Panpsychist and panprotopsychist views have become more prominent during the past years, greatlydue to Philip Goff, Galen Strawson, David Chalmers, William Seager and others. Panpsychism isthe view that fundamental entitites have phenomenal properties while panprotopsychism is the viewthat fundamental entities have the potential to realise consciousness under certain conditions, invirtue of their protophenomenal properties. My focus will be, particularly, on constitutive versionsof panpsychism, which entail the commitment to the constitutive grounding of ordinary subjects ofexperience in more fundamental phenomenal entities. More specifically, I will evaluate whethersolutions to its ”combination problems”, which theorise the combination or decombination offundamental entities, can be solutions of the problem of experience. Constitutive panpsychismattempts to avoid the emergence of consciousness altogether by postulating fundamental subjects,so that ordinary subjects should be explained exhaustively in terms of them. Emergentistpanpsychism, by contrast, is a form of intelligible, or non-brute, emergentism which considersordinary subjects to be something more than mere structure. However, I will argue that evenconstitutivism involves a type of emergence, compositional or individualizing emergence, whichmakes it collapse into emergentism. That also takes away its ability to solve the problem ofexperience through a combination problem. Furthermore, the problem of other minds puts epistemiclimitations on our abilities to solve combination problems, which makes it improbable, even ifconstitutivism could avoid subject emergence, that it would be possible to reach an objectivesolution to the problem of ordinary subjects of experience through combination. Also physicalism isa form of emergentism but involves the commitment of the brute emergence of phenomenalproperties from non-mental fundamental entitites. I will show that it too gains an emergenceproblem as a consequence of a small conceptual shift that causes its collapse intopanprotopsychism. By recognising that there are common emergence problems, if not aboutphenomenal properties in general then about ordinary subjects, physicalists and pan(proto)psychistscan continue consciousness research as a collected force. I will also be presenting versions ofemergentist panpsychism to exemplify views that already expect emergence problems andformulate questions for future research.