In this thesis we examine the issue regarding pricing of radar data and surveillance to the operators of air navigation service (ANS) at the aerodromes in Sweden. The question of who should be responsible for providing radar data to the operators is being managed that results in if it should be LFV, as it is today, the government or another authority. This is being examined since LFV in 2010 lost its monopoly position in the terminal area in Sweden. LFV still has monopoly on the en route part, and thru the en route income finances the radar data to all operators in Sweden. Air traffic service units (ATS) receive the radar data without any compensation to LFV, this needs to be regulated and conditions and prerequisites are necessary to be implemented. Our supervisor at LFV, Anders Andersson, has been the primary source of information regarding the current situation, background for the problem and also provided relevant documents with proper information. Laws and regulations have been accessed via the Swedish Transport Agency’s website and scientific articles on monopolies and pricing in aviation and other markets have been used in order to compare earlier issues similar to ours. The literature studies combined with interviews with Anders Andersson are the foundations of the development of the pricing schemes. The result of the thesis is presented as three different pricing schemes where each one of them are presented in tables and analysed how it will affect the ATS. In the first pricing scheme the cost for maintenance is equally divided between all ATS, this means every ATS has to pay the same cost regardless size of the airport, number of movement and net sales. The second pricing scheme is based on number of landings per year and divides the ATS in three categories. This scheme increases the cost with concern to the number of landings, which results in the larger ATS are charged more than the smaller ATS. The final pricing scheme is divided in four categories and based on terminal control area (TMA) and requirements on surveillance service. This means the different categories are based on a combination of the median distance flown in TMA and the different requirements the ATS must provide surveillance service. This pricing scheme is a disadvantage for the military airports and the ATS with associated TMA. The conclusions that can be made are the Swedish Transport Agency needs to implement some distinct guidelines and regulations regarding how the pricing should be made, where the pricing schemes and analysis in this thesis could form the basis for future investigations.