Praktiker:innen stehen bei der Bewertung bzw. Evaluation von Bibliotheken unter doppeltem Druck, den Wert der Bibliothek zu demonstrieren und gleichzeitig die Werte der bibliothekarischen Profession einzuhalten. Um eine Praxis der Bibliotheksevaluation zu unterstützen, die sowohl den Wert der Bibliothek als auch die bibliothekarische Werte anspricht, untersucht diese Dissertation die Praxis der Bibliotheksevaluation durch die Perspektive praktischer Ethik und angewandter Werte. Die Hauptforschungsfrage lautet: „Wie kann Bibliotheksbewertung ethisch durchgeführt werden?“ Ich folgte einem dreistufigen Forschungsdesign: eine Literaturrecherche, eine Umfrage und Interviews. Die Literaturrecherche konzentriert sich auf die Ethik, Werte, Dilemmata und Praktiken von Bewertungspraktiker:innen. Eine vignettenbasierte Umfrage untersuchte Werte und Ethik bei der Bewertung von Bibliotheken weiter. Die Umfragedaten wurden mittels der konstruktivistischen Grounded Theory analysiert und die daraus resultierenden Codes etablierten ein neues Rahmenwerk und ein neues Instrument für die ethische Bewertung von Bibliotheken. Schließlich wurde das Instrument mit dem Namen Values-Sensitive Library Assessment Toolkit durch Interviews mit Bewertungspraktiker:innen validiert. Die Forschungsergebnisse zeigen, dass Praktiker:innen der Bibliotheksbewertung eine ethische Praxis anstreben, aber durch eine komplexe und dezentralisierte Wertelandschaft herausgefordert werden, die viele konkurrierende Möglichkeiten zur Identifizierung und Umsetzung von Werten bietet. Das Toolkit dient dazu, einen Satz von Werten zu modellieren, den Praktiker:innen anwenden können, um eine ethische Bewertungspraxis zu unterstützen. / Library assessment practitioners face dual pressures to demonstrate library value and adhere to library values. To support a practice of library assessment that addresses both library value and library values, this dissertation examines the practice of library assessment through the lens of practical ethics and applied values. The main research question asks, “How can library assessment be practiced ethically?” I followed a three-step research design: a literature review, a survey, and interviews. The literature review focuses on the ethics, values, dilemmas, and practices of library assessment practitioners. A vignette-based survey further investigated values and ethics in assessment. Survey data was analyzed through constructivist grounded theory, and the resulting set of codes established a new framework and toolkit for ethical library assessment. Finally, the toolkit—named the Values-Sensitive Library Assessment Toolkit—was validated through interviews with assessment practitioners. Research findings indicate that library assessment practitioners seek an ethical practice, but are challenged by a complex and decentralized values landscape that offers many competing choices for identifying and implementing values. The toolkit serves to model a value set that practitioners can apply to support an ethical assessment practice.

The development of predictive biomarkers in neuroscience is increasingly enabling bioprediction of adverse behavioural events, from psychosis to impulsive violent reaction. Because many brain-based disorders can be thought of as end-states of a long development, bioprediction carries immense therapeutic potential. In this thesis, I analyse issues raised by the development of bioprediction of brain-based disorder. I argue that ethical analysis of probabilities and risk information bioprediction provides is confounded by philosophical and social structures that have, until recently, functioned nominally well by assuming categorical (binary) concepts of disorder, especially regarding brain-disorder. Through an analysis of the philosophical concept of disorder, I argue that we can and ought to reorient disorder around probability of future harm and stratify disorder based on the magnitude of risk. Rejection of binary concepts in favour of this non-binary (probability-based) one enables synergy with bioprediction and circumnavigation of ethical concerns raised about proposed disorders of risk in psychiatry and neurology; I specifically consider psychosis and dementia risk. I then show how probabilistic thinking enables consideration of the implications of bioprediction for two areas salient in mental health: moral responsibility and justice. Using the example of epilepsy and driving as a model of obligations to protect others against risk of harm, I discuss how the development of bioprediction is poised to enhance moral responsibility. I then engage with legal cases and science surrounding a predictive biomarker of impulsive violent reaction to propose that bioprediction can sometimes rightly diminish responsibility. Finally, I show the relevance of bioprediction to theories of distributive justice that assign priority to the worse off. Because bioprediction enables the identification of those who are worse off in a way of which we have previously been ignorant, a commitment to assign priority to the worse off requires development of and equal access to biopredictive technologies.

In this doctoral thesis, Kant's distinction between perfect and imperfect duties is examined. The thesis begins with an exploration of how the distinction originates and evolves in the writings of three of Kant's most prominent natural law predecessors: Hugo Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf, and Christian Wolff. The thesis then moves on to Kant's own writings. It is argued that Kant draws the perfect-imperfect distinction in as many as twelve different ways, that these ways are not entirely consistent with one another, and that many of them, even taken by themselves, do not hold up to scrutiny. Furthermore, it is argued that Kant's claim that perfect duties always trump imperfect duties - which can be referred to as "the priority claim" - is not actually supported by any one of the ways in which Kant draws the perfect-imperfect distinction. After this critical reading of Kant's writings, the thesis then switches gears and a more "positive" project is attempted. It is argued that the perfect-imperfect distinction, even though it does not support the priority claim, is not altogether normatively neutral or uninteresting. In particular, for some of the ways in which the distinction is drawn, it is shown that the distinction yields the following normative implication: Sometimes perfect duties override imperfect duties and all other times there is no priority one way or the other. Finally, it is explained that this normative implication - which can be referred to as the "privilege claim" - translates into the following practical directive: When there is a conflict between a perfect duty and an imperfect duty, sometimes one must act in conformity with the former duty and all other times one is free to choose which of the two duties to act in conformity with. This practical directive represents the ultimate finding of this thesis.

<p>This study focuses on ecofeminist ethical theory. A first aim is to clarify ecofeminist views on five central issues in the field of environmental ethics. These issues are: (1) Views of nature, (2) social constructivism and nature, (3) values of nature, (4) ethical contextualism, and (5) ethical pluralism. A second aim is to compare ecofeminist standpoints with certain standpoints within nonfeminist environmental ethical theory. A third aim is to critically discuss some of the main standpoints in ecofeminism. The analysis focuses on the works of Karen Warren, Sallie McFague, Chris Cuomo, and Carolyn Merchant. Other important sources are the environmental philosophers and ethicists J. Baird Callicott, Paul Taylor, Irene Klaver, Bryan G. Norton, Christopher Stone, Eugene Hargrove, Holmes Rolston III, Per Ariansen, Don E. Marietta, and Bruno Latour.</p><p>The result of this study is that there are no main differences between ecofeminism and nonfeminist environmental ethics regarding the main standpoints on the five issues. Rather, the significant differences are found within these main standpoints. In addition, one important characteristic of ecofeminist ethics is its "double nature," that is, the fact that it is rooted in feminism and environmentalism. The double nature of ecofeminism results in a foundation out of which ecofeminism as an environmental philosophy has a unique potential to handle some of the theoretical tensions that environmental ethics creates.</p><p>From the perspective that environmental problems consist of complex clusters of natureculture- discourse and that environmental ethical theory ought to be action guiding, it is argued that ecofeminist ethical theory has an advantage compared to nonfeminist environmental ethics. This standpoint is explained by the fact that ecofeminism holds a variety of views of nature, kinds of social constructivism and contextualism, and conceptions of values and of the self, and from the presumption that this variety reflects the reality of environmental problems. However, in order for ecofeminist ethical theory to fulfill its promise as an acceptable environmental ethical theory, its theoretical standpoints ought to be explicated and further clarified.</p>

This study focuses on ecofeminist ethical theory. A first aim is to clarify ecofeminist views on five central issues in the field of environmental ethics. These issues are: (1) Views of nature, (2) social constructivism and nature, (3) values of nature, (4) ethical contextualism, and (5) ethical pluralism. A second aim is to compare ecofeminist standpoints with certain standpoints within nonfeminist environmental ethical theory. A third aim is to critically discuss some of the main standpoints in ecofeminism. The analysis focuses on the works of Karen Warren, Sallie McFague, Chris Cuomo, and Carolyn Merchant. Other important sources are the environmental philosophers and ethicists J. Baird Callicott, Paul Taylor, Irene Klaver, Bryan G. Norton, Christopher Stone, Eugene Hargrove, Holmes Rolston III, Per Ariansen, Don E. Marietta, and Bruno Latour. The result of this study is that there are no main differences between ecofeminism and nonfeminist environmental ethics regarding the main standpoints on the five issues. Rather, the significant differences are found within these main standpoints. In addition, one important characteristic of ecofeminist ethics is its "double nature," that is, the fact that it is rooted in feminism and environmentalism. The double nature of ecofeminism results in a foundation out of which ecofeminism as an environmental philosophy has a unique potential to handle some of the theoretical tensions that environmental ethics creates. From the perspective that environmental problems consist of complex clusters of natureculture- discourse and that environmental ethical theory ought to be action guiding, it is argued that ecofeminist ethical theory has an advantage compared to nonfeminist environmental ethics. This standpoint is explained by the fact that ecofeminism holds a variety of views of nature, kinds of social constructivism and contextualism, and conceptions of values and of the self, and from the presumption that this variety reflects the reality of environmental problems. However, in order for ecofeminist ethical theory to fulfill its promise as an acceptable environmental ethical theory, its theoretical standpoints ought to be explicated and further clarified.

This study explores the rediscovery and development of a tradition of Ciceronian academic scepticism in British philosophy between c.1660-c.1760. It considers this tradition alongside two others, recently recovered by scholars, which were recognised by contemporaries to offer opposing visions of man, God and the origins of society: the Augustinian-Epicurean, and the neo-Stoic. It presents John Locke, Conyers Middleton and David Hume as the leading figures in the revival of the tradition of academic scepticism. It considers their works in relation to those of Anthony Ashley Cooper, third earl of Shaftesbury, and Bernard Mandeville, whose writings refashioned respectively the neo-Stoic and Augustinian-Epicurean traditions in influential ways. These five individuals explicitly identified themselves with these late Hellenistic philosophical traditions, and sought to contest and redefine conventional estimations of their meaning and significance. This thesis recovers this debate, which illuminates our understanding of the development of the ‘science of man’ in Britain. Cicero was a central figure in Locke’s attempt to explain, against Hobbes, the origins of society and moral consensus independent of political authority. Locke was a theorist of societies, religious and civil. He provided a naturalistic explanation of moral motivation and sociability which, drawing heavily from Cicero, emphasised the importance of men’s concern for the opinions of others. Locke set this within a Christian divine teleology. It was Locke’s theologically-grounded treatment of moral obligation, and his attack on Stoic moral philosophy, that led to Shaftesbury’s attempt to vindicate Stoicism. This was met by Mandeville’s profoundly Epicurean response. The consequences of the neo-Epicurean and neo-Stoic traditions for Christianity were explored by Middleton, who argued that only academic scepticism was consistent with Christian belief. Hume explored the relationship between morality and religion with continual reference to Cicero. He did so, in contrast to Locke or Middleton, to banish entirely moral theology from philosophy.

Infants with hypoxic-ischaemic encephalopathy (birth asphyxia) have a high risk of death or disability. Those with poor prognosis are sometimes allowed to die after withdrawal of intensive care. In recent years, doctors have used new types of brain scan, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), to predict the type and severity of impairment if the infant survives and to help with such decisions. In this thesis, I analyse the issues arising from the use of MRI for prognostication and decision-making in newborn infants. I argue that previous prognostic research has been hampered by a failure to identify and focus on the most important practical question and that this contributes to uncertainty in practice. I outline recommendations for improving research. I then look at existing guidelines about withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. I identify several problems with these guidelines; they are vague and fail to provide practical guidance, they provide little or no genuine scope for parental involvement in decisions, and they give no weight to the interests of others. I argue that parental interests should be given some weight in decisions for newborn infants. I develop a new model of decision-making that, using the concept of a Restricted Life, attempts to set out clearly the boundaries of parental discretion in decision-making. I argue that where infants are predicted to have severe cognitive or very severe physical impairment parents should be permitted to request either withdrawal or continuation of treatment. I justify this model on the basis of overlapping interests, (prognostic, experiential and moral) uncertainty, asymmetrical harms, and the burden of care. In the conclusion, I set out a guideline for the use of MRI in newborn infants with hypoxic-ischaemic encephalopathy. I suggest that this guideline would provide a more robust, coherent and practical basis for decision-making in newborn intensive care.

Based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Seoul from July 2012 until July 2013, this dissertation offers a novel perspective on human-animal interactions and public discourses regarding livestock versus pet moral boundaries in contemporary Korea. I aim to explore how Koreans struggle to make sense of the tension between the emergence of animal welfare and the perpetuation of traditional health behaviours that involve animal processing. The focus will be on why participants in my study, whether activists or not, defended both animal ethics and cat and dog meat consumption, while including Korean animals in fluid and instrumental conceptions of Koreanness. I have analysed a variety of discourses produced by both Korean and non-Korean, academic and non-academic stakeholders, in order to reveal the on-going tension between these powerful ubiquitous ideas and the lived experience of Koreans today. Moreover, I examine how the aesthetics of cruelty and empathy is employed in order to singularize livestock into companion animals thereby transgressing cultural taboos regarding Western ethics of species separation. I also demonstrate that converging and conflicting economic, political, social and cultural agendas are responsible for making Korea’s public discourses about animal welfare very unsettled. My research thus contributes to key anthropological debates about the cross-cultural circulation and cross-fertilisation of moral values that impact the ethics of post-industrial human-animal interactions; and about the influence of policy dialogue, at both national and international levels, on applied animal ethics, cultural stigmatization and the reinforcement of national sentiment.