Olu phando luqwalasela indima yepragmatiki ekuphononongeni iincwadi ezikhethiweyo zesiXhosa. Isahluko sokuqala sinika okuqulathwe lolu phando, iinjongo zolu phando nezibe ngunobangela wokuba kukhethwe esi sihloko, imethodi yophando, imo yophando, ulwakhiwo lophando nalapho kukrotyiswa kokuqulathwe sisahluko ngasinye. Uphengululo lweencwadi lwenziwe eziqulathe umxholo wepragmatiki lwenziwe kwakuso esi sahluko. Ingcaciso yamagama aya kuthi asetyenziswe rhoqo inikiwe kwakuso esi sahluko Isahluko sesibini sijonga nzulu iingcingane eziya kuthi zisetyenziswe njengesikhokelo ekwenzeni olu phando. Ingcingane yolwimi kunye nengcingane yoncwadi zijongiwe kwesi sahluko. Ingcingane zepragmatiki eziquka leyo kaGrice nengundoqo kwipragmatiki nayo ithe yaqwalaselwa. Le ngcingane iye izise iindidi zeentsingiselo namasolotya azo. Ingcingane kaGrice ethi iphuhlise intsingiselo efihlakeleyo, intsingiselo ethe ngqo kunye nocingelo ziya- jongwa gabalala kwesi sahluko. Ingcingane yentetho ntshukumo iya kuthi ijongwe ze kujongwe nonxibelelo lwayo kuncwadi. Isahluko sesithathu sijonga nzulu ukusetyenziswa kwentsingisselo efihlakeleyo kwiincwadi ezikhethelwe esi sifundo. Umgaqo wonxibelelwano nezaci zawo ezizezi; isaci somgangatho, isaci sokungakanani, isaci sonxulumano kunye nesaci sobunjani zijongiwe kwiintetho zabalinganiswa nakwizimvo zombhali. Isaci esizihambelayo nesivela kakhulu ngokusetyenziswa kwesigqebelo namaqhalo naso sithe sajongwa ngokubhekiselele kwiincwadi ezikhethelwe esi sifundo.Isahluko sesine siqwalasele ukusetyenziswa kocingelo. Ucingelo nelilelinye isolotya lepragmatiki. Iindidi zocingelo zithe zajongwa, nezizezi: ucingelo lokukhoyo nokunokwenzeka, ucingelo lokuqonda, ucingelo lonobangela nesiphumo kunye nocingelo lwezichazi nezihlomelo. Izichukumisi zocingelo zijongiwe kugxilwe kwiincwadi zesiXhosa ezikhwethelwe esi sifundo. Isahluko sesihlanu siqwalasele intsingiselo ethe ngqo. Imiba yentsingiselo ethe ngqo efana nokuzigqibela, ukuvala isikhewu, ukunqanda ubumbaxa kunye nokusetyenziswa kwemiqondiso kuthe kwaqwalaselwa kwesi sahluko. Indlela ethe ngqo abalinganiswa abathile abathiywe ngayo ngababhali kwiincwadi ezikhethelwe esi sifundo iye izise intsingiselo ethe ngqo, oko ke kuthe kwaqwalaselwa kwesi sahluko.

The study of swearing has increased in the last decade, diversifying to include a wider range of data and methods of analysis. Nevertheless, certain types of data and specifically large corpora of computer mediated communication (CMC) have not been studied extensively. In this paper, we fill a gap in research by studying the use of swearwords in blog data, and illustrate ways of identifying swearing in a large corpus by taking context into account. This approach, based on the examination of shared and unique collocates of known expletives, facilitates the distinction of attestations of swearing from non-swearing in the case of polysemous lexemes, and the analysis of overlaps in usage and meaning of swearwords. This work therefore goes beyond basic sentiment analysis and offers new insights into the use of collocation for refining profanity filters, providing innovative perspectives on issues of growing importance as online interaction becomes more widespread.

Pragmatics “focuses on how people perform, interpret, and respond to language functions in a social context” (Taguchi, 2012, p.1), and therefore its development is key to the development of language competence. Pragmatics entails both linguistic knowledge to perform language functions (pragmalinguistics) and knowledge about the appropriateness of linguistic forms in a given social context (sociopragmatics) (Thomas, 1983). The acquisition of this skill has been shown to be one of the most difficult and latest acquired aspects of L2 learning (Bardovi-Harlig & Vellenga, 2012), and in this context, corrective feedback (information about the accuracy of learners’output), has been considered to be essential to the mastery of this knowledge. This study attempted to answer whether corrective feedback on L2 request and refusal forms provided through Face-to-Face (FF) or through Technology-Mediated (TM) modes can lead to an improvement in the learners’ performance in comprehension and production. Forty-four ELL students in three parallel intact classes were chosen to participate in the study. A Role-play test was used to collect production data and a multiple-choice discourse completion test was used to gather comprehension data. A mixed-model Analysis of Variance was conducted to examine the main and interaction effects of the treatment (corrective feedback), delivery mode (FF and TM), speech act type (request and refusal), and time (pre-test, post-test, and delayed post-test). The results demonstrated that CF led to improved performance in L2 pragmatics. Significant effects for corrective feedback were clear for both pragmatic comprehension and production, and there was no difference between comprehension and production improvement. Furthermore, the results showed that both FF and TM corrective feedback were effective modalities for improving pragmatic production while only TM delivery was effective in comprehending the target speech acts. The findings of the present study also suggest that CF effects were durable both in production and comprehension. The possibility of the effects of type of speech acts in influencing CF effects was generally rejected as CF improved comprehending and producing both speech acts significantly. In summary, the findings of the study generally support the application of CF and technology to the acquisition of second language pragmatic ability. / Graduate

<p>This work provides a theory of singular reference based on the idea that the function of a referring expression is to get an audience to think of some particular item. Although this obvious fact has not escaped anyone's notice, many believe that the considerations associated with this communicatory function do not belong to "semantics" but to "pragmatics". Others regard such considerations as relating to "perlocutionary", as opposed to "illocutionary", effects. By contrast the framework presented, which can be described as "Gricean", puts forward the theory of communication as the primary arena of semantics. I take the view (derived from Wittgenstein) that representation is to be explained in terms of agency. </p><p> Starting from a simple condition for paradigm acts of reference, the theory is developed by considering three areas of contemporary concern: names, definite descriptions and intentional contexts. While the "cluster" theory is upheld as an insight into the problem of determining the conventional bearer of a name, it is conceded that names function semantically in a manner postulated by Mill. Donnellan's distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions is redrawn; unlike recent accounts of this distinction, the account proposed represents the distinction as a sharp one The account of intentional contexts introduces an approac which exploits the Gricean model for analyzing a speaker' strategy. This approach differs significantly from other published accounts of intentional contexts.</p> / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

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No description available.

If, when asked whether you want more beer, you utter, ‘I’ve had enough’, your interlocutor knows that you have had enough of beer. That is, from the literal content of ‘I’ve had enough’, your interlocutor infers that you say, ‘I’ve had enough [of beer]’. Language theorists convincingly claim that hearers almost always make similar inferences to figure out what speaker say. However, in doing so they also claim that interlocutors do not evaluate literal content for truth in everyday conversation – it is either true or false that you have had enough of beer, not just ‘enough’. That is, they claim that literal content is not useful to interlocutors. In this thesis, I defend Emma Borg’s (2019) claim that literal content actually is useful to interlocutors. First, I argue that Borg is correct in that asking for ‘speaker liability’ shows that interlocutors evaluate literal content for truth in cases of lying. Second, I both consider a challenge to speaker liability and an objection to how the Gricean distinction between saying and implicating, the composite notion of ‘what is said’, I (and Borg) argue for should be drawn.

<p>This investigation examined the functions of two Spanish discourse markers, <i>pues</i> and <i>bueno</i>, in the interlanguage of intermediate English-speaking learners of Spanish. <i>Pues</i> is translated in English to ‘so’, ‘then’, ‘cos’, and ‘well’, and <i>bueno</i> is translated in English to ‘well’ and ‘alright’. Discourse markers like <i>pues</i> and <i>bueno </i>provide cohesion in spoken interaction, and despite the lack of attention received in second language research and classrooms, they are important linguistic features for second language users. While several studies have addressed discourse markers by non-native speakers, the present investigation contributed to the scarce body of research on interlanguage discourse marker use in Spanish and to general theoretical discussions about second language discourse marker use and acquisition by considering discourse marker frequency in input and describing the use of <i>pues</i> and <i>bueno</i> in the interlanguage of Spanish learners. In this investigation, frequency of use, functional range, and functional distribution were analyzed as three distinct facets of discourse marker proficiency.</p> <p>Using a native speaker functional framework established by Travis (2005) for reference, the analyses responded to the following general questions: How do Spanish learners compare to native speakers of Peninsular Spanish in their frequency of use, functional range, and functional distribution of <i>pues</i> and <i>bueno</i>? How are these three variables among learners affected by a 6-week, language immersion study abroad program? Finally, how do native speakers of Peninsular Spanish and second language learners of Spanish compare in their characteristic patterns of <i>pues</i> and <i>bueno</i> functional use? Using oral interviews of 58 non-native (L2) Spanish speakers at the beginning and end of a program abroad and 14 native speakers (NS) of Spanish from Madrid, all tokens of <i>pues</i> (<i>N</i> = 506) and <i>bueno</i> (<i>N</i> = 273) were analyzed according to the functional framework (Travis, 2005). Analyses revealed infrequent L2 use of <i>pues </i>and <i>bueno</i> with a limited range of functions and distinct functional distribution compared to NS data. Over the program abroad, learners significantly increased their functional range of <i>pues</i>.<i> </i>No other significant differences in learner use over the program were identified. Detailed analysis of the patterns of use of native speakers and learners led to the identification of unique discourse marker uses in the interlanguage of learners. These findings were discussed in light of issues of interlanguage discourse marker use, discourse marker frequency in input, and second language instruction.</p>

Pragmatic language impairments have been found in children with high-functioning Autism (HFA). Limited studies have investigated the contributing factors. This study compared 23 children with HFA with 28 typically-developing children on pragmatic language measures, with their age, cognitive ability and language ability matched or controlled. Deficit of children with HFA was found in making inferences in comprehension but not in narrative ability, and abilities to make inferences in narrative and about psychological state. Theory of mind was an impairment for children with HFA and correlated with inferences about psychological state. In the measure of executive functioning at visual-perceptual level, better performance was found in children with HFA. This cognitive factor did not correlate with any pragmatic language measure. / published_or_final_version / Educational Psychology / Master / Master of Social Sciences

Recently, Gualtiero Piccinini and Carl Craver (2011) have argued that functional analyses in psychology lack explanatory autonomy from explanations in neuroscience. In this thesis I argue against this claim by motivating and defending a pragmatic-epistemic conception of autonomous psychological explanation. I argue that this conception of autonomy need not require that functional analyses be distinct in kind from neural-mechanistic explanations. I use the framework of Bas van Fraassen’s Pragmatic Theory of Explanation (van Fraassen 1980) to show that explanations in psychology and neuroscience can be seen as seeking understanding of autonomous levels of mechanistic phenomena.