Despite the need for accurate oil and gas reserves estimates which honor disclosure requirements of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), a number of exploration and production companies have allegedly overstated and subsequently written down their reserves during the last 20 years. Reserves write-downs are of great interest to numerous groups involved in the reserves estimation process and outcome, including estimators, managers, investors, creditors, and regulators. Considering the magnitude and nature of some alleged overstatement cases, it appears that some of these parties may benefit from a better understanding of reserves reporting, the relative risk of overstatements, the regulatory environment and enforcement procedures, and identifying questionable reserves data. After discussing the context and importance of reserves and write-downs, there is a detailed examination of the SEC, including the agency's reserves reporting requirements, and their enforcement methods. A number of alleged overstatement and write-down "case studies" are presented, with details on the specific Federal Laws alleged to have been violated by corporations or individuals and then cited by the SEC and shareholder lawsuits. We also conclude that there may be greater write-down potential due to the updated SEC reserves reporting guidelines. A comprehensive series of systematic questions have been compiled and quick-look graphical techniques have been developed that may be used to gain insight into -and potentially raise questions about- an operator's reserves data.

Despite the need for accurate oil and gas reserves estimates which honor disclosure requirements of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), a number of exploration and production companies have allegedly overstated and subsequently written down their reserves during the last 20 years. Reserves write-downs are of great interest to numerous groups involved in the reserves estimation process and outcome, including estimators, managers, investors, creditors, and regulators. Considering the magnitude and nature of some alleged overstatement cases, it appears that some of these parties may benefit from a better understanding of reserves reporting, the relative risk of overstatements, the regulatory environment and enforcement procedures, and identifying questionable reserves data. After discussing the context and importance of reserves and write-downs, there is a detailed examination of the SEC, including the agency's reserves reporting requirements, and their enforcement methods. A number of alleged overstatement and write-down "case studies" are presented, with details on the specific Federal Laws alleged to have been violated by corporations or individuals and then cited by the SEC and shareholder lawsuits. We also conclude that there may be greater write-down potential due to the updated SEC reserves reporting guidelines. A comprehensive series of systematic questions have been compiled and quick-look graphical techniques have been developed that may be used to gain insight into -and potentially raise questions about- an operator's reserves data.

This paper seeks to explain divergent policies toward oil and gas development across two jurisdictions, Alberta, Canada and Norway. Empirical evidence reveals that Norway collects a significantly higher portion of available economic rent from oil and gas activities than Alberta. Edwards (1987) postulates that if we assume governments have similar economic objectives (e.g. to receive the highest possible levels of revenue from the exploitation of a depleting natural resource), then it is to be expected that oil and gas policy outputs in various states would be similar. Why then did Norway develop a policy regime that allows it to capture comparatively higher levels of economic rent? The puzzle is even more interesting given the fact that Alberta and Norway are both advanced, industrialized, mature democracies that share many institutional characteristics. In response to this question, this paper presents a framework that links contemporary variations in rent collection performance to early government policies in Alberta and Norway. Several alternative explanations are tested as a means for understanding these divergent policies: resource differences approaches, bargaining power explanation, and political institutional differences. Finding each of these alternative explanations insufficient, it is argued that fundamental differences in political culture are important for understanding variations in early policies and ultimately in rent collection performance. The implications of this research are important both theoretically and empirically. For one, the analysis overcomes some of the traditional shortcomings of political culture analyses by delineating the specific dimensions of political culture that impacted policy outcomes. The analysis is pushed further by hypothesizing the intervening mechanism linking political culture to policy outcomes, namely motives. On the empirical side, there is a dearth in the political-economy literature dealing with why oil and gas fiscal policy outputs differ between developed states. This research seeks to fill this gap by focusing on how political culture can affect oil and gas policy.

This paper seeks to explain divergent policies toward oil and gas development across two jurisdictions, Alberta, Canada and Norway. Empirical evidence reveals that Norway collects a significantly higher portion of available economic rent from oil and gas activities than Alberta. Edwards (1987) postulates that if we assume governments have similar economic objectives (e.g. to receive the highest possible levels of revenue from the exploitation of a depleting natural resource), then it is to be expected that oil and gas policy outputs in various states would be similar. Why then did Norway develop a policy regime that allows it to capture comparatively higher levels of economic rent? The puzzle is even more interesting given the fact that Alberta and Norway are both advanced, industrialized, mature democracies that share many institutional characteristics. In response to this question, this paper presents a framework that links contemporary variations in rent collection performance to early government policies in Alberta and Norway. Several alternative explanations are tested as a means for understanding these divergent policies: resource differences approaches, bargaining power explanation, and political institutional differences. Finding each of these alternative explanations insufficient, it is argued that fundamental differences in political culture are important for understanding variations in early policies and ultimately in rent collection performance. The implications of this research are important both theoretically and empirically. For one, the analysis overcomes some of the traditional shortcomings of political culture analyses by delineating the specific dimensions of political culture that impacted policy outcomes. The analysis is pushed further by hypothesizing the intervening mechanism linking political culture to policy outcomes, namely motives. On the empirical side, there is a dearth in the political-economy literature dealing with why oil and gas fiscal policy outputs differ between developed states. This research seeks to fill this gap by focusing on how political culture can affect oil and gas policy.

This paper seeks to explain divergent policies toward oil and gas development across two jurisdictions, Alberta, Canada and Norway. Empirical evidence reveals that Norway collects a significantly higher portion of available economic rent from oil and gas activities than Alberta. Edwards (1987) postulates that if we assume governments have similar economic objectives (e.g. to receive the highest possible levels of revenue from the exploitation of a depleting natural resource), then it is to be expected that oil and gas policy outputs in various states would be similar. Why then did Norway develop a policy regime that allows it to capture comparatively higher levels of economic rent? The puzzle is even more interesting given the fact that Alberta and Norway are both advanced, industrialized, mature democracies that share many institutional characteristics. In response to this question, this paper presents a framework that links contemporary variations in rent collection performance to early government policies in Alberta and Norway. Several alternative explanations are tested as a means for understanding these divergent policies: resource differences approaches, bargaining power explanation, and political institutional differences. Finding each of these alternative explanations insufficient, it is argued that fundamental differences in political culture are important for understanding variations in early policies and ultimately in rent collection performance. The implications of this research are important both theoretically and empirically. For one, the analysis overcomes some of the traditional shortcomings of political culture analyses by delineating the specific dimensions of political culture that impacted policy outcomes. The analysis is pushed further by hypothesizing the intervening mechanism linking political culture to policy outcomes, namely motives. On the empirical side, there is a dearth in the political-economy literature dealing with why oil and gas fiscal policy outputs differ between developed states. This research seeks to fill this gap by focusing on how political culture can affect oil and gas policy. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

The Alaskan Arctic region is estimated to hold the largest undiscovered Arctic oil deposits---about 30 billion barrels. Realizing this immense potential, however, will not be easy, as firms face technical, political and regulatory barriers in their quest to explore and develop this frontier. To overcome these challenges, energy companies should adopt a comprehensive education and engagement strategy. This document formulates key elements of a strategy to help alleviate concerns of the stakeholders who have the power to thwart development. At a time of uncertainty over offshore oil and gas development in the U.S. Arctic, a combined education and engagement campaign promises to help interested parties protect and expand their license to operate in the region. / text

No description available.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 1984. / Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 205-210). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center.

Oil and gas auctions help transact billions of dollars in property sales in the US each year. Value is lost by participants with ineffective strategies. Federal lease auctions have been investigated from public data, but research in this narrow area peaked in the 1980s. Private property auctions did not emerge as a transaction force until nearly a decade later; however, today they dwarf federal lease sales in volume and value. This is the first study to publish research on private auctions and the first to consolidate historical lease research findings with private auction strategies. This dissertation reviews past research, interviews industry professionals, analyzes case histories, conducts game experiments, and synthesizes these views for strategic application. Findings from these efforts include the following: Reducing uncertainty increases bid values; Federal lease bid values tend to be log normal; Aggressive bidding results in a poor portfolio performance; Increasing competition increases bid values; Inexperience increases aggressive bidding; A significant group of companies do not follow consistent auction strategies; Top winning bid drivers are aggressive 3P reserves and commodity prices; Top value risks are commodity prices, capital, and operating expenses; Properties with upside value receive higher bids using sealed-bid auctions; Auction players can bid significantly less and sustain a high win probability; More money is left on the table in federal lease sales than private auctions; Poor data is primary reason auctions fail to complete the transaction; Profit taking is primary reason for selling properties though an auction; Market metrics are useful in valuation analysis; Producing properties receiver higher bids than undeveloped properties with same common knowledge including total proved reserves; Oral auctions receive higher bids than sealed-bid auctions with same common knowledge; Competition increases bid values in sealed-bid auctions; Reserve size does not increase relative value in sealed-bids with same common knowledge other than a magnitude of volume.

The crude oil is one of the major energy resources in our lifetime and plays its crucial role in our economy. How the stock prices of the oil industry will react to the foreseeable rising price that is important issue needed to be investigated. This research analyzes the relationship among oil price¡BSpread¡BDow Jones Index and five integrated oil and gas companies which are traded in NYSE. We found that the stock prices of all five companies were not related to Dow Jones Index and themselves according to the Granger-Causality test. We also found that the movement of Exxon¡¦s stock prices has significantly impact on the stock prices of the other four oil companies based on the results of the impulse function. In the long run, the five company¡¦s stock prices, oil price and Spread are jointly cointergrated, but not for only five companies considered. According to the VECM (Vector Error Correction Model), Spread could affect the changes in five oil company¡¦s stocks in short run, but not vice versus. It may explain that the investor would pay more attention on the future volatility of oil price into their investment strategies.