism (i.e., attribute distortion) that can resolve goal competition in choice.

This dissertation explores how nonconscious thought processing might be affected and activated in ways that influence consumer decision making. To activate nonconscious thought processes, this dissertation relies on priming—the unobtrusive activation of mental representations by stimuli in a social context, which occurs without participants' conscious awareness. Three dimensions of consumer decision making are investigated: purchase intention, product evaluation and arousal. The dissertation is based on the auto-motive model of nonconscious goal pursuit and somatic marker hypothesis. The dissertation is driven by three experiments, which respectively explore crucial areas in priming effects and addresses the following research question: can primes be shaped or controlled by marketers? Specifically, the dissertation examines whether shopping behavior can be primed. Second, the dissertation also examines how facial primes displaying basic emotions (happiness, anger, contempt, disgust, fear, sadness, and surprise) can prime emotion and arousal. Finally the dissertation examines the effect of the interaction of the buying prime with the primes of faces displaying basic emotions on the dependent variables of purchase intention, product evaluation, emotion, and arousal. Results from three experimental studies show that shopping behavior can be primed, and primed participants will exhibit higher product evaluation than those exposed to a control prime. Second while exposing participants to primes of faces displaying emotions did not elicit those emotions, the priming with faces did reveal a marginal activation of arousal in the participants. Third priming with faces was not found to interact with primed buying behavior such that the interaction would affect the level of arousal. The results indicate that Bargh's auto-motive model of nonconscious goal pursuit can be applied to marketing. Thus priming shopping behavior can affect product evaluation though the effect of this prime appears to be too weak to be applied in the field. Priming with faces was found not to interact with primed shopping behavior and thus affect product evaluation. The impact of the findings on marketing practitioners suggests that more laboratory investigation is necessary. Further laboratory investigation should be used to raise the effect level of the prime and to find ways to shape and control nonconscious goal pursuit prior to attempting to bring priming into the field.

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Symptoms and syndromes in neuropathology, whether expressed in conscious or nonconscious behaviour, remain imbedded in often complex diagnostic categories. Symptom-based strategies for studying brain disease states are driven by assessments of presenting symptoms, signs, assay results, neuroimages and biomarkers. In the present account, symptom-based strategies are contrasted with existing diagnostic classifications. Topics include brain areas and regional circuitry underlying decision-making and impulsiveness, and motor and learned expressions of explicit and implicit processes. In three self-report studies on young adult and adolescent healthy individuals, it was observed that linear regression analyses between positive and negative affect, self-esteem, four different types of situational motivation: intrinsic, identified regulation, extrinsic regulation and amotivation, and impulsiveness predicted significant associations between impulsiveness with negative affect and lack of motivation (i.e., amotivation) and internal locus of control, on the one hand, and non-impulsiveness with positive affect, self-esteem, and high motivation (i.e., intrinsic motivation and identified regulation), on the other. Although presymptomatic, these cognitive- affective characterizations illustrate individuals' choice behaviour in appraisals of situations, events and proclivities essentially of distal perspective. Neuropathological expressions provide the proximal realities of symptoms and syndromes with underlying dysfunctionality of brain regions, circuits and molecular mechanisms.

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