This paper aims to investigate the grounds of political legitimacy on which Vladimir Putin relied and still relies to sustain his popularity and remain in power today. Special emphasis is placed on the period after the opposition protests in 2011-2012 and demonstrations on Bolotnaya Square in Moscow. These protests had a dramatic effect on the Russian regime and showed that there is opposition to Putin's leadership, at least among a segment of Russian society. This study is based on Max Weber's three ideal types of legitimacy: civil-legal, traditional, and charismatic, which will be used to investigate, how Vladimir Putin has been able to stay in power for more than 20 years. This requires investigation of grounds for legitimacy that Vladimir Putin successfully exploited during his 2000-2008 period in the presidency that made him so popular among the majority of Russian citizens. It also means the investigation of the grounds for legitimacy that Putin began to exploit after the protests on the Bolotnaya Square 2011-2012, namely during the 2012-2020 period, to stay in power despite the dissatisfaction of some citizens with his rule. This study will use qualitative analysis to examine the corresponding empirical and analytical data related to the two periods investigated in this study. In addition, data from the currently disenfranchised Levada Center will be used to follow the development and changes in approval and disapproval of Putin's leadership. / Denna undersökning har målet att analysera grunderna för den politiska legitimitet som Vladimir Putin utnyttjat och fortfarande utnyttjar för att underhålla sin popularitet och förbli vid makten fram till i dag, särskilt efter det oppositionella utbrottet 2011-2012. Det senare är centralt, eftersom protesterna på Bolotnajatorget i Moskva hade en chockartad effect på den ryska regimen och visade att det finns missnöje med Putins ledarskap, åtminstone bland en del av den ryska befolkningen. Denna undersökning utgår från Max Webers tre ideala typer av politiska legitimitet som kommer att användas för att begripa hur Vladimir Putin kunde förbli vid makten under mer än 20 år. Det krävs därför en analys av grunderna för den politiska legitimitet som Putin framgångsrikt utnyttjade under 2000-2008 års presidentperiod och som gjorde honom så populär bland de flesta ryska medborgarna. Det blir också nödvändigt med en analys av grunderna för den politiska legitimitet som Putin började använda efter protesterna, nämligen under 2012-2020 års presidentperiod för att förbli vid makten trots missnöjet med hans ledarskap. Denna undersökning ämnar använda en kvalitativ textanalys för att gå genom motsvarande empiriskt och analytiskt material som anknyts till de två tidsperioderna som undersöks i denna studie. Dessutom kommer undersökningen att använda sig av de statistiska data från Levada Center för att vidare följa förändringar i godkännandet eller icke-godkännandet av Putins ledarskap. / Данное исследование ставит своей целью изучение основ политической легитимности Владимира Путина, способствовавших его популярности среди большинства российских граждан и позволивших ему оставаться у власти более 20 лет. Анализ основывается на теории Макса Вебера о трех идеальных видах легитимности: гражданско-правовом, традиционном и харизматичном. Исследование предусматривает изучение основ легитимности в период с 2000 по 2008 годы и в период с 2012 по 2020 годы. Уделяется внимание протестам 2011-2012 года на Болотной площади в Москве, показавшим недовольство части населения правлением Путина и ставшим переломным моментом в политике Путина. Для проведения данного исследования используется квалитативный анализ с целью изучения эмпирических и аналитических данных, относящихся к выбранным периодам. Основываясь на статистических данных Левада Центра, исследование анализирует позитивное и негативное отношение россиян к правлению Путина.

This article proceeds from the observation that Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin—two politicians frequently correlated and compared since Trump’s bid for the Presidency—have been remarkably successful in mobilizing support for their politics and in seemingly immunizing their rhetorics against vernacular critique. To work toward an understanding of this phenomenon, we propose to look at how political communication by and around the two politicians draws on forms and venues of popular culture. Both contexts, we will argue, have developed new strategies for the instrumentalization of popular culture, strategies that, while actualized differently in the two settings, revolve around an ‘invective turn’ in political communication—a radicalization of the familiar nationalist rhetoric of ‘us versus them’ that seems specifically fueled by pop-cultural forms. To explore this traffic between pop and politics, this article puts into conversation two case studies: On the one hand, of Trump’s campaign speeches which, we contend, symbolically organize around the logic of agôn—of the competitive game—as it has coagulated in the reality-tv genre of the gamedoc. On the other hand, we look at (state-controlled) pop music in the Russian genre of Ėstrada which, thus our argument, advertises a distinct form of patriotism through the principle of ‘glamour.’ Glamour, in Putin’s Russia, operates simultaneously as a style and as an ideology of self-glorification. The article will outline how reality tv’s logic of agôn and patriotic pop music’s aesthetics of glamour each fuel a qualitatively new orientation of political discourse toward the aesthetically charged, affect-saturated denigration of others and valorization of self.

Given the doubtfulness of the legal justification of Crimea’s declaration of independence on March 11 2014, which was followed by a referendum on March 16 that culminated in the peninsula’s treaty with Moscow to join the Russian Federation, Mr Putin used his speech on March 18 to put historical arguments forward in an effort to legitimise the Russian course of action in front of his own population. The speech counters the international community’s legal assessment, which classified Crimea’s accession to Russia as an annexation, with a historical legitimisation full of symbolism and mysticism that blatantly reinterprets Russian history and delegitimises the territorial integrity of Ukraine. This article analyses Putin’s attempt to justify Russia’s annexation of Crimea and tries to infer the mindset and aims that lie behind his historic-political argumentation.