Pu-Ma Hangjaeng (the Pusan and Masan Uprising, hereafter Pu-Ma) of 1979 was the largest and longest incident of civil unrest and resistance during the Park Chung-hee regime in South Korea. However, overshadowed by more sensational and disruptive events in the turmoil of contemporary South Korean history, Pu-Ma was largely forgotten. In the post-democratization era, scholarly attention on Pu-Ma in Korean has steadily increased, and Pu-Ma’s valorization as a citizens’ uprising against government oppression has increased as well. It has now been given an important place in the genealogy of the democratic movement in South Korea. I term such recognition among scholars, as well as South Korean governments, the nationalization of Pu-Ma. One of the central concerns of this study is to explore the socio-political reasons behind this process. I attempt to demonstrate that the nationalization of Pu-Ma is closely related to the consensus among progressive scholars about the need to transcend regionalism and resist nostalgia for the Park Chung-hee era. My other focus is on the localization of Pu-Ma, which refers to citizens’ acceptance of Pu-Ma as a proud part of the identities of Pusan and Masan. I explore why localization of Pu-Ma has been problematic despite progressive scholars’ efforts to promote it. I argue that the most significant reason is the difficulty in building coherent collective memory among the participants in Pu-Ma as well as the citizens who witnessed the uprising. I investigate Pu-Ma through newspapers, oral history, and scholarly works to learn why memories of it have remained disconnected and inconsistent for so long. / text

Applied research project (D. Min.)--School of Theology and Missions, Oral Roberts University, 2006. / Includes abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 132-138).

Applied research project (D. Min.)--School of Theology and Missions, Oral Roberts University, 2006. / Includes abstract and vita. Translated from Korean. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 151-156).

Fighting Power: Interpretive Issues The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, 1950 Hammes, Thomas Xavier Lincoln College Submitted for Doctor of Philosophy in History Trinity Term 2008 When the Korean War broke out on 25 June 1950, the Marine Corps was ordered to deploy an air-ground brigade from California in less than ten days. Due to five years of massive budget and manpower cuts, the Marine Corps did not have even a brigade immediately available. The only way to meet the sailing timeline was to organize, man and equip the force while actually embarking it. As it embarked, the brigade had to incorporate marines flown in from posts all over the western United States; draw equipment from war reserves held hundreds of miles away; reorganize many of the existing units under new tables of organization; and add an experimental helicopter detachment from the east coast of the United States. Despite these enormous handicaps and numerically superior enemy forces, the brigade won every engagement. This performance was in stark contrast to the performance of all other US forces at this stage of the war. The brigade’s brief existence (7 July to 6 Sept 1950), combined with its exceptional combat record under adverse conditions, provides the opportunity to study the impact of institutional culture, education, doctrine, organization, training and leadership on performance in combat. Research showed that a key element of the brigade’s success was the Marine Corps’ institutional culture. In particular, the culture of remembering ensured marines understood the unchanging aspects of war and provided its men with the education, training, doctrine and organization to cope with its enduring friction, fog and chance. At the same time, the culture of learning ensured the marines understood what was changing in the character and tools of war so the brigade was well adapted to the realities of modern war from its first day in combat.