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Rational Secret Sharing with and without Synchronous Broadcast, Conspicuous Secrets, Malicious Players and Unbounded Opponents

In secret sharing we are asked to split a secret into several shares in such a way that a minimum number of shares is necessary and sufficient to reconstruct the secret. Rational secret sharing considers secret sharing in the context of adversarial players who want to learn the secret but, secondarily, want to prevent other players from learning the secret.

We present protocols, and bounds on the effectiveness of any protocol, for recombining secret shares in the presence of players who do not want others to learn the secret (rationality), may not want to learn the secret themselves (maliciousness), may be colluding, may have unbounded computational capacity, may be able to synchronize sends (asynchronous/synchronous broadcast), and/or may be able to recognize the secret independently (conspicuousness).

We propose four protocols and analyze their security against players and coalitions who are each rational or malicious. We also prove three results that show protocols using only asynchronous broadcast are less secure than what can be achieved by protocols using synchronous broadcast.
Date22 March 2012
CreatorsGidney, Craig
Source SetsLibrary and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada
Detected LanguageEnglish

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