Shortly after the February 2014 Euromaidan revolution which ousted pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, Russia orchestrated a rapid and mostly bloodless annexation of the Crimea. Following the removal of Ukrainian authority from the peninsula, the Kremlin focused simultaneously on legitimizing the annexation via an electoral reform in Crimea and fermenting political unrest in the Donbas. As violence broke out in the Donbas, anti-Ukrainian government militias were formed by defecting Ukrainian security forces members, local volunteers, and volunteers from Russia. The Kremlin provided extensive support for these militias which sometimes even came in the form of direct military intervention by conventional Russian forces. However, the use of state-sponsored militias by Russia is not a new phenomenon. Since the end of the Cold War, the Russian Federation has been relying on militias to help stabilize local security environments, and more recently, achieve foreign security policy objectives in the Near Abroad. By tracking the history of Vostok (East) Battalion during its two distinctly different iterations, first as a militia for the Yamadayev family which operated primarily in Chechnya as well as briefly in South Ossetia and Lebanon and then as separatist formation in Eastern Ukraine, my thesis seeks to examine why Russia uses militias. Using the theoretical frameworks of principle-agent relations and organizational hierarchy, my thesis examines post-Soviet military reforms to contextualize the Kremlin's rationale for utilizing militia groups as well as analyzing the costs and benefits Moscow ultimately incurs when it leverages militias as force projection assets domestically and in the Near Abroad. / Master of Arts / This thesis is an examination of Russia’s relationship with its proxy militias. Proxy militias are paramilitary formations comprised of a mix of civilians and military veterans which states use to carry out acts of coercive violence without having to rely on regular military forces. Specifically, the thesis is divided into two case studies of a unit known as Vostok Battalion. Vostok has existed in two distinctly different iterations; first as a Chechen based militia operating throughout the Caucuses and later as a rebel militia fighting the Ukrainian government in the Donbas region. In both cases, Vostok received support and varying levels of guidance from Russia. The case studies of this thesis are attempting to contextualize why Russia utilizes proxy militias and identify the challenges Russia faces when its ability to control them is degraded.

In this dissertation I study corruption in the public sector in Sweden, a country which the literature regards as having few corruption problems. Sweden is therefore classified as a “least corrupt” case, and such countries are seldom studied in corruption research. My work is thus an effort to fill a gap in the literature. This research is also motivated by a conviction that such a case provides a fertile ground for studying danger zones for corruption. For example, this work allows me to explore how institutional and contextual changes impact on corruption and danger zones. Though the main focus of this work is on Sweden, I also have comparative ambitions. First, I locate Sweden in a cross-national context. I then study corruption in Sweden using a comparative methodology and with an eye to international comparisons. I apply a combined theoretical approach and a multi-method investigation based on several empirical sources and both quantitative and qualitative techniques. This research strategy enables me to capture a phenomenon (corruption) that is more difficult to identify in countries with relatively few obvious corruption scandals than it is in countries in which the phenomenon has traditionally been studied. Regarding danger zones for corruption, the results show that some of the zones identified in the international literature, such as public procurement, are also important in Sweden. For the Swedish case, my empirical research also identifies the types of corruption that occur, perceptions of danger zones and corruption, how corruption changes over time, and how corruption is fought. With regard to the latter, one conclusion is that ingrained (male) sub-cultures can be problematic and may need to be opened up using a combination of measures like promoting a more heterogeneous group of politicians, creating more transparent proceedings in decision groups and conducting more effective audits. The research also highlights the importance of adapting control measures to existing structures of delegation. For example, if delegation arrangements are changed to improve efficiency and cut costs, new accountability measures may be necessary. In general, delegation and control structures should be structured in such a way as to make the cost of shirking quite high. Finally, based on the results of this multi-method investigation, I conclude that one avenue for further corruption research is to connect our knowledge of danger zones to what we know about mechanisms effecting corrupt behaviour, and then to apply this to discussions of new models of the politics of management in multi-level governance.