Since theories of corporate finance are recognised to be conditional, this study explores the impact of the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-2009 and institutional settings in determining corporate financial decisions. The recession on the supply of credit and demand for credit affects the corporate financial channels. The credit recession causes more agency costs, bankruptcy costs and information asymmetry, which adversely influence both borrowing and investments. Firms reduce debt financing, retain more cash and cut corporate payouts due to a sharp rise in uncertainty. Moreover, the role of institutional settings on corporate decisions differs following the GFC. Three empirical chapters contribute to the literature: First, Chapter 3 investigates the role of GFC on determinants and the adjustment speed of leverage and debt maturity and reveals that the effect of bankruptcy costs, agency costs and information asymmetry only increases on debt maturity, as opposed to leverage in the post-GFC. The adjustment speed of leverage and debt maturity drops after the GFC due to the low supply and demand for credit. Chapter 4 examines how cash holdings have been affected by the GFC across countries which have different agency problems and analyses how the rise of agency costs and information asymmetry can explain cash decisions before and after the GFC. Financially constrained firms have quicker cash holdings’ adjustment compared to unconstrained firms. However, while firms in low-governance countries have slower adjustment speed of cash than those in high-governance countries in pre-crisis, it has been found that it is vice versa in the post-crisis period. Finally, Chapter 5 analyses the effect of agency problems and the GFC on dividend payouts. Contrary to firms in high-governance countries, those in common-law countries are less likely to pay out dividends, as confirmed by the substitute and outcome models, sequentially after the GFC. Also, dividends are used as a signalling device by the GFC. Overall, the GFC and institutional settings impact corporate financial policies of firms to specify where and when their shareholders invest. / Ministry of National Education of the Republic of Turkey İlim Yayma Vakfı İstanbul İktisatçılar Derneği (İKDER)

<p dir="ltr">An inquiry into the additionality of the income tax credit program for solar purchasing in Ohio, where aggregation electric purchasing programs exist.</p><p dir="ltr">In the State of Ohio, a unique feature of the electric market regulatory landscape permits local governments to become energy suppliers to their residents and small businesses through programs known as community choice aggregation (CCA). Some of these programs guarantee 100% renewable electricity to all enrollees. Concurrently, the federal government offers an income tax credit (ITC) for the purchase of a solar array. When policy incentives are offered, it is important to ensure they impact their target audience to act in ways that would not be observed in the scenario without the tax incentive. This is known as “additionality.” In the context of carbon emissions reduction goals, individuals who claim the ITC while already having 100% renewable electricity would violate additionality. In other words, these renewable aggregation programs may crowd out the benefits of the ITC. This paper seeks to assess the additionality of the ITC in the context of Ohio’s CCA program. The actual additionality can depend on whether renewable energy is already being supplied to the site that constructs a solar array. Hence, we study the relationship between CCA and solar adoption probability to determine whether tax incentives are additional. Using non-parametric survival analysis, panel data methods, and post-estimation simulations, this paper seeks to discern if additionality is violated using the ITC in areas where a supply of renewable energy is already guaranteed. We find that aggregation programs increase the probability of solar adoption and that on average, in Ohio, roughly $0.44 of every dollar spent on the income tax credit is non-additional. This will help policymakers determine the efficacy of funds allocated to their respective programs.</p>