Thesis (M.P.A.)--Bowling Green State University, 2007. / Document formatted into pages; contains ix, 127 p. Includes bibliographical references.

This thesis summarizes and analyzes the key factors in the cooperative U.S-Russian effort, pre-and post-9/11, to prevent nuclear proliferation. Especially highlighted are pertinent efforts to prevent terrorist organizations from obtaining nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons capabilities. This thesis catalogues both, Russian and the U.S. successes and failures to prevent nuclear proliferation through administration policies, as well as, the various cooperative threat reduction measures employed in coordination with the nations that once composed the former Soviet Union. Finally, this thesis offers a prediction of what the near future will hold for threat reduction and arms elimination programs.

Truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are. - Nietzsche / On March 5th 1970, a long process of international negotiation and power brokering culminated into the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty. As a result the 121 signatory states were legally subject to the norms, values, principles, and behavioural prescriptions of the nuclear proliferation regime. Twenty-nine years after the treaty's entrenchment, however, the nuclear proliferation regime and its enforcement agencies still face many of the same challenges that have plagued its implementation since its conception. The purpose of this analysis is to examine the causal relationship between the perception of the political legitimacy among the signatory members of the NPT, the likelihood of adherence to these behavioural prescriptions and to provide a framework to understand what would make for a legitimate treaty in the eyes of its members. This analysis will reveal that signatory members of the NPT who perceive the treaty as illegitimate are more likely to either defect or disobey the obligations of the treaty than those signatory members who perceive the NPT to be legitimate. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

Thesis (Ph. D.)--UCLA, 2009. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 259-270).

Thesis (M.A.)--Ohio State University, 2009. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 78-80).

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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / Iran may have a nuclear weapon soon if Washington and Moscow do not unite to slow its efforts. The collapse of the Soviet Union created new complications in a long tradition of nonproliferation cooperation between the United States and Russia, and Iran is just one example. In the 1960s, faced with a common nuclear threat of China, Washington and Moscow united to negotiate the Limited Test Ban Treaty and Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to prevent China and other nuclear aspirants from proliferating nuclear weapons. They shepherded their allies to the nonproliferation table and made them sign the treaties. Their efforts retarded nuclear proliferation but failed to prevent China, India, and Pakistan, from gaining nuclear weapons. Following the Cold War their cooperative relationship changed as Washington began treating Moscow as an unequal partner and their nonproliferation efforts broke down into a cooperative and uncooperative mix. This mix has reduced the effectiveness of their efforts and may accelerate proliferation. The September 11th terrorist attacks put more attention on the nuclear proliferation threat to the international community. If this threat is to be minimized, Washington and Moscow need to work together, as they did against China, to prevent new nuclear powers from emerging. / Captain, United States Air Force

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Thesis (M.S. in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy)--Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2007. / Title from title screen. "5 April 2007." Electronic version of original print document. Includes bibliographical references (p. 84-87).

The nuclear nonproliferation regime was established in the late 1950's and 1960's, especially with the creation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968, and has altered considerably in subsequent decades. It has also been subject to the challenges posed by several external shocks. This thesis seeks to examine the relationship, if any, between shocks and the ways in which the regime has changed from its inception to the present day. While there is a wide theoretical literature on international regimes, much of it ignores the ways in which regimes change and develop over time. Instead, most regime theory focuses on the reasons behind regime creation and decay, rather than on the processes that occur in between. When the question of regime change has been examined, it has also commonly been assumed that such change occurs in a gradual, incremental fashion. This dissertation will examine the nuclear nonproliferation regime in order to challenge the assumptions in regime theory regarding the existence and manner of regime change. Specifically, the relationship between certain shocks and subsequent change (or its absence) will be examined through four contrasting case studies of shocks and their aftermaths. They involve the Indian nuclear test of 1974, the Israeli attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981, the post-Gulf War revelations of Iraq's nuclear weapon programme, and the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of 1998. These case studies make it possible to understand both the implications for regime theory generally, and the circumstances under which such change occurs, or fails to occur. The thesis ultimately asserts that the nonproliferation regime has indeed changed considerably since its creation, of necessity for its survival, and that such change was often non-incremental. It ends by proposing a model by which to illustrate the conditions under which regime change occurs in response to a shock.