The person has in theory been at the center of the law since Gaius divided the private law into persons, things, and actions. In constructing the person, however, the law takes apart and sets aside the human being, replacing it with a legal abstraction that diverges markedly from it. This gap is partly due to the way the law has been structured conceptually, as a set of bounded categories clearly distinguished from each other. Viewing the person as the result of a series of either/or classificatory decisions privileges the liberal model of the person: a partimonialized, transactionalized bearer of rights. If instead we reconceptualize the persons-things-actions structure of the private law to emphasize the dynamic interactions between the categories, we can bring back into the concept of the person some aspects of the human being---such as personal relationships---that have traditionally been outside legal analysis.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität zu Rostock. / Cover title. Includes bibliographical references ([vii]-viii).

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität zu Rostock. / Cover title. Includes bibliographical references ([vii]-viii).

No description available.

Thèse--Université de Montpellier. / "Notice bibliographique": p. 403-407.

No description available.

Tesis--Universidad javeriana, Bogotá. / "Bibliografía": p. [63].

Thesis (doctoral)--Rijksuniversiteit te Leiden, 1905.

Thesis (doctoral)--Rijksuniversiteit te Leiden, 1916.

Thesis (doctoral)--Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt a.M., 1936. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [5-7]).