published_or_final_version / Education / Master / Master of Education

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

The question of whether ratings agencies convey new information to financial markets when they assign new ratings or change previous ratings has been debated for at least 40 years. In this study I first examine equity market, bond market and CDS market reactions to long and short term rating changes from S&P, Fitch and Moody's. I find that not all the credit rating changes affect the market but only those classified as unanticipated. Subsequently, I study whether the regulatory setting, in which the Credit Ratings Agencies work, can possibly affect the financial markets reactions. Lastly I show that the probability of a future rating change is severely affected by different factors proportional hazard rate models.

No description available.

Consumers have long relied on ratings measures to help them make choices among goods of heterogeneous quality. With the growth of the New Economy over the last 10 years, it is becoming increasingly possible to aggregate information and create ratings for many industries. My research focuses on the effect of quality ratings on consumer choice, the social benefit of the quality signals, and on how well firms that develop ratings signals can capture a share of the social benefit. I examine these issues using data from Netflix, the on--line DVD rental service with mail delivery, which also provides a rating system that aggregates the preferences of the people who use their service. In the first chapter I use a reduced--form specification to analyze the Netflix ratings database and estimate aggregate demand for movies. The second chapter develops a structural Bayesian learning model and assesses the effect of ratings on DVD rental behavior. The last chapter is dedicated to the analysis of consumer and producer welfare as a function of the information created by the ratings system.

No abstract available. / Thesis (MA)-University of Durban-Westville, 1986.

Background and problem: Recent banking and financial crises has undoubtedly stressed the importance of a sound and well-functioning banking system. The banking industry is in critical need of strong governance stemming from their opaque and complex business along with the high social costs incurred in the event of bank failure. Previous research has shown that credit rating changes serve as a governance mechanism on the U.S. banking market, affecting real economic decision-making. However, no existing research has been conducted in an European context, rendering the objective of this thesis. Objective: The objective of this study is to examine the governance effects of credit rating changes on banks within the European banking market. Methodology: The objective of this thesis is achieved by using a novel and comprehensive data set comprising credit rating changes and financial accounting variables of 202 banks on the European banking market between the time period 1997-2011. A quantitative method is implemented to examine banks’ financial accounting variables in the event of credit rating changes. In order to measure the isolated effect from a credit rating change, the difference-in- differences econometric approach in combination with a Propensity Score Matching procedure will be conducted. Conclusions: The results from this research provide numerous evidence that credit rating changes have consistent governance effects on the European banking market. In the event of a credit rating downgrade, banks on the European banking market decrease in size and set aside more capital as reserves for non performing loans. In the event of a credit rating upgrade, banks increase in size and re-allocate assets, providing evidence that these banks have a more optimistic view of their financial conditions. The findings in this thesis are in line with previous research on the U.S. banking market, however, banks on the European banking market seems to have, on average, a more conservative attitude towards risk-taking in the event of a credit rating change.