31 |
Internal controls, collusion, and hierarchical structureNovoselov, Kirill Evgenievitch, 1968- 28 August 2008 (has links)
This study uses the principal-agent framework to investigate the trade-off between the benefits of internal control stemming from a reduction of the losses from inappropriate employee actions and the cost of implementing it brought about by the possibility of collusion that it creates. It is shown that, when the agents find it relatively easy to collude, implementing internal control reduces agency welfare, defined as the sum of expected payments accruing to the principal and the agents, even as, with positive transaction costs of collusion, it improves productive efficiency, defined as the expected output. As a result, the principal, under certain conditions, finds it in her best interest to use internal control as a threat instead of implementing it. When this is the case, the principal sometimes prefers to decrease the accuracy of the accounting information system. The analysis of the agents' side contracting indicates that, even if the principal can prevent explicit collusion, for some values of parameters the possibility of tacit collusion still results in a loss. The study also investigates the effect of the choice of organizational form on the value of internal control. The analysis of two different versions of the model demonstrates that, for a wide range of parameters, creating a hierarchical structure reduces, albeit does not eliminate, the loss from collusion -- i.e., internal control and hierarchical delegation are complementary instruments of organizational design. It is also shown that, when one agent is ex ante more likely to be efficient than the other, in most cases the principal optimally appoints to the supervisory position the one who is less likely to be efficient. As a result, the supervisor, in expectation, exerts a lower effort level than the subordinate and collects higher salary. / text
|
32 |
Government sponsored crime prevention in Hong Kong: an overviewEvans, S. G. January 1992 (has links)
published_or_final_version / Sociology / Master / Master of Social Sciences
|
33 |
Crime prevention: the role of the district Fight Crime CommitteesWai, Hing-cheung, William., 衛慶祥. January 1995 (has links)
published_or_final_version / Sociology / Master / Master of Social Sciences
|
34 |
Pragmatic approaches for identifying and treating individuals at high risk of diabetes and cardiovascular diseaseChamnan, Parinya January 2011 (has links)
No description available.
|
35 |
The screening and evaluation of suicide interventionistsAdesso, Vincent J. January 1970 (has links)
No description available.
|
36 |
Fatalistic social control : the reproduction of oppression through the medium of gangs /Durán, Robert. January 2006 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.) -- University of Colorado, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 268-298). Also available online (viewed 2/18/08).
|
37 |
Governing crime through prevention in late twentieth century Canada /Gervais, Christine L. M. January 1900 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Carleton University, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 437-478). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.
|
38 |
Crime prevention : the role of the district Fight Crime Committees /Wai, Hing-cheung, William. January 1995 (has links)
Thesis (M. Soc. Sc.)--University of Hong Kong, 1995. / Xeror copy of the original. Includes bibliographical references (leaf 68-75).
|
39 |
Sense of safetyHaas, Charles G. January 1900 (has links)
Thesis (M.A.)--University of Detroit Mercy, 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 116-117).
|
40 |
Crime prevention the role of the district Fight Crime Committees /Wai, Hing-cheung, William. January 1995 (has links)
Thesis (M.Soc.Sc.)--University of Hong Kong, 1995. / Xeror copy of the original. Includes bibliographical references (leaf 68-75) Also available in print.
|
Page generated in 0.1004 seconds