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The aim of this work is to use contemporary notation to build theory of Rosser logic, explain in detail its relation to Peano arithmetic, show its Kripke semantics and finally using plural self-reference show the proof of arithmetical completeness. In the last chapter we show some of the properties of Rosser sentences. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)

This thesis deals with the algorithmic undecidability (unsolvability) of provability in some non-classical logics. In fact, there are two natural variants of this problem. Fix a logic, we can study its set of theorems or its consequence relation, which is a more general problem. It is well-known that both these problems can be undecidable already for propositional logics and we provide further examples of such logics in this thesis. In particular, we study propositional substructural logics which are obtained from the sequent calculus LJ for intuitionistic logic by dropping structural rules. Our main results are the following. First, (finite) consequence relations in some basic non-associative substructural logics are shown to be undecidable. Second, we prove that a basic associative substructural logic with the contraction rule, which is notorious for being hard to handle, has an undecidable set of theorems. Since the studied logics have natural algebraic semantics, we also obtain corresponding algebraic results which are interesting in their own right.

In the Light of Intuitionism: Two Investigations in Proof Theory This dissertation focuses on two specific interconnections between the clas- sical and the intuitionistic proof theory. In the first part, we will propose a formalization for Gödel's informal reading of the BHK interpretation, using the usual classical arithmetical proofs. His provability interpretation of the propositional intuitionistic logic, first appeared in [1], in which he introduced the modal system, S4, as a formalization of the intuitive concept of prov- ability and then translated IPC to S4 in a sound and complete manner. His work suggested the search for a concrete provability interpretation for the modal logic S4 which itself leads to a concrete provability interpretation for the intutionistic logic. In the first chapter of this work, we will try to solve this problem. For this purpose, we will generalize Solovay's provabil- ity interpretation of the modal logic GL to capture other modal logics such as K4, KD4 and S4. Then, using the mentioned Gödel's translation, we will propose a formalization for the BHK interpretation via classical proofs. As a consequence, it will be shown that the BHK interpretation is powerful enough to admit many different formalizations that surprisingly capture dif- ferent propositional logics, including...

This thesis examines the method of forcing in set theory and focuses on aspects that are set aside in the usual presentations or applications of forcing. It is shown that forcing can be formalized in Peano arithmetic (PA) and that consis- tency results obtained by forcing are provable in PA. Two ways are presented of overcoming the assumption of the existence of a countable transitive model. The thesis also studies forcing as a method giving rise to interpretations between theories. A notion of bi-interpretability is defined and a method of forcing over a non-standard model of ZFC is developed in order to argue that ZFC and ZF are not bi-interpretable. 1