This dissertation argues that the novels of Henry James offer a conception of personhood and of human freedom better able to explain and unify private law than the conceptions currently dominant in private law theory. I begin by laying out the two conceptual frameworks that now dominate private law theory: Kantian right and the feminist ethic of care. I argue that Kantian right‟s exclusive focus on respect for freedom of choice makes it unable to explain private law doctrines founded upon concern for human well-being, including unjust enrichment, unconscionability, and liability for negligence. However, feminism‟s ethic of care, which can be understood as a response to the Kantian abstraction from considerations of well-being and need, is also incomplete, because its understanding of the person as essentially connected to others fails to respect human separateness. I then offer readings of James‟ novels—The Portrait of a Lady, What Maisie Knew, and The Ambassadors—that show how vindicating individual worth requires both respect for abstract agency‟s separateness and freedom to choose, on the one hand, and concern for the dependent individual‟s well-being and autonomous flourishing, on the other. I argue that these two ideas are complementary parts of a complete understanding of human dignity and freedom. Finally, I argue that this understanding illuminates doctrines of private law that remain mysterious on the Kantian account while avoiding feminism‟s tendency to immerse private law in public law.

This dissertation argues that the novels of Henry James offer a conception of personhood and of human freedom better able to explain and unify private law than the conceptions currently dominant in private law theory. I begin by laying out the two conceptual frameworks that now dominate private law theory: Kantian right and the feminist ethic of care. I argue that Kantian right‟s exclusive focus on respect for freedom of choice makes it unable to explain private law doctrines founded upon concern for human well-being, including unjust enrichment, unconscionability, and liability for negligence. However, feminism‟s ethic of care, which can be understood as a response to the Kantian abstraction from considerations of well-being and need, is also incomplete, because its understanding of the person as essentially connected to others fails to respect human separateness. I then offer readings of James‟ novels—The Portrait of a Lady, What Maisie Knew, and The Ambassadors—that show how vindicating individual worth requires both respect for abstract agency‟s separateness and freedom to choose, on the one hand, and concern for the dependent individual‟s well-being and autonomous flourishing, on the other. I argue that these two ideas are complementary parts of a complete understanding of human dignity and freedom. Finally, I argue that this understanding illuminates doctrines of private law that remain mysterious on the Kantian account while avoiding feminism‟s tendency to immerse private law in public law.