Whole document restricted at the request of the author. / Christian religion and art enjoy a persistent relationship. Trying to account for this, I investigate the possibility that an aesthetic experience might facilitate a religious experience. I look at different kinds of experiences which typically are called "religious", and review some theories of religious experience. Even though my concern is not to use religious experience as a justification for religious belief, I settle, temporarily, for William Alston's account, which characterises religious experience as mystical perceptual experience. Alston's theory, however, underemphasises the role played in religious perceptual experiences by the experiencer's background beliefs. Arguing that background beliefs always play a part in how religious presentations are interpreted, I develop a theory called Alston-B. Within the structure of Alston-B, which identifies two highly integrated phases of perception (presentation and interpretation), I explore how artworks might play a part in these activities. The most persuasive theories, however, point away from understanding aesthetic experiences as a matter of observation. They point, rather, towards understanding them as imaginative personal encounters, or whole-person explorations of "worlds". While the force of this paradigm shift is felt, I examine three central background beliefs from the Protestant theological tradition. Alston-B, with its proper understanding of the importance of background beliefs in religious experience, requires that particular beliefs be admitted into enquiries about the nature of particular religious experiences. My examination of the background beliefs turns up material that suggests, in a way paralleled in my exploration of art theories, that the religious encounter is not so much a perceptual event as much as it is a perichoretic exchange. My investigation, then moves its focus from how a perceptual experience of art might serve a perceptual experience of God, to how a perichoretic encounter with art might serve a perichoretic experience of God. Drawing on Nicholas Wolterstorff's concepts of action, artwork-world, and projection, I argue that an encounter with an artwork can act as a rehearsal for the experience of God, since a "good" artwork provides its audience with a high degree of structural similarity (with regard to personal interaction) to the human encounter with the divine.

One of the traditional aims of the philosophy of science has been to formulate a methodology of science—that is, a normative theory of scientific method. The rules and standards of such a theory are intended to capture the central features of scientific rationality and to explain the sense in which scientific knowledge progressively grows. Although no particular methodology of science has won universal endorsement, it is generally agreed among philosophers that the broad aim of constructing one is both reasonable and worth pursuing in order to understand the nature of scientific growth. But this aim has also been attacked as fundamentally misconceived by some critics who maintain that no theory of method can do justice to actual science. The objections to the philosophical program of framing a methodology of science come mainly from three quarters. Firstly, there is Paul Feyerabend, according to whom the historical development of science reveals that no set of general normative rules and standards can be given for science. Most of the rules and standards hitherto proposed, he contends, have been violated by scientists and, moreover, were necessarily violated, owing to the incommensurability of revolutionary scientific theories. Secondly, there is Michael Polanyi, who claims that scientific rationality cannot be codified in the explicit rules and standards of any theory of method because much of scientific knowledge and practice is 'tacit' and reflects the personal, unspecifiable contributions of individual scientists. And thirdly, sociologists of scientific knowledge (in particular, those of the Strong Programme) assert that the nature and content of science should be explained in sociological terms rather than by reference to a methodology of science. However, it is argued here that the objections made by Feyerabend, Polanyi and the sociologists to the possibility of a theory of method do not stand up to critical examination. A large part of the anti-methodologists' case is based not only on an overly narrow view of the nature of a theory of method, but also on the mistaken belief that the traditional philosophical and epistemological approach to the investigation of scientific rationality should be replaced by a largely descriptive analysis of scientific practice. This belief is criticised on the grounds that a normative methodology must not be supposed to explain scientific practice, nor can views on the nature of scientific rationality be derived from descriptions of scientific practice. Finally, it is suggested that the positions of Feyerabend, Polanyi, and the Strong Programme have deep affinities with the 'practice-oriented' philosophy of the later Wittgenstein. This may, perhaps, explain why they abandon realist construals of scientific theories, of scientific standards, and of the notion of truth. Like Wittgenstein, they adopt a form of antirealism and conventionalism which leads, ultimately, to a relativist interpretation of scientific standards and knowledge. Coupled with the anti-methodologists' failure to defeat the possibility of a theory of method, this relativism demonstrates the poverty of an attack on method constructed on wittgensteinian lines.

This thesis is about the similarities of process between aesthetic experience and ethical judgement. I claim that in both cases the activity is best described as a type of play in which elements interact in mutual adjustment and transformation. This conception of play has its roots in Kant's aesthetic theory. Describing aesthetic experience as play results in emphasis on three central characteristics. These characteristics become the basis of constraints on judgement. In the case of ethical judgement these are important because they save from subjectivism a moral theory, particularism, which relies on individual judgement rather than moral rules. Seeing the activity of judgement as play suggests a conception of the outcome of judgement as picturing. This conception helps to make sense of reason-giving within the particularist model. A further analogy with the grounds of aesthetic qualities is used to illuminate the problem of justifying the values put into play. These values are ultimately defended in terms of their relationship to human flourishing. Perennial problems for theories based on human flourishing are avoided by my account because prescriptions for action are not derived from the characterisation of flourishing but from the process of individual judgement which values based on flourishing merely inform. One positive effect of adopting my model of judgement as play is the reduction of problems concerning the motivation to act on ethical judgements.

Throughout the 20th Century, a number of philosophers, writers, artists and film makers have implied that there is some profound significance to the work of Donatien Alphonse François, the Marquis de Sade (1740-1814). The project at hand is to evaluate the claim that Sade, in some sense, is a philosopher, and to assess what his philosophy amounts to. There are two aspects to this task. Firstly, I will consider the various philosophical interpretations of Sade’s work. This part of the study will serve as a guide into the Sadeian labyrinth, and will establish some of the more central interpretive themes, in particular the claim that Sade’s thought anticipates that of the Nazis, or that he brings early Modern thought to its logical conclusion. Secondly, I will inquire into Sade’s writings themselves. Of particular interest are Sade’s thoughts concerning the nature of sexuality, psychology, and the human condition in general, his critique of conventional morality, and his description of the nature of power. / Whole document restricted, but available by request, use the feedback form to request access.

Throughout the 20th Century, a number of philosophers, writers, artists and film makers have implied that there is some profound significance to the work of Donatien Alphonse François, the Marquis de Sade (1740-1814). The project at hand is to evaluate the claim that Sade, in some sense, is a philosopher, and to assess what his philosophy amounts to. There are two aspects to this task. Firstly, I will consider the various philosophical interpretations of Sade’s work. This part of the study will serve as a guide into the Sadeian labyrinth, and will establish some of the more central interpretive themes, in particular the claim that Sade’s thought anticipates that of the Nazis, or that he brings early Modern thought to its logical conclusion. Secondly, I will inquire into Sade’s writings themselves. Of particular interest are Sade’s thoughts concerning the nature of sexuality, psychology, and the human condition in general, his critique of conventional morality, and his description of the nature of power. / Whole document restricted, but available by request, use the feedback form to request access.

Whole document restricted at the request of the author. / Christian religion and art enjoy a persistent relationship. Trying to account for this, I investigate the possibility that an aesthetic experience might facilitate a religious experience. I look at different kinds of experiences which typically are called "religious", and review some theories of religious experience. Even though my concern is not to use religious experience as a justification for religious belief, I settle, temporarily, for William Alston's account, which characterises religious experience as mystical perceptual experience. Alston's theory, however, underemphasises the role played in religious perceptual experiences by the experiencer's background beliefs. Arguing that background beliefs always play a part in how religious presentations are interpreted, I develop a theory called Alston-B. Within the structure of Alston-B, which identifies two highly integrated phases of perception (presentation and interpretation), I explore how artworks might play a part in these activities. The most persuasive theories, however, point away from understanding aesthetic experiences as a matter of observation. They point, rather, towards understanding them as imaginative personal encounters, or whole-person explorations of "worlds". While the force of this paradigm shift is felt, I examine three central background beliefs from the Protestant theological tradition. Alston-B, with its proper understanding of the importance of background beliefs in religious experience, requires that particular beliefs be admitted into enquiries about the nature of particular religious experiences. My examination of the background beliefs turns up material that suggests, in a way paralleled in my exploration of art theories, that the religious encounter is not so much a perceptual event as much as it is a perichoretic exchange. My investigation, then moves its focus from how a perceptual experience of art might serve a perceptual experience of God, to how a perichoretic encounter with art might serve a perichoretic experience of God. Drawing on Nicholas Wolterstorff's concepts of action, artwork-world, and projection, I argue that an encounter with an artwork can act as a rehearsal for the experience of God, since a "good" artwork provides its audience with a high degree of structural similarity (with regard to personal interaction) to the human encounter with the divine.

One of the traditional aims of the philosophy of science has been to formulate a methodology of science—that is, a normative theory of scientific method. The rules and standards of such a theory are intended to capture the central features of scientific rationality and to explain the sense in which scientific knowledge progressively grows. Although no particular methodology of science has won universal endorsement, it is generally agreed among philosophers that the broad aim of constructing one is both reasonable and worth pursuing in order to understand the nature of scientific growth. But this aim has also been attacked as fundamentally misconceived by some critics who maintain that no theory of method can do justice to actual science. The objections to the philosophical program of framing a methodology of science come mainly from three quarters. Firstly, there is Paul Feyerabend, according to whom the historical development of science reveals that no set of general normative rules and standards can be given for science. Most of the rules and standards hitherto proposed, he contends, have been violated by scientists and, moreover, were necessarily violated, owing to the incommensurability of revolutionary scientific theories. Secondly, there is Michael Polanyi, who claims that scientific rationality cannot be codified in the explicit rules and standards of any theory of method because much of scientific knowledge and practice is 'tacit' and reflects the personal, unspecifiable contributions of individual scientists. And thirdly, sociologists of scientific knowledge (in particular, those of the Strong Programme) assert that the nature and content of science should be explained in sociological terms rather than by reference to a methodology of science. However, it is argued here that the objections made by Feyerabend, Polanyi and the sociologists to the possibility of a theory of method do not stand up to critical examination. A large part of the anti-methodologists' case is based not only on an overly narrow view of the nature of a theory of method, but also on the mistaken belief that the traditional philosophical and epistemological approach to the investigation of scientific rationality should be replaced by a largely descriptive analysis of scientific practice. This belief is criticised on the grounds that a normative methodology must not be supposed to explain scientific practice, nor can views on the nature of scientific rationality be derived from descriptions of scientific practice. Finally, it is suggested that the positions of Feyerabend, Polanyi, and the Strong Programme have deep affinities with the 'practice-oriented' philosophy of the later Wittgenstein. This may, perhaps, explain why they abandon realist construals of scientific theories, of scientific standards, and of the notion of truth. Like Wittgenstein, they adopt a form of antirealism and conventionalism which leads, ultimately, to a relativist interpretation of scientific standards and knowledge. Coupled with the anti-methodologists' failure to defeat the possibility of a theory of method, this relativism demonstrates the poverty of an attack on method constructed on wittgensteinian lines.

This thesis is about the similarities of process between aesthetic experience and ethical judgement. I claim that in both cases the activity is best described as a type of play in which elements interact in mutual adjustment and transformation. This conception of play has its roots in Kant's aesthetic theory. Describing aesthetic experience as play results in emphasis on three central characteristics. These characteristics become the basis of constraints on judgement. In the case of ethical judgement these are important because they save from subjectivism a moral theory, particularism, which relies on individual judgement rather than moral rules. Seeing the activity of judgement as play suggests a conception of the outcome of judgement as picturing. This conception helps to make sense of reason-giving within the particularist model. A further analogy with the grounds of aesthetic qualities is used to illuminate the problem of justifying the values put into play. These values are ultimately defended in terms of their relationship to human flourishing. Perennial problems for theories based on human flourishing are avoided by my account because prescriptions for action are not derived from the characterisation of flourishing but from the process of individual judgement which values based on flourishing merely inform. One positive effect of adopting my model of judgement as play is the reduction of problems concerning the motivation to act on ethical judgements.

Whole document restricted at the request of the author. / Christian religion and art enjoy a persistent relationship. Trying to account for this, I investigate the possibility that an aesthetic experience might facilitate a religious experience. I look at different kinds of experiences which typically are called "religious", and review some theories of religious experience. Even though my concern is not to use religious experience as a justification for religious belief, I settle, temporarily, for William Alston's account, which characterises religious experience as mystical perceptual experience. Alston's theory, however, underemphasises the role played in religious perceptual experiences by the experiencer's background beliefs. Arguing that background beliefs always play a part in how religious presentations are interpreted, I develop a theory called Alston-B. Within the structure of Alston-B, which identifies two highly integrated phases of perception (presentation and interpretation), I explore how artworks might play a part in these activities. The most persuasive theories, however, point away from understanding aesthetic experiences as a matter of observation. They point, rather, towards understanding them as imaginative personal encounters, or whole-person explorations of "worlds". While the force of this paradigm shift is felt, I examine three central background beliefs from the Protestant theological tradition. Alston-B, with its proper understanding of the importance of background beliefs in religious experience, requires that particular beliefs be admitted into enquiries about the nature of particular religious experiences. My examination of the background beliefs turns up material that suggests, in a way paralleled in my exploration of art theories, that the religious encounter is not so much a perceptual event as much as it is a perichoretic exchange. My investigation, then moves its focus from how a perceptual experience of art might serve a perceptual experience of God, to how a perichoretic encounter with art might serve a perichoretic experience of God. Drawing on Nicholas Wolterstorff's concepts of action, artwork-world, and projection, I argue that an encounter with an artwork can act as a rehearsal for the experience of God, since a "good" artwork provides its audience with a high degree of structural similarity (with regard to personal interaction) to the human encounter with the divine.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.