This research explains the formation of territorial autonomy regimes, arrangements enabling ethnic groups to express their distinct identity. The origins of territorial autonomy arrangements is an important topic due to the great potential of such institutions to prevent ethnic strife or reduce ongoing conflict. While the literature has explored the consequences of autonomy regimes, its contribution to our understanding of the origins of territorial autonomy is limited. In answering why territorial autonomy regimes are adopted, I develop a theory that focuses on the bargaining strategies of ethnic groups. Specifically, I posit that nonviolent bargaining strategies adopted by ethnic groups influence national leaders’ decision-making processes. In this dissertation, I also address the question of why ethnic groups employ peaceful, as opposed to violent, tactics. Hypotheses derived from this theorization are tested using 197 ethnic groups in 95 states. In the empirical analysis I use data from 1945 to 2000 and employ the duration model and the modified Heckman selection model as my primary statistical methods. To trace the process of territorial autonomy formation I use a case study conducted in the Republic of Tatarstan in the Russian Federation. The results suggest that while groups with access to easily extractable resources choose to employ violent strategies, ethnic collectivities who use peaceful protest tactics are in fact more successful in obtaining territorial autonomy arrangements from central governments.