11 |
The economic performance of Chinese state-owned enterprises after denationalizationLok, Pui-kit, Pokit., 駱佩傑. January 1998 (has links)
published_or_final_version / Economics and Finance / Master / Master of Economics
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12 |
Corporatization: a step towards privatizationSwartz, Kristi L. January 1998 (has links)
published_or_final_version / Law / Master / Master of Laws
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13 |
Effectiveness of privatization of public shopping centers and identification of asset enhancement opportunitiesKung, Wai-hung., 龔偉雄. January 2009 (has links)
published_or_final_version / Housing Management / Master / Master of Housing Management
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14 |
Privatization of the management of public housing estateFan, Kin-lok., 范健樂. January 2005 (has links)
published_or_final_version / Housing Management / Master / Master of Housing Management
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15 |
A study of the impact of privatization on ex-Housing Department staff transited from public sector to private sectorHui, Kam-ming., 許甘銘. January 2006 (has links)
published_or_final_version / Housing Management / Master / Master of Housing Management
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16 |
A study of private sector involvement of the Hong Kong Housing Authority in property management serviceLam, Kwong-ho., 林江河. January 2006 (has links)
published_or_final_version / Housing Management / Master / Master of Housing Management
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17 |
Corporatisation of university as future strategy of reinventing highereducation in Hong KongLi, Chi-yan, 李智恩 January 2005 (has links)
published_or_final_version / Public Administration / Master / Master of Public Administration
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18 |
An analysis of the failure to privatise the Airport AuthorityTsang, Hoi-leung., 曾海亮. January 2010 (has links)
published_or_final_version / Politics and Public Administration / Master / Master of Public Administration
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19 |
An evaluating of privatization of public housing management in Hong KongWu, Kit, 胡傑 January 2009 (has links)
published_or_final_version / Architecture / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy
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20 |
An investigation of incentive conflicts in the privatization of highlyspecific fixed infrastructure assetsYue, Tsz-kit., 余子傑. January 2009 (has links)
Inefficient industrial policies in the 1970’s led to the growth of privatization since the late 1970’s. Apart from the general trend of privatization worldwide, budgetary distress (1999-2003) after the Asian Financial Crisis (1997-8) obliged the Hong Kong government to adopt extensive privatization of public assets and services to increase income and reduce expenditure, including privatizing the construction, ownership and management of infrastructure projects. However, obstacles to efficient privatization abound, and it is suggested that incentive conflicts in privatizations may result in poorly performing or even failed transactions. Following a literature review, it is suggested that inefficient privatization seem to be present in complex and highly asset specific projects. The review suggests that asset specificity could also be an obstacle to efficient transactions. In project finance, however, it has been shown that asset specificity could be used strategically to manage agency incentive conflicts. It is thus argued that highly specific fixed assets privatization transactions may be incentive inefficient if incentive conflicts are unchecked. Since asset specificity has been used particularly in the project finance field to manage agency incentive conflicts, this study investigates the effect of high asset specificity in facilitating incentive efficient privatization of highly specific fixed infrastructure assets. The proposition that high asset specificity contributes significantly to incentive efficient privatization of fixed infrastructure assets is examined using the case study methodology. Incentive efficiency is taken to mean clear identification of incentive conflicts, clear measures taken to manage the conflicts, and clear measures taken to “minimize” costs incurred in managing such conflicts. A fourth concept, a transaction's "internal coherence" is a subjective consideration of the mutually reinforcing functioning of these measures whilst drawing on asset specificity for additional effectiveness. An exploratory case study, the Western Harbour Crossing (WHC) Build Operate Transfer privatization, a highly specific cross harbour tunnel in Hong Kong, was analyzed. Evidence was sought through desk research of published secondary case material, aimed at confirming or otherwise the proposition. Three major sources of information, namely the concession agreement and allocation of property rights, corporate structure and financing and operational matters, were considered, following a structured transaction analysis framework. Incentive conflicts and corresponding management mechanisms are pointed out, and it is discovered that asset specificity has salient effects on the management of incentive conflicts in WHC. Since asset specificity was used strategically in the design of transaction governance mechanisms, asset specificity contributed substantially to enforce property rights and monitor incentive conflicts. Furthermore, the three concepts of incentive efficiency seem well coordinated. Thus it was argued that transaction governance in WHC was internally coherent. The presence of the four concepts of incentive efficiency was considered convincing evidence to conclude that high asset specificity contributes significantly to incentive efficient privatization of fixed infrastructure assets. / published_or_final_version / Real Estate and Construction / Master / Master of Philosophy
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