In this dissertation, I reconcile our knowledge of our own minds with philosophical naturalism. Philosophers traditionally hold that our knowledge of our own minds is especially direct and authoritative in comparison with other domains of knowledge. I introduce the subject in the first chapter. In the second and third chapters, I address the idea that we know our own minds directly. If self-knowledge is direct, it must not be grounded on anything more epistemically basic. This creates a puzzle for all epistemologists. For the naturalist, the puzzle is especially tricky. To say that self-knowledge has no epistemic ground threatens the naturalist’s ability to understand it as psychologically real. I argue that the idea that self-knowledge is direct is not well motivated and that models of direct self-knowledge have fundamental problems. In the fourth and fifth chapters, I examine first-person authority. I distinguish between epistemic authority, or being in a better position than others to know, and nonepistemic authority, or being immune to challenge according to some conventional norm. I argue that we have only limited epistemic authority over our own minds. I then consider whether there may be an interesting non-epistemic authority attached to the first-person perspective. This would locate first-person authority in connection with our responsibility for our own minds. I argue that this sort of authority may exist, but is unlikely to threaten naturalism without further anti-naturalist commitments in the philosophy of mind. In the final two chapters, I explore the possibility that the underlying disagreements between naturalists and anti-naturalists are about the nature of belief. I consider what failures of self-knowledge might demonstrate about the nature of belief. I show how, with the proper understanding of belief, a theory of self-knowledge can assuage some of these worries. Having adopted a conception of belief that makes sense for philosophy and empirical psychology, I outline a positive theory of self-knowledge and suggest directions for future research.

In this dissertation, I examine the nature and structure of consciousness. Conscious experience is often said to be phenomenally unified, and subjects of consciousness are often self-conscious. I ask whether these features necessarily accompanyconscious experience. Is it necessarily the case, for instance, that all of a conscious subject's experiences at a time are phenomenally unified? And is it necessarily the case that subjects of consciousness are self-conscious whenever they are conscious? I argue that the answer to the former is affirmative and the latter negative. In the first chapter, I set the stage by distinguishing phenomenal unity from other species of conscious unity. A pair of conscious states is phenomenally unified if they are experienced together as part of a single experience that encompasses them both. The Unity Thesis is formulated using the notion of a maximal state of consciousness. In the second chapter, I attempt to precisify this notion in a way that does not pre-emptively decide the debate over the Unity Thesis. In informal terms, a maximal state of consciousness is a sum of conscious states that are i) simultaneous, ii) have the same subject, and iii) all have a conjoint phenomenology. I call this the Consensus View. In chapter three, I consider a recent attempt by Bayne to account for the split-brain data in a way that does not attribute two streams of consciousness to them. I close the chapter by presenting the rough outline of an interpretation of the split-brain data that is consistent with both the Unity Thesis and the split-brain data. In chapter four, I turn from defending the Unity Thesis to examining an attempt to account for conscious unity. Rosenthal has offered a theory of conscious unity as an extension of his higher-order theory of consciousness. I consider his account of conscious unity in light of a well-known objection to his theory: the (Representational) Mismatch Objection. In chapter five, the discussion turns from the unity of consciousness to self-consciousness. The question that is considered in this and the last chapter is the question whether conscious experience is necessarily accompanied by self-consciousness. The affirmative answer to this question I call the Ubiquity Thesis. I spend some time distinguishing robust conceptions of self-consciousness from minimal conceptions of self-consciousness. In the sixth and final chapter, I take up a contemporary defence of the Ubiquity Thesis. Kriegel, a higher-order theorist like Rosenthal, has argued that every conscious state is conscious in virtue of the fact that it represents itself. This self-representation is understood as a kind of self-consciousness and, thus, his theory can be seen as affirming the Ubiquity Thesis. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

From an indeterminist's perspective, I support and defined the following argument for deontic incompatibilism: (1) If determinism is true, then no one ever can do otherwise than he does. (2) If no one ever can do otherwise than he does, then nothing anyone does is ever right, wrong, or obligatory. (3) Therefore, if determinism is true, then nothing anyone does is ever right, wrong, or obligatory. They sense of 'can' I use in this argument is what I call "the power-'can' of ordinary language." The power-'can' has two (implicit or explicit) time indexes; one applies to the power itself, the other to the relevant doing. (In ordinary language these indexes usually are not explicit.) I argue that the power-'can' is a sense of 'can' with which the "ought implies can" principle holds true. I review and respond to various accounts of 'can' proposed by compatibilists Bruce Aune, Keith Lehrer, David Lewis, G. E. Moore and others. Elsewhere I discuss writings by Peter van Inwagen and J. L. Austin. To support (1), I utilize, argue for, and show the advantages of the Temporal Physical Possibility Requirements: If an agent, S, can at time T do A (not do A) at time T$\sp\prime$, then S's doing A (not doing A) at $T\sp\prime$ is jointly possible with the conjunction of the state of the world at T and the laws of nature. When arguing for these requirements, I focus on how most people use the power-'can' and how they would use it in various situations. I present and respond to objections to my arguments. Most of the objections are based on certain strong forms of contextualism. I argue for (2) and defend my premises against various objections. One objection is based on a form of utilitarianism advocated by Fred Feldman. Other objections are based on an example by Harry Frankfurt concerning moral responsibility. Two arguments against (3) are presented and I respond. They are developed from a suggestion by John Martin Fischer that people would continue making deontic claims if a consortium of scientists were to find strong evidence of determinism.

Inference is a process by which appropriate belief states get connected. Belief states are biological states in the sense that they are reentrant loops (or loops which connect different stimulus); their intrinsic feature is recognition. In inference or reasoning the transition process between belief states is regulated by the rule of concept usage, involved in the belief state, in natural language. Like belief states experiential states are also biological states whose extrinsic feature is recognition, such that, one can have an, say, X-type experience without recognizing it as an experience of X. One can, however, also have an experience of an X; in the latter case, one not only has an X-type experience but also recognizes an X as an X. In some cases the transition from X-type experience to believing an X to be there instantiates a quasi-inferential pattern. In all such cases the transition process is regulated by the rule of X usage. In such quasi-inferential transition additional belief states are involved. Such states assert that there are no countervailing factors and there are additional factors conducive to the conclusion. Such belief states are expressed non-propositionally in the language of thought. Propositions are a necessary part of such quasi-inference for they give content to thoughts to which one can assign 'falsity' and defeasible reasoning requires us to assign 'falsity' to our thoughts. Propositions implicated in the quasi-inferences from experience types to belief states are the evidential reasons for the conclusion and they can only be accepted as provisionally true and have to be revised in the light of further information.

The author defines development, or growth, as the ethically desirable direction of change. Is there a principle which can express what all developmental changes have in common, and what makes them desirable? The orthogenetic principle defines development as change towards increasing integration with complementary differentiation of people with respect to their environment. Heinz Werner and Bernard Kaplan first articulated this idea. It characterizes the portrayal of development by Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg, and John Dewey. None of these authors, however, justify orthogenesis as an ethical definition of development across a global range of experience. The author attempts this here, giving educators a tool for criticizing or justifying education having development as its aim. The author analyzes integration and differentiation into three aspects: co-ordination of distinguished elements in the environment; autonomous choice from a de-centered or objective perspective; immunity from environmental vicissitudes alongside an opening of and openness to the environment. Advancing these qualities is justified as ethically desirable in two ways. It overcomes the problem of egocentrism and habit-attachment which gives meaning to the notion of development across human experience. It also meets formal ethical criteria of universalizability, universality, and prescriptivity. Educators can use the orthogenetic principle to examine assumptions about development within psychological theories to see how these might themselves influence development. This enables educators to make eclectic use of psychologies within an ethical framework. The principle is also used to generate guidelines for thorough and objective inquiry into what is most growthful for a particular person at a particular time. The author argues that the principle cannot prescribe any educational course in advance of such inquiry into unique situations.

Alasdair MacIntyre (1984) asserts that the ethical systems of the Enlightenment (formalism and utilitarianism) have failed to provide a meaningful definition of "good." Lacking such a definition, business managers have no internal standards by which they can morally evaluate their roles or acts. MacIntyre goes on to claim that managers have substituted external measures of "winning" or "effectiveness" for any internal concept of good. He supports a return to the Aristotelian notion of virtue or "excellence." Such a system of virtue-based ethics depends on an interrelationship of the community, one's roles in that community, and the virtues one needs to perform that role well. This study presents MacIntyre's position, stressing its implications for business ethics. It presents an empirical study to determine if MacIntyre's assertions about the existence of an excellence/effectiveness dichotomy can be supported. I use a scenario to present an ethically ambiguous situation which reflects MacIntyre's dichotomy. A sample of 25 practicing managers taking MBA courses at different New England schools participated in this study. After these respondents read the scenario and decided upon courses of action, they then performed a Q sort to prioritize their reasons for deciding as they did. The hypothesis that an excellence/effectiveness dichotomy exists for managerial priorities was supported. Factor analysis revealed four factors which accounted for 68.3% of the total variance. Eighteen of the 25 respondents clustered on a factor which strongly reflected an ethic of emphasis on excellence while the other 7 clustered on three factors which expressed various versions of MacIntyre's concept of an ethic of effectiveness. I interpret these four factors to see what they reveal about the subjective priorities of the respondents. Beyond this core hypothesis, the following research question was asked: What demographic and attitudinal variables might be associated with the respondents who report an excellent or effective orientation? Using Chi-square tests, I found that "effective" managers were more likely than "excellent" managers to be in a marketing class, to choose an aggressive marketing response to the scenario's situation, and to be younger. This study concludes with some recommendations for theoretical development and some avenues for future research.

<p> A holoflux theory of consciousness as energy is hypothesized and shown to support both local and non-local properties. This thesis emerges from an integral evaluation of evidence drawn from three sources: (1) the holonomic mind/brain theories of Karl Pribram, (2) the ontological interpretation of quantum theory by David Bohm, and (3) the hyperphysics of consciousness developed by Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. Applying an integral methodology to superimpose and correlate seemingly disparate concepts from among these sources and others, a composite theory emerges, a &ldquo;holoflux&rdquo; theory of consciousness, after the term favored by Karl Pribram to describe David Bohm&rsquo;s &ldquo;holomovement.&rdquo; This Pribram&ndash;Bohm composite holoflux theory is shown to be congruent with established principles of physics, mathematics, and electrical engineering, as well as with what Pierre Teilhard de Chardin termed &ldquo;hyperphysics.&rdquo; </p><p> Extending the panpsychist paradigm that consciousness is inherent in the structure of the universe, the thesis describes a dynamic energy process bridging the explicate space&ndash;time domain with a transcendent flux domain located at the spatial center, everywhere. This center is hypothesized to be synonymous with three key concepts: Karl Pribram&rsquo;s &ldquo;flux domain,&rdquo; David Bohm&rsquo;s &ldquo;implicate order,&rdquo; and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin&rsquo;s &ldquo;point Omega.&rdquo; </p><p> Commonly held arguments, both philosophical and technical, dismissive of energy fields as a possible substrate of consciousness, are examined and refuted. Major theories of consciousness developed by Pribram, Bohm, and Teilhard de Chardin are examined in detail, and presented in the context of their life experiences. Extending their theories, the holoflux theory of consciousness views reality as one energy, cycling mathematically, lens-like, in a process of transformation manifesting in three modes: (1) electromagnetic energy in space&ndash;time, (2) holoflux energy in a transcendent order, and (3) vibrating isospheres at the boundary gap separating the implicate from the explicate orders. </p><p> Pierre Teilhard de Chardin&rsquo;s more technical concepts (e.g., centro-complexity, radial energy, tangential energy, complexity-consciousness, noogenesis, centrology, and Omega) are evaluated in detail, and interpreted within the framework of holoflux theory, to provide new insights into his hyperphysics of centro-complexity. </p><p> The plausibility of this holoflux theory is examined through identification of correlations between physiological, electromagnetic, and geophysical measurements. </p>

<p> Workplace bullying is a topic that impacts many people in many different disciplines. Research has shown that workplace bullying affects upwards of half of all workers during their work histories, and once it becomes an entrenched pattern, targets, witnesses, and human resource managers, alike, face difficulties in effectively addressing or abating the issue. This quantitative study used a non-experimental design to explore whether there was any relationship between the following variables: minority status, acculturation, workplace satisfaction, perceived bullying, and perceived acculturation. Learned helplessness theory and minority stress theory were the theoretical foundations utilized to investigate workplace bullying and the role of culture. The General and Racial/Ethnic Bullying Scale, The Negative Acts Questionnaire-Revised (NAQ-R), and the Stephenson Multigroup Acculturation Scale (SMAS) were used to measure participant&rsquo;s experiences. The results revealed that workplace bullying had been experienced by both minority and non-minority individuals; however, the assumption that minorities are at a greater risk for workplace bullying than non-minorities could not be substantiated by the data.</p>

<p> Words are a human medium for relaying any and all psychic states, from mundane to profound, and as a medium of description language also is considered an archetype. In the practice of psychotherapy the practitioner and client must find common linguistic ground in order to collaborate effectively and facilitate the therapeutic process. This thesis utilizes hermeneutic, alchemical hermeneutic, and heuristic methodologies&mdash; interweaving mythology, philosophy, psychology, and literature&mdash;as a means of emphasizing the poetic nature of the soul and a multifaceted approach to what James Hillman referred to as "soul-making." The research is guided by the principal question: How does language shift the imaginative landscape and deepen experience? Hermes is present in this work as a mythological figure as well as the archetypal representation of shape-shifting, uncertainty, and the ability to move in and out of literal and nonliteral realms, emphasizing the importance of metaphor in the therapeutic encounter.</p><p>

<p> This interdisciplinary, theoretical dissertation puts Meister Eckhart and psychoanalysis (in particular, the work of Jacques Lacan) in dialogue in order to examine the question of the self. It extends the success of recent Buddhist-psychoanalytic dialogues on the self into the neglected area of Christian mysticism. The author reviews the extant literature on psychoanalysis and mysticism, summarizes Freud and Lacan's psychoanalytic theories of subjectivity, and examines the existing literature on Meister Eckhart and the self. Then, the author undertakes a commentary of an especially significant passage in one of Eckhart's sermons using an interpretive method which brings together "radical hermeneutics," a form of hermeneutics developed by the American philosopher of religion John Caputo (1987, 2000) with <i>Lectio Divina</i> and centering prayer, two Christian contemplative practices. </p><p> Based on the commentary, the author presents a fresh understanding of Eckhart's view of the self which emphasizes the unity between the soul and God in the process of God's birth in the soul (<i>Gottesgeburt</i>). Then, some of the key themes of Eckhart's sermons are put in dialogue with key Lacanian concepts &ndash; e.g., properties (<i>eigenschaften</i>) with symptoms, detachment (<i>abegescheidenheit</i>) with castration, and living without why (<i>ohne Warum</i>) with jouissance &ndash; in order to explore the significance of Eckhart's view of the self for psychoanalytic theories of subjectivity. Additionally, the discussion includes clinical vignettes in order to suggest implications for the practice of psychotherapy. The dissertation concludes that psychoanalysis and mysticism are guided by a similar logic and structure, as they are both oriented around processes of change.</p>