<p>This dissertation critically examines predominant political-economic theories of public credit and public debt in light of the origins, development, and recent record expansion in such debt. Using a "history of thought" approach, I focus on those aspects of theory, from three main schools of thought - Classical, Keynesian, and Public Choice - which seek to explain the evolution of public debt, its political-economic causes and effects, the meaning of sustainability in public debt burdens, and the conditions under which governments are likely to monetize or repudiate their debts. For empirical context, I also provide three centuries of data on public debt for major nations, relative to their national income, and government bond-yield data for more recent decades.</p><p>There is value in classifying the major political economists who have examined public credit and public debt since 1700 as "pessimists," "optimists" or "realists." </p><p>Public debt pessimists argue that government provides no truly productive services, that its taxing and borrowing detract from the private economy, while unfairly burdening future generations, and that high and rising public leverage ratios are unsustainable and will likely cause national insolvency and long-term economic ruin. When public debts become excessive or un-payable, pessimists advise explicit default or deliberate repudiation. Public debt pessimists also believe financiers in general and public bondholders in particular are unproductive. Pessimists usually endorse smaller-sized governments and free markets. With few exceptions, most public debt pessimists appear in the Classical or Public Choice schools of thought. Among prominent public debt pessimists, the most representative are David Hume and Adam Smith.</p><p>Public debt optimists believe that government provides not only productive services, such as infrastructure and social insurance, but means to mitigate what they perceived to be "market failures," including savings gluts, economic depressions, inflation, and secular stagnation. Optimists contend that deficit-spending and public debt accumulation can stimulate or sustain economy activity and ensure full employment, without burdening present or future generation. To the extent public debts become excessive or un-payable, optimists tend to advise implicit default, by official and deliberate debasement of the national currency (inflation). As do pessimists, public debt optimists view financiers and bondholders as essentially unproductive. Optimists also defend a relatively larger economic role for the state. Almost without exception, optimists reside in the Keynesian school of political-economic thought. Among the leading optimists, the most representative are Alvin Hansen and Abba Lerner.</p><p>Public debt realists contend that government can and should provide certain productive services, mainly national defense, police protection, courts of justice, and basic infrastructure, but that social and redistributive schemes tend to undermine national prosperity. Realists say public debt should fund only services and projects that help a free economy maximize its potential, and that analysis must be contextualized - i.e., related to a nation's credit capacity, productivity, and taxable capacity. According to realists, public leverage is neither inevitably harmful, as pessimists say, nor infinite, as optimists say. Realists view financiers as productive and insist that sovereigns redeem their public debts in full, on time, and in sound money. Realists favor constitutionally-limited yet energetic governments that help promote robust markets. They appear mainly in the Classical era of political-economic thought. The most representative and renowned of the public debt realists are Sir James Steuart and Alexander Hamilton.</p><p>My main thesis is that public debt realists provide the most persuasive theories of public credit and public debt, and thus the most plausible interpretations of the long, fascinating history of public debt. Moreover, certain puzzles and paradoxes arising in contemporary public debt experience, among developed nations - including the recent, multi-decade trend of simultaneously rising public-leverage ratios and declining public debt yields - is explicable primarily in realist terms. In contrast, public debt pessimists and optimists alike offer unbalanced, inadequate accounts of public debt experience. Whereas pessimists are too often confused or mistaken in foreseeing an alleged "inevitable" ruin from public debt, optimists more often than not are confused and mistaken about the alleged "stimulus" attainable by large-scale deficit-spending and debt build-ups. Looking ahead, the realist perspective is likely to provide superior guideposts for maximally-accurate interpretations of public debt policies and trends.</p> / Dissertation

No description available.

The subject of this thesis is the politics of economic restructuring, euphemistically termed 'reform' in the Pacific. Although structural adjustment policies are essentially neoliberal economic policies, the project of global economic restructuring, and its supposed end, a global regime of free trade, is a political one in several respects. It involves the wielding of economic power over developing countries by powerful multilateral institutions, developed countries and private corporate entities to such a degree that it is considered by some to represent the disciplining/subjugating and dis-empowering of developing states. It is supported by a successfully propagated ideology that combines economic growth theories (held to be infallible), 'good governance' rhetoric (with which no-one can reasonably disagree), and new notions of equality and 'non-discrimination' - the 'level playing field' and 'national treatment, in WTO parlance (which have been enshrined in enforceable global trade rules). It entails redefining the role of the state, transferring public ownership of assets to private hands, and removing subsidies that protect domestic industries and jobs, all of which are strongly contested. Successfully implementing 'reform' is widely acknowledged to require not only 'reform champions' but also 'ownership', and thus broad acceptance and legitimacy, yet commitments to restructuring are often made by government ministers without reference at all to national parliaments. National economic summits are used to rubber stamp or legitimate policies in a fait accompli. The thesis begins by situating the global regime of structural adjustment within the political context of North-South relations in the 1970s, the debt crisis of the early 1980s, and the collapse of socialist regimes and consequent discrediting of the socialist economic model and other variants of state-led development. It shows the key role of the World Bank in advocating the neoliberal model and setting the development aid agenda, and its abdication of this lead role after 1995 in favour of the World Trade Organisation and its agenda of global trade liberalisation. The thesis then examines the origins, agents and interests behind structural reform in the island states of the Pacific before focusing on how a regional approach to achieving regional wide economic restructuring and trade liberalisation is being taken, using a regional political organisation of Pacific Island states (The Pacific Islands Forum), and regional free trade agreements. It then illustrates the path of economic restructuring embarked on by Fiji following the 1987 coups, examines the implementation of 'economic reform' concurrently with policies to advance the interests of indigenous Fijians, and discusses some of the less acknowledged dimensions of reform.

Doctor of Philosophy / The relationship between the Angkorian Empire and its capital is important for understanding how this state was sustained. The empire’s political economy is studied by analysing data from Pre-Angkorian and Angkorian period inscriptions in aggregated form, in contrast to previous studies which relied mainly on detailed reading of the texts. The study is necessarily broad to overcome the constraints of having relatively few inscriptions which relate to a selected range of topics, and are partial in viewpoint. The success of the pre-modern Khmer state depended on: its long-established communication and trade links; mutual support of rulers and regional elites; decentralised administration through regional centres; its ability to produce or acquire a surplus of resources; and a network of temples as an ideological vehicle for state integration. The claim that there was a centrally controlled command economy or significant redistribution of resources, as for archaic, moneyless societies is difficult to justify. The mode of control varied between the core area and peripheral areas. Even though Angkor did not have money, it used a unit of account. Despite being an inland agrarian polity, the Khmer actively pursued foreign trade. There are indications of a structure, perhaps hierarchical, of linked deities and religious foundations helping to disseminate the state’s ideology. The establishment of these foundations was encouraged by gifts and privileges granted to elite supporters of the rulers. Contrary to some views, Angkor was not excessively rigid or unusually hierarchical and autocratic when compared with contemporary analogous states. Its political economy is marked by three simultaneous cycles indicative of changing power relationships: cycles of royal inscriptions; of non-royal inscriptions; and fluctuating control over peripheral territories. Its processes and strategies were sufficiently flexible for it to endure as an empire for approximately six centuries, despite internal and external disturbances.

This thesis describes the place of alcohol in the lives of people from Rarotonga, Cook Islands. It incorporates historical and ethnographic analyses to provide the broad context of drinking by people aged from their teens to late thirties. / The historical component of this study describes specific accounts of alcohol consumption, and situates these with regard to changes that occurred in Rarotonga from the early 19th century. Prior to contact with Papa’a (Europeans), people of Rarotonga neither produced nor consumed alcoholic beverages. Thus, the use of alcohol was a phenomenon intimately bound up with global exploration, proselytisation and trade. I trace historical changes in the distribution of power, resources, religious practice, and social discourse, and show how alcohol practice, distribution, and trade was linked to these changes from missionary contact onward. / This history informs the ethnography of contemporary drinking practices. Individual and group practices and understandings of alcohol are described. I also describe the contribution of state policy, commercial interests, government institutions, and religious organisations to the place of alcohol in Rarotonga. Alcohol is a transformative substance that changes the comportment of drinkers. But its effect is ambiguous, and recognised as such. ‘Drunken’ behaviours are often explained as originating in concerns and desires that pertain in sobriety. Thus, the status of alcohol consumption as an explanation for specific behaviours is equivocal, and contested. / Drinking is a means by which relationships between friends, kin and strangers are initiated and/or maintained. The particular significance of alcohol to the maintenance of (drinking) relationships is not only due to social constructions of meanings and practices associated with drinking; pharmacological effects of alcohol increase the social salience of drinking. Drinking both alters bodies and alters relationships between drinkers. In this sense, it embodies social meanings and understandings of drinking practice. / Finally, I suggest that in Rarotonga, the association of drinking with emotional experience and behaviour is also, in part, attributable to the ‘embodied’ experience of alcohol. The form of emotional experience, and the form of embodied experience of alcohol, are similar. These are associated with one another through analogy (and so by the social construction of each) by embodied experience.

This thesis investigates the potential for radio on the Internet to enhance processes of communication and media practice in the form of new a public sphere. Drawing on the work of Marshall McLuhan, the early stages of this thesis present an enquiry into the unique positive qualities of both radio and the Internet. The argument that follows contends that radio presented on the Internet can draw from the perceived technological benefits of each individual medium, combining as a potential site for public spheres. Both Habermas’s liberal public sphere and contemporary critiques of the concept are examined to define a range of principles that could be tested against relevant examples. The increasing commercialisation of the Internet is presented as a challenge to the normative ideals of a public sphere and counter-balances the optimism of a technologically determinist approach. A series of thematic codes are developed from the relevant theory and combined with qualitative interviews. This forms the framework for a thematic analysis of three individual case studies: Unwelcome Guests, an anti-corporate radio programme, SW Radio Africa, “the independent voice of Zimbabwe,” and NH Making Waves, the radio arm of a community peace activist group. The study investigates opportunities for these three individual case studies to act as public spheres, by examining the interplay that occurs between both Internet and radio practices. As the thematic analysis will demonstrate, placing radio content on the Internet presents new opportunities to diversify content and audiences through collaborative production and improved distribution. Recommendations for further research emphasise the need to pursue the Internet’s role in the public sphere potential of radio.

Genetically modified insect-resistant (Bt) cotton is widely cultivated in Pakistan, although the Pakistani Government has yet to approve its commercial cultivation. This thesis is the first in-depth, systematic and critical examination of its commercialisation through the informal sector, and explains the conundrum of around 6.4 million acres of ‘illegal’ cultivation of a GM crop. / Most popular Bt varieties under cultivation in Pakistan contain Monsanto’s genetic modification event (called MON 531), widely believed to be under patent protection in Pakistan. Not wanting to infringe Monsanto’s intellectual property rights (IPR), the Pakistani Government has refused biosafety approval to these varieties. Consequently, the Pakistani breeders of these high-yielding Bt varieties commercialised them in the informal sector. This research decriminalises seed provision in the informal sector and shows that rather than being discrete categories, the formal/informal sectors are locations across which breeders and varieties travel. / For its part, Monsanto is not willing to enter the Pakistani seed market, considering it too disorderly in which to operate. It seeks to operate in the ‘high-differential’ end of the market, therefore requiring active engagement of the Government to keep the farmer from dropping out. Alternatively, Monsanto proposes that the Government licenses MON 531 on payment of an annual technology fee for use by Pakistani farmers and breeders. This technology fee is compared with Monsanto’s cost of development of Bt products, and Pakistan’s budgetary allocation for agriculture. On both counts, the technology fee demanded by Monsanto is excessive. / An examination of Pakistan’s patent law and the patents granted to Monsanto reveals that neither MON 531 nor biotechnological products/processes required for its insertion in local cotton varieties are patented in Pakistan. Thus Pakistan presents a unique case where the Government has consistently honoured patents that it never issued. It is argued that Monsanto’s non-existent IPR has been honoured due to the particular social relations between Monsanto and Pakistani farmers and breeders. Since MON 531 is a commodity objectifying the labour of a particular social group, a patent thereupon becomes a means to operationalise the social relations between this social group and those who consume this commodity. / An alternate route for commercialisation is through the hybrid seed. Monsanto is willing to enter the Pakistani seed market if its technology can be carried in hybrid seeds. But the use of hybrid seed is economically unfeasible in cotton production, and there are significant problems with hybrid seed production in large quantities for the Pakistani market. Yet Monsanto and other companies prefer the hybrid route to technology commercialisation because of an important latent function that hybrids perform – they stop the farmer from saving seed. / It is argued that IPR and the use of hybrid seed are key social and technical strategies for accumulation by dispossession. They represent the commodification of seed, which is a pre-requisite for the process of accumulation. At the same time, these appear to be the only available strategies within existing social relations for improving cotton germplasm and for providing quality Bt seed to the Pakistani farmer.

Genetically modified insect-resistant (Bt) cotton is widely cultivated in Pakistan, although the Pakistani Government has yet to approve its commercial cultivation. This thesis is the first in-depth, systematic and critical examination of its commercialisation through the informal sector, and explains the conundrum of around 6.4 million acres of ‘illegal’ cultivation of a GM crop. / Most popular Bt varieties under cultivation in Pakistan contain Monsanto’s genetic modification event (called MON 531), widely believed to be under patent protection in Pakistan. Not wanting to infringe Monsanto’s intellectual property rights (IPR), the Pakistani Government has refused biosafety approval to these varieties. Consequently, the Pakistani breeders of these high-yielding Bt varieties commercialised them in the informal sector. This research decriminalises seed provision in the informal sector and shows that rather than being discrete categories, the formal/informal sectors are locations across which breeders and varieties travel. / For its part, Monsanto is not willing to enter the Pakistani seed market, considering it too disorderly in which to operate. It seeks to operate in the ‘high-differential’ end of the market, therefore requiring active engagement of the Government to keep the farmer from dropping out. Alternatively, Monsanto proposes that the Government licenses MON 531 on payment of an annual technology fee for use by Pakistani farmers and breeders. This technology fee is compared with Monsanto’s cost of development of Bt products, and Pakistan’s budgetary allocation for agriculture. On both counts, the technology fee demanded by Monsanto is excessive. / An examination of Pakistan’s patent law and the patents granted to Monsanto reveals that neither MON 531 nor biotechnological products/processes required for its insertion in local cotton varieties are patented in Pakistan. Thus Pakistan presents a unique case where the Government has consistently honoured patents that it never issued. It is argued that Monsanto’s non-existent IPR has been honoured due to the particular social relations between Monsanto and Pakistani farmers and breeders. Since MON 531 is a commodity objectifying the labour of a particular social group, a patent thereupon becomes a means to operationalise the social relations between this social group and those who consume this commodity. / An alternate route for commercialisation is through the hybrid seed. Monsanto is willing to enter the Pakistani seed market if its technology can be carried in hybrid seeds. But the use of hybrid seed is economically unfeasible in cotton production, and there are significant problems with hybrid seed production in large quantities for the Pakistani market. Yet Monsanto and other companies prefer the hybrid route to technology commercialisation because of an important latent function that hybrids perform – they stop the farmer from saving seed. / It is argued that IPR and the use of hybrid seed are key social and technical strategies for accumulation by dispossession. They represent the commodification of seed, which is a pre-requisite for the process of accumulation. At the same time, these appear to be the only available strategies within existing social relations for improving cotton germplasm and for providing quality Bt seed to the Pakistani farmer.

The purpose of this study is to explain how Australia has bargained for improved outcomes in its trade with the United States over the 1980s and into the early 1990s. This explanation is sought by means of an analysis of the forces which have shaped Australia's trade policy-making towards the U.S. in the five trading sectors of wheat, sugar, beef, steel and international air passenger transport. The study adopts a theoretical framework which postulates that state actors and institutions are principally responsible for trade policy-making and the concomitant bargaining strategies adopted to improve trade outcomes. However, a state-centred approach needs to be qualified by state actors' accomodation of societal-actor demands for policy action. While exogenous to this domestic bargaining process, influences emanating from the international political economy must also be taken into account. The relationship within and between state and societal actors, influenced as they are by international institutions and ideas, are critical to understanding the bargaining approaches made by one state towards another. It is argued that sectoral trading outcomes between Australia and the U.S. can be understood by reference to a bilateral bargaining process within each trading sector. Within each such bargaining process, Australia has, within broad bilateral and multilateral approaches, devised strategies by which it could mobilize sectorally-specific resources to seek to exploit opportunities and minimise problems so as to improve its trading outcomes. The nature of these sectoral strategies has been influenced by first, the nature of the U.S. policy and policy-making process; second, the Australian domestic bargaining process between state and societal actors; and third, and to a lesser extent, prevailing ideas and the perceptions of the negotiating parties.

Doctor of Philosophy / The relationship between the Angkorian Empire and its capital is important for understanding how this state was sustained. The empire’s political economy is studied by analysing data from Pre-Angkorian and Angkorian period inscriptions in aggregated form, in contrast to previous studies which relied mainly on detailed reading of the texts. The study is necessarily broad to overcome the constraints of having relatively few inscriptions which relate to a selected range of topics, and are partial in viewpoint. The success of the pre-modern Khmer state depended on: its long-established communication and trade links; mutual support of rulers and regional elites; decentralised administration through regional centres; its ability to produce or acquire a surplus of resources; and a network of temples as an ideological vehicle for state integration. The claim that there was a centrally controlled command economy or significant redistribution of resources, as for archaic, moneyless societies is difficult to justify. The mode of control varied between the core area and peripheral areas. Even though Angkor did not have money, it used a unit of account. Despite being an inland agrarian polity, the Khmer actively pursued foreign trade. There are indications of a structure, perhaps hierarchical, of linked deities and religious foundations helping to disseminate the state’s ideology. The establishment of these foundations was encouraged by gifts and privileges granted to elite supporters of the rulers. Contrary to some views, Angkor was not excessively rigid or unusually hierarchical and autocratic when compared with contemporary analogous states. Its political economy is marked by three simultaneous cycles indicative of changing power relationships: cycles of royal inscriptions; of non-royal inscriptions; and fluctuating control over peripheral territories. Its processes and strategies were sufficiently flexible for it to endure as an empire for approximately six centuries, despite internal and external disturbances.