While democracy is the least likely outcome of any given democratic transition from authoritarianism, this dissertation argues that the likelihood for democratization diminishes even further in a praetorian state. This is because the military continues to play a decisive role in the transition either directly or indirectly. If the transitions appears bound to bring about civilian control, the military will decide to rule overtly. At a broad conceptual level, this project adds to the existing literature on democratic breakdown that has been comparatively overlooked in relation to transitions and consolidation. The research also expands on the civil-military literature, and aims to explore the role praetorian militaries play during political transitions and processes of democratic consolidation. In particular, it seeks to explain the conditions under which a guardian or a moderator praetorian army would opt to become a ruling praetorian army, and, therefore, preclude the possibility of democratic consolidation. Indeed, this work aims to identify the factors responsible for the undoing of Egypt’s electoral advances, and whether or not that outcome was inevitable. The general assertion here is that the imbalance of power within the state, caused by the army’s oversized political role, and within society, caused by the Brotherhood’s relative organizational prowess, meant a confrontation between the two was virtually unavoidable. Fearing the prospect of subjective civilian control imposed by a potentially hegemonic party, a praetorian military is bound to check that party’s rise by waging a coup d’état in order to maintain the army’s institutional autonomy, economic privileges and right to rule. The rest of the political class aids this process by playing the role of the disloyal opposition paving the way for the officers to remove civilian officials, and carry out a restorative coup. While praetorian armies prefer to delegate the burden of governing to pliable civilians, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces’ (SCAF) failure to orchestrate a political transition into a tutelary democracy drove the army to shift its posture into ruling praetorianism. Contrary to their wishes and interests, the political transition engendered an intolerable situation for the army: the emergence, in the Muslim Brotherhood, of a potentially hegemonic party that repeatedly attempted (and failed) to subject the military to civilian control. / 2028-02-29T00:00:00Z

In the course of time, the Egyptian army has developed a complicated network of economic interests as a privileged establishment, and independent from civilian oversight or political surveillance. This dissertation argues that; the well-established and long lasting independent economic interests may turn the military establishment to an independent stakeholder and closed, conservative group within the society seeks to preserve its own privileges by controlling over the political power and resist any external oversight including the democratic reforms that may create a threat to these privileges. Such military establishment is a direct threat to any democratic transition. In this case, the armies securitize the political sphere raising the democratic reforms as foreign conspiracy and an existential threat to its privileges and raise the nationalism and xenophobic rhetoric as it needs to create a political justification for their security practices that aim to crush the opposition and secure the political power. I suppose that the Egyptian case shows causal relations between the economic interests of the military establishment and the nationalism as a dominant ideology. Such military is leaning to not only control the political power, but it aims to militarize the societal values and control over the...

The July military coup attempt in 2016 forced the Turkish nation to decide, whether it would follow examples of Republic's past and support the coup, or whether it would turn away from the army, thus giving up on the traditional perception of the army as a guardian of secularism and values on which Atatürk built the Republic. This work analyses how the Turkish civil-military relations changed, what factors influenced this change and how the Turkish society currently perceives the army. The research focused on four interventions staged by the army in the 20th century, as well as on the July coup attempt. Military coup is understood as a specific feature of the Turkish army and it is examined based on the theory of praetorianism; the coups in Turkey are then being presented as interventions, that were repeated not only based on army's determination to protect stability and the Republic as such, but also based on the nation's acceptance of the interventions which did perceive the army as a last resort. Furthermore, the work presents reasons, which played a crucial role in the transformation of civil-military relations in the beginning of 21st century, and it compares, how the perception of army by the Turkish nation was changing before and after the July coup attempt.

No / This study explores how colonial laws and administrative practices shaped the evolution of employment management in Pakistan. It identifies important mechanisms used by the British Raj (the period of British rule of the subcontinent) to institutionalise legal and administrative frameworks: the legacies of these structures continue to influence contemporary management practices in government sector organisations. This article investigates the legacy of the Raj's ¿quota system¿ in the civil services and the doctrine of the ¿martial race¿ in military services, both of which offered enduring structural advantages in the labour market to designated groups. It further considers the implications of the study's findings for international HRM in particular, but also management theory, comparative HRM and comparative management in post-colonial societies.