朱英女. / Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學, 1988. / Reprint ed. / Includes bibliographical references: leaves 103-107. / Zhu Yingnü. / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 1988. / 簡語表 --- p.I / 前言 --- p.III / Chapter 第一章 --- 後期維特根斯坦的語言觀 --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- 對早期語言觀的批評 --- p.4 / Chapter 1.2 --- 一個新的進路 --- p.8 / Chapter 1.3 --- 語言遊戲 --- p.10 / Chapter 1.4 --- 對奧古斯殅語言觀的批評 --- p.13 / Chapter 1.5 --- 從用法了解意義 --- p.16 / Chapter 1.6 --- 語言規則 --- p.18 / Chapter 1.7 --- 遵守規則是慣常的活動 --- p.23 / Chapter 1.8 --- 小結 --- p.26 / Chapter 第二章 --- 私有語言論證 --- p.28 / Chapter 2.1 --- 什麼是私有語言？ --- p.28 / Chapter 2.2 --- 怎樣才是一套語言？ --- p.31 / Chapter 2.3 --- 語言的使用判準 --- p.34 / Chapter 2.4 --- 語言的「舞台背景」 --- p.38 / Chapter 2.5 --- 感覺語言與行為 --- p.42 / Chapter 2.6 --- 「私有」的意義 --- p.44 / Chapter 2.7 --- 獨處者的語言 --- p.48 / Chapter 2.8 --- 綜述 --- p.50 / Chapter 第三章 --- 克里普克對私有語言論證的解釋 --- p.55 / Chapter 3.1 --- 私有語言論證的基本結構 --- p.55 / Chapter 3.2 --- 《哲學探究》的中心問題 --- p.57 / Chapter 3.3 --- 懷疑論者的問題 --- p.60 / Chapter 3.4 --- 回答問題的幾個設想 --- p.63 / Chapter ( 1 ) --- 定義 --- p.63 / Chapter ( 2 ) --- 獨一的答案 --- p.64 / Chapter ( 3 ) --- 傾向性分析 --- p.65 / Chapter ( 4 ) --- 最簡單的假設 --- p.67 / Chapter ( 5 ) --- 不可還原的內省經驗 --- p.69 / Chapter ( 6 ) --- 原初狀態的本身 --- p.70 / Chapter 3.5 --- 亦是感覺語言的問題 --- p.71 / Chapter 3.6 --- 懷疑論的解答 --- p.73 / Chapter 3.7 --- 真值條件和斷言條件 --- p.74 / Chapter 3.8 --- 遵守規則的證立條件 --- p.76 / Chapter 3.9 --- 否認遵守規則的私有模式 --- p.78 / Chapter 第四章 --- 對克里普克解釋的回應 --- p.80 / Chapter 4.1 --- 「解釋」在遵守規則的行為中的位置 --- p.80 / Chapter 4.2 --- 意圖：過去的事實 --- p.85 / Chapter 4.3 --- 社團的判斷 --- p.89 / Chapter 4.4 --- 克里普克何以作出這個解釋 --- p.92 / Chapter 4.5 --- 維特根斯坦對懷疑論的態度 --- p.94 / Chapter 4.6 --- 結論 --- p.97 / 注釋 --- p.100 / 參考書目 --- p.103 / 論文撮要 --- p.108

by Lau Yiu Keung. / Thesis (M.Ph.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1987. / Bibliography: leaves 72-73.

Wittgenstein was a very important philosopher of the early twentieth century. One of his most important points was that which has been known as the Private Language Argument. This argument was given a new interpretation by Saul Kripke in 1982, which stirred up much debate. This essay investigates Kripke´s so called “skeptical challenge” and his “skeptical solution” to that challenge. To further enlighten the subject this essay also discusses a critique to Kripke´s interpretation, provided by the main critics, Baker and Hacker (1984). The conclusion of the essay is that Kripke´s theory takes up some interesting and important issues, although there are some serious flaws in Kripke´s solution that needs to be addressed if the solution is to be taken seriously.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--York University, 2001. Graduate Programme in Philosophy. / Typescript. Title on certificate page: Wittgenstein's jukundus : language, pathology and therapy. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 405-433). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pNQ66362.

none

No description available.

Este trabalho tem como objetivo principal a análise do papel do conceito de regra nas Investigações Filosóficas de Wittgenstein. No decorrer do texto, deparamonos com as leituras de S. Kripke e G.P. Baker & P.M.S. Hacker. O primeiro defende que a noção de regra, apesar de apresentar um paradoxo, cumpre um importante papel no argumento contra a linguagem privada. E acredita que há uma solução cética para o paradoxo que flerta com o niilismo. Por outro lado, os comentadores ingleses apresentam o conceito de regra cumprindo um papel fundamental na explicação de Wittgenstein acerca do funcionamento da linguagem. Na medida em que estas se constituem como funções normativas de usos das palavras, são expressas na linguagem e determinadas contingentemente de acordo com os contextos de uso. / This work has as main objective the analysis of the role of the concept of rule in Wittgensteins Philosophical Investigations. Throughout the text we have the readings of S. Kripke and G.P. Baker & P M S. Hacker. The first argues that the notion of rule, inspite of presenting a paradox, it is a very important point in the argument against private language. He believes there is a skeptical solution to the paradox which flirts with nihilism. Furthermore, the Englishs commentators have the concept of rule fulfilling a key role in the explanation of Wittgenstein on the functioning of language. The rules are as functions of normative uses of words, they are expressed in the language and determinate according to the contexts of use.

No description available.

The rule-following problem can be condensed into the paradox that a rule cannot determine any course of action because every course of action can be made to accord with that rule. In his Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke sees this paradox as potentially leading to a radical semantic scepticism that renders meaning itself meaningless, and attributes a sceptical solution of the problem to Wittgenstein. After a critical examination of Kripke's work, I conclude that this solution fails on account of allowing neither for a normativity beyond the subjection of the individual to correction by others in her community, nor for a non-interpretive conception of the understanding. Finally, I propose an alternative solution that incorporates the notion of communal background understanding into that of a form of life and thus preserves the normativity of rule-following and of language.

This thesis analyzes the relation between Kripke&#039 / s rule-sceptic argument and Wittgenstein&#039 / s paradox. Besides, Kripke&#039 / s claim that the conclusion of Wittgenstein&#039 / s private language argument is stated in PI 202 will be discussed. The thesis will also evaluate the consistency of Kripke&#039 / s rule-sceptic argument independently of Wittgenstein&#039 / s views.