Internprissättning är vanligt inom dagens koncerner och växer mer allt eftersom världshandeln har globaliserats. Användandet av internprissättning för att öka vinsten är en diskussion som tog fart redan på 1950-talet. En diskussion som baserats på att bolag medvetet förbättrar sin skatt genom de olika metoderna som finns. Ett utnyttjande av regleringars brister och otydliga tolkningar. Ämnet är speciellt då det kräver kunskap inom både företagsekonomi och juridik. Att ämnet är brett gör det än mer komplext och en bredare kunskap krävs för att fullt förstå dess problematik. / Transfer pricing is common in today's corporations and grows more as world trade has become globalized. The use of transfer pricing to increase profits is a discussion that took off in the 1950's. A discussion based on the company consciously improve their taxes through the various methods available. A utilization of regulation flaws and unclear interpretations. The topic is unique because it requires expertise in both business administration and law. That the subject is wide makes it even more complex and broader knowledge required to fully understand its problems.

I consider the workings, under free entry, of some plausible mechanisms enforcing product quality when it is not readily observed by buyers, but is chosen by sellers: there is a moral hazard problem to be overcome. In equilibrium, uninformed buyers can often take price as indicating quality. This is however not the sarne as Spence's signalling notion, since quality is chosen by sellers. It is fruitful to consider price as a commitment, which changes the quality-incentives in a common-knowledge way. In the introduction, I note briefly much of the relevant literature, including my M. Phil, thesis. In Chapter 1, on Repeat-Sales, I consider a continuous model of that incentive to quality. With strong simplifying assumptions, I am able to solve for 'competitive' equilibrium, which involves a bunding of buyers at the minimum quality level, price premia for higher qualities, and consequent inefficiencies. The second chapter is the theory of cheating. It is possible, but costly, for buyers to be 'vigilant'; but equilibrium cannot involve their all being vigilant. There are various externalities between buyers. Different prices can exist in equilibrium, with different honesty levels. I identify a key feature of the cost function, which (together with buyers' tastes, etc.) determines equilibrium. In Chapter 3, I consider introductory offers and their role in entry and quality-signalling, when buyers are very rational. When buyers are identical, a single entrant will never use introductory offers. If there are many entrants, a low first-period price will be observed, but it conveys no information. Only some quality levels can (credibly) be promised by an entrant, and the result is that an incumbent can make positive profits but prevent entry.

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In North America, automobile prices are largely determined through negotiation. Recognizing that some consumers have a strong aversion to negotiation, some manufacturers and dealers are now offering consumers the option of buying cars at a “no-haggle”, or fixed price. This dissertation consists of three essays which address how a fixed price alternative impacts both consumer behavior and firm strategies. The first essay explores the conditions under which a dealer would simultaneously offer a “no-haggle” Internet price and a negotiable price on the lot (which we term a dual-channel), and studies the marketing strategies adopted under this structure. We use consumer haggling cost as a key to understanding a dealer’s choice of pricing strategy. We find that a dual-channel is optimal for the dealer when there is sufficient diversity in consumer haggling cost. We also find that it is optimal for a dealer to specify a higher-than-cost “minimum acceptable price” to the salesperson as a price floor for negotiations. Surprisingly, a dual-channel may serve fewer customers while still being more profitable than a single channel structure. The second essay examines the competitive implications of a no-haggle pricing policy. By using Toyota’s fixed pricing policy in Canada as a natural experiment, we explore the impact of such a strategy on the prices and sales of Toyota and that of its close competitor, Honda. We find that the program has had important competitive consequences. While prices of both Toyota and Honda were higher in provinces with the program, there was an increase in Honda’s sales but with no effect on the sales of Toyota. The third essay determines the impact of a consumer’s bargaining behavior and information she collects on the final price paid. Using an extensive dataset, we find that a consumer’s negotiation skill and attitude toward negotiating significantly influences the negotiation outcome. In particular, consumers that enjoy negotiating have a greater propensity to search for price information which then allows them to obtain a better deal. In addition, we find that, while Internet users pay a lower price, the savings depend on the type of information collected by the buyer.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--UCLA, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 125-126).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1990. / Vita. Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 334-343). Also available via the Internet.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Columbia University, 2007. / Advisers: Soulaymane Kachani, Mark Broadie. Includes bibliographical references.

Zugl.: Wien, WirtschaftsUniversity, Diss., 2005. / Description based on print version record.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--West Virginia University, 1999. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains xii, 147 p. : ill. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 100-113).