Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Breslau.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Marburg.

Würzburg, Rechts- u. staatswiss. Diss. v. 5. Juli 1913, Ref. Oetker. / Auch als: Strafrechtl. Abhandlungen. H. 168.

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Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Münster, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität München. / Lebenslauf. Bibliography: p. 65-68.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität München. / Lebenslauf. Includes bibliographical references (p. 65-68).

Delinquency and criminal penalties of youth The aim of my thesis is to focus on juvenile delinquency and analyze it as a whole especially from the perspective of the causes, evolution, structure and control of delinquency and subsequent penalties for young offenders. The thesis is comprised of five chapters, each divided into sections. Chapter one follows the Introduction and defines basic terms which occur throughout the thesis. Chapter two is divided into two sections specifying basic indexes of youth delinquency. The second section provides a statistical support for these with a description of youth delinquency evolution since the late 20th century until now. The third chapter focuses on the causes of delinquency of youth and is thematically divided into two sections. The first one deals with the internal factors of crime, as opposed to the second section, divided into three subsections in accordance with the external factors - namely family, school and leisure time. The fourth chapter deals with the control of youth crime, and is again divided into two sections. Whilst the first refers to the importance of preventive control, the second section focuses on its equally important counterpart, the repressive component. The fifth chapter is divided into three sections and summarizes the sanctions that are...

The thesis consists of three essays. In the first essay, the strategic effects of bonus/penalty compensation contracts are analysed. This essay consists of the first three chapters of the thesis. In Chapter 1, viewing each firm as a "principal-agent" pair, we examine firms' rivalry in bonus/penalty contracts in oligopolistic markets when the agents are risk-neutral. Under standard assumptions concerning production, demand, and cost functions, we show that bonus/penalty contracts may be used for strategic purposes. We find that whether agents' actions would (in equilibrium) be encouraged through bonuses or discouraged through penalties would critically depend on the existing strategic relationships between agents' actions or firms' products. We further show that firms' capita] stocks can affect their strategic positions in the bonus/penalty rivalry. The social welfare implication of the bonus/penalty rivalry is also examined. In Chapter 2, using a general framework of rivalrous agency with risk-averse agents, we identify two distinctive effects of bonus/penalty contracting, namely, the strategic effect and the incentive effect. We find that the two effects may or may not work in the same direction for a principal-agent pair, depending on the nature of strategic relationships between agents' actions. In Chapter 3, we compare the strategic effects of bonus/penalty contracts with that of linear contracts. We find that, if only one principal is active in designing agency compensation contracts, then he/she would be indifferent between a bonus/penalty contract and a linear contract. If both principals are active in designing agency contracts, however, the choice between bonus/penalty and linear contracts would in general matter to the principals. In particular, we show in an example that both principals would non-cooperatively choose a bonus contract over a linear contract. The second essay of the thesis, as in Chapter 4, presents an analysis of common sales agents based on their precommitment role when consumers are imperfectly informed about the products on the market. We show that an exclusive channel stucture can create a cost due to exclusive channels' inability to commit themselves to sales impartiality. We further show that independent non-cooperative firms may use common agents as a precommitment device to convince potential consumers that the risk of being misrepresented has been reduced or eliminated. We demonstrate that a market involving common sales agents can arise as an equilibrium outcome. Our analysis shows that common sales agents can be welfare improving for both firms and consumers. The third essay, as in Chapter 5, investigates the dynamic pattern of firm competitive conduct, using time-series and firm-specific data for a set of duopoly airline routes. We estimate the mean conduct parameters for each firm and each period, and infer whether the data are consistent with the Cournot, Bertrand, Friedman, or Green-Porter models. We find that airlines' competitive behavior may switch between the competitive and collusive regimes. Moreover, we find that airline profits in a collusive period appear less than the (single-period) monopoly profits, and the degree of overall market competitiveness is between the Cournot and monopoly solutions but closer to the Cournot solution. Our data suggest that major carriers might use quantity volumes, rather than prices, as their strategy variables. We also conduct some Bayesian analysis of seeing how our results would influence priors associated with different models. We illustrate a model choice criterion based on Bayesian analysis and use the criterion to choose the "best" model among competing models. / Business, Sauder School of / Graduate

El proyecto se basa en la mejora de los procesos de empresa Industrias John’s, dedicada al soplado, etiquetado y embalado de botellas de Pereftalato de Polietileno, dentro de la Planta de Perú Cola en Ucayali. El problema de la empresa es el número elevado de mermas de la empresa, que traducido en términos monetarios representa un importante porcentaje de pérdidas respecto a los ingresos anuales. Como primer paso se realizará el análisis de los procesos para identificar las principales causas de este problema. Además, se realizarán propuestas que ayudarán a la mejora de los procesos, las que se basan en conceptos de las técnicas de la ingeniería industrial que servirán para atacar y hacer frente el problema central. Las propuestas planteadas y desarrolladas serán evaluadas a fin de determinar los diferentes impactos dentro de la organización. Estas propuestas tienen el fin de reducir las mermas en los dos procesos anteriores. Se trabajan los siguientes puntos: Económico: De acuerdo con la medida que se opte se pueda disminuir el impacto económico que tienen las mermas relacionadas a los ingresos. Estratégico: Se desarrollará una alternativa de solución que le permita a la empresa poder competir con las principales empresas dentro del rubro y pueda estar a la par con la competencia. Además de ello, crear modelos de Mejora Continua. Por último, se optará por la mejor alternativa que aseguren el avance de la empresa, el desarrollo de sus ventajas competitivas a fin de mejorar la situación actual de la empresa, empleando menos recursos y por supuesto con mayores ganancias. / The project is based on the improvement of Industrias John's company processes, dedicated to the blowing, labeling and packaging of polyethylene perethalate bottles, within the Peru Cola Plant in Ucayali. The problem of the company is the high number of losses of the company, which translated into monetary terms represents a significant percentage of losses with respect to annual revenues. The first step will be the analysis of the processes to identify the main causes of this problem. In addition, proposals will be made that will help to improve processes, which are based on concepts of industrial engineering techniques that will serve to attack and address the central problem. The proposals proposed and developed will be evaluated in order to determine the different impacts within the organization. These proposals are aimed at reducing the merchandise in the two previous processes. The following points are worked: Economic: According to the measure chosen, the economic impact of the losses related to income can be reduced. Strategic: A solution alternative will be developed that allows the company to compete with the main companies within the field and can be on par with the competition. In addition to this, create models of Continuous Improvement. Finally, we will choose the best alternative to ensure the progress of the company, the development of its competitive advantages in order to improve the current situation of the company, using fewer resources and of course with higher profits. / Tesis