This thesis engages in a semioethic analysis of the English text of international human rights treaties to assess whether the provisions as formulated clearly identify the girl child and take into account her unique condition. Its hypothesis is that the terminology employed to define the girl child and phrase her rights is insufficient to ensure her protection. The thesis firstly explores the unique status of the girl child as a female and a child, and the obstacles she faces in exercising her rights as a result of sexism, childism, and interactive intersectional discrimination. It also presents the semiotics theory, the Meaning Triad developed by Victoria Lady Welby, which allows for an analysis of the sense, meaning and significance of terminology, and the semioethic approach, which studies the import of signs for the purpose of improving the human condition. The thesis explains how intersectionality theory and semioethics shall be applied as methodologies to examine the content of international treaties as concerns the girl child. Secondly, the thesis explores the status of the girl child under international law. It examines the gradual recognition of the girl child in the international legal apparatus and the definition of the girl child in international law and the English language. Thirdly, the thesis analyses the right to life of the girl child as a case study to investigate whether its formulation under international law sufficiently tackles three key violations experienced by girl children: prenatal sex selection, female infanticide, and feminicide of adolescent girls. The thesis focuses on the two main treaties pertaining to the girl child, the CRC and the CEDAW, and a central treaty protecting the right to life, the ICCPR. At the end of each chapter, recommendations are provided, where applicable, to modify the wording of relevant provisions in order to strengthen the protection of the girl child.

Thesis (LLM)-- Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The purpose of this study was to determine whether an individual can and/or should be allowed to consent to objectifying treatment. This necessitated the determination of the meaning of dignity, the meaning of freedom and the relationship between dignity and freedom. It was found that both the right not to be objectified and the right to consent to objectification could be found within human dignity. This is due to the broad definition of dignity in terms of which dignity has two, sometimes contradicting, components. One component safeguards autonomy and the right to choose, which supports consent to objectification, whereas the other promotes individual self-worth by prohibiting objectifying treatment. By investigating the meaning of freedom it was found that freedom as a constitutional value, and possibly also a free-standing constitutional right, could incorporate the right to consent to objectifying treatment. Three possible solutions to this tension between human dignity and freedom were identified and critically analysed. The first was that an individual cannot and should not be allowed to consent to objectification. This solution is primarily based on the notion that dignity is supreme to freedom and that freedom should yield to communitarian dignity. Furthermore, it is contended that consent to objectification is often invalid due to economic coercion and undue influence. The second possible solution was that, although an individual might not be able to validly consent to objectifying treatment, such consent should still be allowed under certain circumstances. The example of invalid consent due to economic coercion introduced in the previous solution was examined in relation to prostitution. The contention regarding this approach is that, since our government is unable to fulfil the socio-economic needs of those who consent due to economic coercion, such consent should be allowed and strictly regulated. The third possible approach was that circumstances do exist in which individuals can give valid consent to objectification and that in these circumstances they should be allowed to do so. In this solution the grounds of the first approach is criticised by contending, for example, that dignity is not supreme to freedom, that a plural society should allow these type of choices and that consent to objectification is already allowed in some instances. The results of this study were that, although there are situations in which genuine consent is not possible, it can be given under certain circumstances. An individual who cannot give genuine consent to objectification should not be allowed to do so, unless transitional measures dictate otherwise. However, an individual who is capable of giving valid consent to objectification should be allowed to do so. Finally, regardless of whether such consent is genuine or not, strict regulation thereof is required. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die doel van hierdie studie was om vas te stel of 'n individu kan toestem en/of toegelaat behoort te word om toe te stem tot objektiverende behandeling. Dit genoodsaak dat die betekenis van menswaardigheid en vryheid, asook verhouding tussen hierdie twee begrippe vasgestel word. Daar is bevind dat beide die reg om nie te geobjektifeer te word nie en die reg om toe te stem tot objektivering gevind kan word binne die begrip van menswaardigheid. Hierdie is te danke aan die breë definisie van menswaardigheid in terme waarvan menswaardigheid uit twee, soms weersprekende, komponente bestaan. Een komponent beskerm outonomie en die reg om te kies, wat toestemming tot objektivering ondersteun, terwyl die ander komponent individuele waarde bevorder deurdat dit objektiverende behandeling verbied. Tydens die ondersoek aangaande die betekenis van vryheid is bevind dat vryheid as 'n grondwetlike waarde, en moontlik ook 'n vrystaande grondwetlike reg, die reg om toe te stem tot objektiverende behandeling kan inkorporeer. Drie moontlike oplossings vir hierdie spanning tussen menswaardigheid en vryheid is geïdentifiseer en krities ontleed. Die eerste is dat 'n individu nie kan toestem en ook nie toegelaat behoort te word om toe te stem tot objektivering nie. Hierdie oplossing is hoofsaaklik gebaseer op die veronderstelling dat vryheid onderworpe is aan menswaardigheid en dat individuele vryheid moet toegee tot die menswaardigheid van die gemeenskap. Verder word dit beweer dat toestemming tot objektivering dikwels ongeldig is as gevolg van die ekonomiese dwang en onbehoorlike beïnvloeding. Die tweede moontlike oplossing was dat, alhoewel 'n individu nie noodwendig instaat is om geldige toestemming tot objektiverende behandeling te verskaf nie, sodanige toestemming onder sekere omstandighede steeds toegelaat behoort te word. Die voorbeeld van ongeldig toestemming as gevolg van ekonomiese dwang wat in die vorige oplossing bekendgestel is, is ondersoek aan die hand van prostitusie. Die bewering ingevolge hierdie benadering is dat, aangesien ons regering is nie in staat is om die sosio-ekonomiese behoeftes van diegene wat toestem tot objektivering as gevolg van ekonomiese dwang te vervul nie, sodanige toestemming toegelaat en streng gereguleer behoort te word. Die derde moontlike benadering is dat daar wel omstandighede bestaan waar individue geldige toestemming kan gee tot objektivering en dat hulle in hierdie omstandighede toegelaat behoort te word om dit te gee. In terme van hierdie oplossing word die gronde waarop die eerste benadering gebaseer is gekritiseer, deur byvoorbeeld te argumenteer dat menswaardigheid nie verhewe is bo vryheid nie, dat in ons huidige diverse samelewing sulke soort keuses aanvaar behoort te word en dat toestemming tot objektivering reeds in sommige geval toegelaat word. Die resultate van hierdie studie was dat, alhoewel daar omstandighede bestaan waaronder geldige toestemming nie moontlik is nie, dit wel onder sekere omstandighede gegee kan word. 'n Individu wat nie daartoe instaat is om geldige toestemming tot objektivering te gee nie, behoort nie toegelaat word om dit te doen nie, tensy oorgangsmaatreëls anders bepaal. Waar 'n individu egter in staat is om geldige toestemming tot die objektivering te gee, behoort dit toegelaat word. Ten slotte is streng regulering van toestemming tot objektiverende behandeling nodig ongeag of sodanige toestemming geldig is of nie.

Understanding human dignity is integral to protecting human rights. An examination of Canada‘s Supreme Court decisions and Canadian public policy debates reveals that human dignity is being defined synonymously with individual autonomy and equality. This narrow understanding has serious implications for people who are not able to assert their autonomy. To understand the philosophical ideas behind these decisions, this thesis examines classical, modern, and postmodern accounts of human dignity and concludes that they fall short in providing an objective grounding for dignity that is truly human. It then looks to the Judeo- Christian account of human dignity to provide a transcendent foundation for human dignity. With this account, persons are rational and physical, relational, inviolable, and teleological – a hopeful contrast to the prevailing contemporary accounts. This thesis then defends the place of this religious perspective in our secular country. / vi, 182 leaves : ill. ; 29 cm.

This thesis explores the use of domicilium as a criterion in choice of law and jurisdiction in South African law with special reference to private-law status. In this area of the law adherence to the status theory has, in the recent past, resulted in the use of domicile as an exclusive ratio jurisdictionis. This has impacted negatively on choice of law issues in status matters: since domicile constituted the sole jurisdictional criterion, little attention was devoted to choice of law. Even though the lex domicilii was, in actual fact, applied to choice of law issues concerning private-law status, it happened only as a result of the assumption of jurisdiction by the forum domicilii. With the emergence of alternative jurisdictional criteria, such as ordinary residence, choice of law issues will have to be addressed from a conflict of laws perspective, since the jurisdictional criteria will no longer ensure the application of the appropriate lex causae. In this regard recognition of the functional diversification of jurisdictional and conflicts connecting factors is crucial: different principles and policies underlie the fields of jurisdiction and choice of law and this must be borne in mind when a connecting factor is selected. In view of the prominence of domicilium as a connecting factor, problem areas in regard to the interpretation and ascertainment of domicile, especially the domicile of choice, is investigated within the context of the Domicile Act 3 of 1992 and with a view to future reform. It is submitted that the subjective animus requirement for the acquisition of a domicile of choice remains uncertain and undefined. Since domicile constitutes such an important connecting factor in issues pertaining to private-law status, as well as other non-status matters, it is essential that it should be readily and easily ascertainable. In this regard certain concrete proposals for future reform are advanced. Ultimately the domicile of an individual should indicate the community to which he/she truly belongs: only then will domicile constitute a conflicts connecting factor which satisfies the demands of conflicts justice. / Private Law / LL. D. (Law)

<p>This thesis examined to what extent the current legislation protects the HIV positive employee against unfair discrimination and dismissal. The study gave short medical background to HIV/AIDS and introduced HIV discrimination by giving the historical background to HIV related discrimination. From this, the extent of stigmatization against this group was introduced.</p>

The dramatic improvement of neonatal intensive care has produced vexing ethical and legal questions. One of the most striking issues is to determine whether the most defective neonates should be provided with intensive care and to what extent they should be treated. This thesis demonstrates that an attempt to answer this question and an analysis of the demands and limitations of a duty to treat defective neonates cannot properly occur without first considering the legal concerns and ethical issues surrounding the notion of "person". The author examines germane ethical theories and North-American jurisprudence to see what approaches and standards commentators and courts have adopted in this respect. This thesis demonstrates that in the context of the cessation or non-initiation of intensive care, the legal and moral status of very defective neonates remain ambiguous. In particular, the author suggests that a legal best interests analysis that includes quality of life considerations may actually involve the use of criteria similar to those supported by the authors of the controversial moral theories that negate the personhood of seriously handicapped newborns. The author ultimately concludes that a clear divide between the legal definition of the "person" and the moral and social perceptions of that term is misleading.

<p>This thesis examined to what extent the current legislation protects the HIV positive employee against unfair discrimination and dismissal. The study gave short medical background to HIV/AIDS and introduced HIV discrimination by giving the historical background to HIV related discrimination. From this, the extent of stigmatization against this group was introduced.</p>

This thesis explores the use of domicilium as a criterion in choice of law and jurisdiction in South African law with special reference to private-law status. In this area of the law adherence to the status theory has, in the recent past, resulted in the use of domicile as an exclusive ratio jurisdictionis. This has impacted negatively on choice of law issues in status matters: since domicile constituted the sole jurisdictional criterion, little attention was devoted to choice of law. Even though the lex domicilii was, in actual fact, applied to choice of law issues concerning private-law status, it happened only as a result of the assumption of jurisdiction by the forum domicilii. With the emergence of alternative jurisdictional criteria, such as ordinary residence, choice of law issues will have to be addressed from a conflict of laws perspective, since the jurisdictional criteria will no longer ensure the application of the appropriate lex causae. In this regard recognition of the functional diversification of jurisdictional and conflicts connecting factors is crucial: different principles and policies underlie the fields of jurisdiction and choice of law and this must be borne in mind when a connecting factor is selected. In view of the prominence of domicilium as a connecting factor, problem areas in regard to the interpretation and ascertainment of domicile, especially the domicile of choice, is investigated within the context of the Domicile Act 3 of 1992 and with a view to future reform. It is submitted that the subjective animus requirement for the acquisition of a domicile of choice remains uncertain and undefined. Since domicile constitutes such an important connecting factor in issues pertaining to private-law status, as well as other non-status matters, it is essential that it should be readily and easily ascertainable. In this regard certain concrete proposals for future reform are advanced. Ultimately the domicile of an individual should indicate the community to which he/she truly belongs: only then will domicile constitute a conflicts connecting factor which satisfies the demands of conflicts justice. / Private Law / LL. D. (Law)

No description available.

The legal historical development of fairness in the South African common law of contract is investigated in the context of the political, social and economic developments of the last four centuries. It emerges that the common law of contract is still dominated by the ideologies of individualism and economic liberalism which were imported from English law during the nineteenth century. Together with the theories of legal positivism and formalism which are closely related to parliamentary sovereignty and the classical rule of law, these ideals were transposed into the common law of contract through the classical model of contract law which emphasises freedom and sanctity of contract and promotes legal certainty. This approach resulted in the negation of the court’s equitable discretion and the limitation of good faith which sustain the social and economic inequalities that were created under colonialism and exacerbated under apartheid rule. In stark contrast, the modern human rights culture grounded in human dignity and aimed at the promotion of substantive equality led to the introduction of modern contract theory in other parts of the world. The introduction of the Constitution as grounded in human dignity and aimed at the achievement of substantive equality has resulted in a sophisticated jurisprudence on human dignity that reflects a harmonisation between its Western conception as based on Kantian dignity and ubuntu which provides an African understanding thereof. In this respect, ubuntu plays an important role in infusing the common law of contract with African values and in promoting substantive equality between contracting parties in line with modern contract theory. It is submitted that this approach to human dignity should result in the development of good faith into a substantive rule of the common law of contract which can be used to set aside an unfair contract term or the unfair enforcement thereof. / Private Law / LL. D.