Univ., Diss.--Göteborg, 2005.

No description available.

Zugl.: Kaiserslautern, Univ., Diss., 1986 u.d.T.: Hoellen, Burkhard: Stoizismus und rational-emotive Therapie (RET)

In secret sharing we are asked to split a secret into several shares in such a way that a minimum number of shares is necessary and sufficient to reconstruct the secret. Rational secret sharing considers secret sharing in the context of adversarial players who want to learn the secret but, secondarily, want to prevent other players from learning the secret. We present protocols, and bounds on the effectiveness of any protocol, for recombining secret shares in the presence of players who do not want others to learn the secret (rationality), may not want to learn the secret themselves (maliciousness), may be colluding, may have unbounded computational capacity, may be able to synchronize sends (asynchronous/synchronous broadcast), and/or may be able to recognize the secret independently (conspicuousness). We propose four protocols and analyze their security against players and coalitions who are each rational or malicious. We also prove three results that show protocols using only asynchronous broadcast are less secure than what can be achieved by protocols using synchronous broadcast.

Chemnitz, Techn. Univ., Magisterarb., [2006].

Thesis (M.A.)--California State University Channel Islands, 2008. / Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters Of Science in Mathematics. Title from PDF t.p. (viewed October 25, 2009).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2003. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references. Available also from UMI Company.

Universiẗat, Diss., 2000--Mannheim.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Western Conservative Baptist Seminary, 1982. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 171-178).

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