Tout entier empreint de la question de la relation entre volontarisme et justice contractuelle, le droit des contrats a forgé son édifice sur le principe d’équilibre. La tentative de conciliation trouve ses limites : les notions d’économie du contrat ou de contrats relationnels ont fait leur apparition. Certaines notions prennent plus d’importance telles les obligations essentielles, la protection de la partie faible ou encore la bonne foi. Pour intéressantes qu’elles soient, en ce qu’elles proposent une conception plus poussée de l’équilibre, ces approches sont-elles satisfaisantes ? L’analyse des mutations jurisprudentielles et législatives conduit sans cesse à remettre l’ouvrage sur le métier. Ces évolutions ne seraient-elles que de surface ? Ne traduisent-elles pas la nécessité de revisiter plus profondément le droit des obligations ? La question est posée : qu’est-ce qu’un contrat ? Pragmatiquement et sans dogmatisme, il s’agit d’une relation donnant-donnant. Sous cet angle, la relation contractuelle appelle l’équivalence et non l’équilibre. Ainsi, l’équilibre ne serait que l’abstraction de l’équivalence, conçue comme une donnée concrète. L’objet de l’étude consiste à interroger la place de l’équivalence dans le droit des contrats. Plus, il s’agit de savoir comment de postulée, elle peut se transfigurer en notion opérationnelle. / As far as the question of the relationship between voluntarism and contractual justice is concerned, contract law has built its structure on the principle of balance. Attempts at conciliation has its limits: the notions of economy of contracts and relational contracts have appeared. Some notions take on more importance such as essential obligations, protection of the weaker party or even good faith. However interesting they are, in that they propose a more in depth notion of balance, are these approaches satisfactory ? The analysis of jurisprudential and legislative changes constantly leads to re-workings being done. Are these developments only superficial? Do they not convey the need to re-examine in more detail the law of obligations? The question is asked: what is a contract? Pragmatically and without dogmatism, it is a two-way relationship. From this perspective, the contractual relationship calls for equivalence and not balance. In this way, balance would only be an abstract of equivalence, conceived as a concrete fact. The object of this study is to ask the place of equivalence in contract law. Furthermore, it is to know how it can be transformed from the hypothetical to an operational notion.

Instrument d'échange économique par excellence, le contrat n'est pas, de prime abord, le terrain le plus propice à la satisfaction d'un idéal religieux. Il n'est pas rare, cependant, qu'un contractant se prévale de ses convictions et pratiques religieuses aux fins d'y adapter le contenu ou les conditions d'exécution d'une prestation. La tentation est grande de s'y montrer indifférent. D'un côté est invoquée, pour y parer, l'autonomie de la volonté. De l'autre, il est même suggéré de transposer le principe de laïcité aux relations privées pour obliger les contractants à faire preuve de neutralité. Or, ces dernières sont gouvernées par la liberté de religion. Ainsi, la contractualisation des convictions et pratiques religieuses doit être fortement encouragée. En outre, dans le silence du contrat, le juge peut imposer certaines obligations positives aux contractants, au nom de la liberté de religion et du droit à la non discrimination, au terme d'un processus de conciliation. / Prima facie, as the most representative economic instrument, contract is not favourable to the satisfaction of religious interests. Nevertheless, contractors frequently invoke their religious beliefs and practices in order to adapt either the content or the conditions of implementation of their duties. Indifference is sometimes considered as a tempting reaction to those claims. One the one hand, it is referred to contractual autonomy. On the other hand, it is suggested to extend secularism to private relations, for the purpose of compelling contracting parties to remain neutral. However, these ones are ruled by freedom of religion. As a consequence, individuals should be incited to include their religious convictions and practices to their contracts. Morerover, judges should be allowed to impose positive obligations, on behalf of both religious freedom and the right to non-discrimination, after a conciliation process.

The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the application of the common law rule prohibiting unilateral price determination in contracts of sale governed by the Consumer Protection Act. The unilateral determination of price has been a controversial issue for an extended period of time. This controversy is traced back to Roman law where different translations and interpretations are given to the texts dealing with the unilateral determination of price in a contract of sale. The majority of the Roman-Dutch writers preferred the view that regarded a contract granting a discretion to one of the parties to determine the price as void. Subsequently, this view was incorporated into South African law. During the 1990s the Supreme Court of Appeal questioned whether the rule should still form part of South African law. An overview of the case law indicates that the courts have been prepared to allow contractual price discretions provided such discretions refer to an objective external standard or reasonableness. There are also indications that the courts would imply that the discretion should be exercised reasonably, except in the case of clearly unfettered discretions. Recently, the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 ("the CPA") has made substantial amendments to the law of sale in respect of contracts governed by the CPA. The dissertation investigates the influence of the CPA on the rule governing unilateral price determinations in such sales. It also investigates the consumer's fundamental rights to disclosure of information and fair, just and reasonable terms and conditions. Legal uncertainties and issues arising from the provisions of the CPA are identified. Finally, a comparative study with English law is undertaken which provides a comparative basis from which possible solutions are extracted and proposals made to address the uncertainties and issues emanating from the CPA. Copyright / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Mercantile Law / unrestricted

The legal historical development of fairness in the South African common law of contract is investigated in the context of the political, social and economic developments of the last four centuries. It emerges that the common law of contract is still dominated by the ideologies of individualism and economic liberalism which were imported from English law during the nineteenth century. Together with the theories of legal positivism and formalism which are closely related to parliamentary sovereignty and the classical rule of law, these ideals were transposed into the common law of contract through the classical model of contract law which emphasises freedom and sanctity of contract and promotes legal certainty. This approach resulted in the negation of the court’s equitable discretion and the limitation of good faith which sustain the social and economic inequalities that were created under colonialism and exacerbated under apartheid rule. In stark contrast, the modern human rights culture grounded in human dignity and aimed at the promotion of substantive equality led to the introduction of modern contract theory in other parts of the world. The introduction of the Constitution as grounded in human dignity and aimed at the achievement of substantive equality has resulted in a sophisticated jurisprudence on human dignity that reflects a harmonisation between its Western conception as based on Kantian dignity and ubuntu which provides an African understanding thereof. In this respect, ubuntu plays an important role in infusing the common law of contract with African values and in promoting substantive equality between contracting parties in line with modern contract theory. It is submitted that this approach to human dignity should result in the development of good faith into a substantive rule of the common law of contract which can be used to set aside an unfair contract term or the unfair enforcement thereof. / Private Law / LL. D.

The legal historical development of fairness in the South African common law of contract is investigated in the context of the political, social and economic developments of the last four centuries. It emerges that the common law of contract is still dominated by the ideologies of individualism and economic liberalism which were imported from English law during the nineteenth century. Together with the theories of legal positivism and formalism which are closely related to parliamentary sovereignty and the classical rule of law, these ideals were transposed into the common law of contract through the classical model of contract law which emphasises freedom and sanctity of contract and promotes legal certainty. This approach resulted in the negation of the court’s equitable discretion and the limitation of good faith which sustain the social and economic inequalities that were created under colonialism and exacerbated under apartheid rule. In stark contrast, the modern human rights culture grounded in human dignity and aimed at the promotion of substantive equality led to the introduction of modern contract theory in other parts of the world. The introduction of the Constitution as grounded in human dignity and aimed at the achievement of substantive equality has resulted in a sophisticated jurisprudence on human dignity that reflects a harmonisation between its Western conception as based on Kantian dignity and ubuntu which provides an African understanding thereof. In this respect, ubuntu plays an important role in infusing the common law of contract with African values and in promoting substantive equality between contracting parties in line with modern contract theory. It is submitted that this approach to human dignity should result in the development of good faith into a substantive rule of the common law of contract which can be used to set aside an unfair contract term or the unfair enforcement thereof. / Private Law / LL. D.

Le professionnel que l'on croyait capable de défendre ses intérêts, par opposition au salarié ou au consommateur, s'est révélé tout autant victime de contrats déséquilibrés depuis quelques décennies. L'apparition de puissantes entreprises privées dans différents secteurs entraîne, de toute évidence, une inégalité entre les professionnels. Notre étude souligne la complexité de trouver un juste critère pour identifier de manière juste ce qu'est un professionnel partie faible. Il n'est pas possible de dire si, de manière générale, telle entreprise est plus puissante qu'une autre, car la personne morale partie au contrat peut cacher des intérêts difficiles à cerner au premier abord. Le juge ne peut pas non plus être l'arbitre autoritaire des prix sans risquer un détournement de sa fonction. Nous développerons le parti suivant : un contrat entre professionnels est dit d'adhésion lorsque celui-ci n'a pas donné lieu à une négociation idoine ; le juge doit alors s'efforcer de regarder le processus de pourparlers ainsi que les circonstances qui ont précédé la convention. De multiples critères peuvent aider le juge, tels que la taille de chaque entreprise, les parts de marché, les propos échangés par les parties, leur bonne ou mauvaise foi ou encore les efforts engagés par elles. Si le choix de l'analyse des négociations nous apparaît ultimement le plus juste, nous tiendrons cependant compte de ses limites. Il serait illusoire de penser que le juge peut toujours parvenir de manière certaine à connaître l'intégralité des circonstances antérieures au contrat. C'est pourquoi nous ajouterons à l'analyse des négociations un système de présomptions - quoique réfragables - lorsque la disproportion des prestations ou la différence de taille des entreprises ne laisse pas de place au doute. Nous mettrons enfin en lumière les stratégies employées par les parties fortes pour contourner cette analyse des négociations, comme des stipulations néfastes ou une tactique d'internationalisation. Il sera donc préféré une impérativité renforcée en droit national ainsi qu'en droit international. Une fois l'analyse des négociations effectuée, nous essayerons de proposer des sanctions à la hauteur du phénomène. Le juge, selon nous, doit être en mesure de modifier le contrat de façon souple, aussi bien de manière rétroactive que par un changement en cours d'exécution du contrat. Le caractère extrême de certains comportements contractuels nous incite à réfléchir à la possibilité d'un droit pénal plus dissuasif ou bien un droit « quasi pénal » sanctionnant ces comportements de manière plus appropriée. Néanmoins, c'est surtout au niveau de la procédure que se joue la protection contractuelle des professionnels. Un référé ajusté à cet objectif a tout lieu de répondre aux exigences de célérité qui gênent les parties faibles dans leurs démarches. Nous soulignerons aussi l'importance d'un système d'actions collectives qui surmontent efficacement l'écueil du coût du procès. À l'inverse, la sécurité juridique des entreprises nous conduira à proposer une procédure de protection par un système de droit doux. Première partie : L'identification du contrat d'adhésion entre professionnels. Deuxième partie : Le traitement judiciaire des contrats d'adhésion entre professionnels. / The professional, supposed to be able to defend his interests, by opposition to the employee or the consumer, has proven to also be victim of imbalanced contracts for a few decades. The emergence of powerful private companies in various sectors clearly leads to inequalities between professionals. Our study underlines the difficulty to find the best criterion to identify what a professional weaker party is. It is impossible to say that globally such company is stronger than another because the legal person party to the agreement can hide many interests, which are hard to seize at first sight. Nor can the judge arbitrate prices in an authoritarian way without risking a misappropriation of his part. We shall side for this idea: a business-to-business agreement is to be qualified of adhesion contract as long as it does not give place to adequate bargaining; so the judge has to look the bargaining process and the circumstances preceding the contract. Many criteria can help the judge such as the size of the company, market parts, exchanged words, the good or bad faith of the parties or the efforts they have made. If we consider the bargain analysis as the ultimately rightest choice, we have to contemplate its limitations. It would not be realistic to consider that the judge could always discover every circumstance prior to the agreement. This is why we shall join a system of presumptions - albeit rebuttable - to the bargain analysis, when the difference of size of companies or the disproportion of provisions is obvious. We shall put into light the strategies used by strongest parts to bypass the bargain analysis, such as harmful clauses or internationalization tactics. Thus, we shall opt for high obligatory standards, as well as in national law than in international law. Once the bargain analysis is done, we shall try to suggest sanctions adapted to the concern. The judge, in our opinion, must be able to modify the agreement in a very flexible way, either retroactively or during the implementation of the said agreement. The gravity of various contractual behaviors must lead us to think about a form of criminal law or a "quasi criminal" law in order to combat those behaviors in a more suitable mean. Nevertheless, the protection of the professional weaker part is also to be dealt on a procedural ground. A proceeding for interim measures is likely to face the needs for celerity, which bother the weakest parts for their action. We shall also underline the advantages of a class action, which could overcome the financial issue of the lawsuit. Conversely, the legal security of business will bring us to foster a protection by a soft law system. First Part: The identification of the business-to-business adhesion contract. Second Part: The judicial treatment of business-to-business adhesion contracts.