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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
51

Defending Rawls on the self : a response to the communitarian critique.

Matolino, Bernard. January 2005 (has links)
This thesis aims at defending John Rawls from the communitarian critique by Michael Sandel and Alasdair Maclntyre. The main focus of the thesis is to investigate how cogent their criticism of Rawls's conception of the person is. In chapter one I summarise Rawls's theory of justice. I look at the two principles of justice and what they entail. These principles determine the rights of the citizens as well as how material goods in society should be distributed. He formulates what he calls 'justice as fairness'. Deeply embedded in establishing the notion of justice as fairness are two inseparable ideas. These are the idea of the original position and the idea of the veil of ignorance. The original position presents a thought experiment in which individuals are brought together to come up with an ideal society that they would want to live in. The ideas they have to discuss ultimately include individual rights and freedoms as well as how material goods are to be shared in that society. The individuals, however, are deprived of certain crucial information about how they would appear in the resulting society. This is what Rawls calls the veil of ignorance. The individuals do not know who or what they are going to be in their society. In other words, they do not know if they are going to be male or female, rich or poor, rulers or the oppressed or what their personality traits/character type or talents and disabilities will be. In chapter two I will look at the communitarian objection to Rawls's project. As a crucial part of his characterisation of the veil of ignorance and the original position he claims that these individuals do not know of their own conception of the good. This means that they are not aware of what they will choose as worthwhile and what they will consider to be a wasted life. Thus, these individuals, in considering principles that must govern them, that is principles of justice, will not discriminate between those who pursue a life of enlightenment and those who pursue a life of drugs and heavy parties. This has caused problems with communitarians who insist that one cannot be indifferent to what she considers to be worthwhile. They argue that an individual will defend what she considers to be worthwhile in the face of what she considers to be base, she will discriminate what is worthwhile from what is not worthwhile. Any interpretation that does not conform to this understanding is a distorted understanding of the nature of individuals. The work of communitarians is very broad. My main concentration is going to be on the work of Michael J. Sandel and Alasdair Mclntyre in so far as they argue that Rawls's project rests on a fundamentally mistaken view of the self. I have chosen Sandel and Mclntyre because their work is similar though expressed differently. They both argue that Rawls views the individual as preceding the existence of her society. They both claim that Rawls is committed to a certain metaphysical view of the self that leaves out the essence of community and values in the make up of individuals. In chapter three I argue that the objections by both Maclntyre and Sandel fail to apply to Rawls's project. I argue that their objections have strayed from metaphysics of the person. Sandel and Maclntyre claim that Rawls is committed to a certain metaphysical view of the self. Sandel calls it an "antecedently individuated self and Maclntyre calls it an "unencumbered emotivist self. Using the example of Derek Parfit and Bernard Williams I conclude that Sandel and Maclntyre are not discussing metaphysics of the person but have brought other issues that are at odds with our traditional understanding of the metaphysics of the self. In chapter four I conclude by considering the differences between my response to the communitarian critique and Rawls's response. Rawls explicitly denies that his theory is committed to any view of the person. He argues that justice as fairness is intended as a political conception of justice. He argues that justice as fairness is a moral conception that is meant for a specific subject. The subject he has in mind refers to the economic social and political institutions that make up society. Rawls chooses to explain what his theory entails and its limitations regarding metaphysics. I show how my response differs from Rawls's and argue that my response has got certain attractions over Rawls's own response. I end by looking at possible ways of furthering the debate. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2005.
52

Rawls' Kantian egalitarianism and its critics

Liotti, Maria Cecilia January 2003 (has links)
This thesis explores the role of the concept of equality in John Rawls' theory of justice. Rawls argues that the Kantian idea of the moral equality of persons translates into a primary principle of equal basic liberties, followed by a principle of fair equality of opportunity that addresses the moral arbitrariness of social and natural contingencies. Furthermore, the "difference principle" specifies that social and economic inequalities are only justified if they benefit the worst-off group. Libertarian critics such as Robert Nozick argue that Rawls' "difference principle" is inconsistent with a Kantian respect for the moral equality of persons as ends in themselves. Communitarians such as Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor argue that Rawls' egalitarian commitments are not supportable via a Kantian conception of the moral subject of justice as an autonomous pre-social self. This thesis defends Rawls' theory of justice against these challenges.
53

Problemes filosòfics: del liberalisme polític rawlsià

Vergés Gifra, Joan, 1972- 09 December 2003 (has links)
La doctrina que Rawls anomena "liberalisme polític" -i que trobem exposada en el llibre homònim que Rawls va publicar l'any 1993- ens diu com han de ser i com hem de veure aquelles concepcions de la justícia que pretenen donar compte de l'exercici legítim del poder polític en una societat marcada per un pluralitat insuperable de postures morals, filosòfiques i religioses. En aquest sentit, doncs, el liberalisme polític configura el marc conceptual en el qual hem d'encabir la concepció de la justícia que Rawls va proposar en el seu primer llibre, Una teoria de la justícia -i que va anomenar "justícia com a equitat". En la tesi, el que he mirat de criticar és justament aquest marc conceptual o, si es vol, la interpretació que acaba oferint Rawls de la seva pròpia concepció de la justícia com a equitat. Segons el meu parer, el liberalisme polític no reforçarà la posició de la justícia com a equitat davant de la constatació del pluralisme radical de les societats modernes, sinó que més aviat la debilitarà. I això serà així, crec, perquè el liberalisme polític és una mala resposta al fet del pluralisme en general. Efectivament, no és una bona manera d'abordar el pluralisme filosòfic -per exemple- afirmar que ens hem de quedar "a la superfície, filosòficament parlant" o que una concepció de la justícia ha de prescindir de la fonamentació filosòfica i que en fa prou de partir d'allò que en la societat es considera correcte. No és una bona manera de resoldre les disputes de la filosofia política sostenir que tan sols necessitem fixar-nos en la raonabilitat de les múltiples concepcions de la justícia existents i que podem oblidar-nos de fins a quin punt són correctes o vertaderes. Tot això és el que he mirat de demostrar en la segona part de la tesi -i en la mesura que és així, doncs, constitueix una crítica a la idea rawlsiana segons la qual una concepció de la justícia ha de ser exclusivament "política". Així mateix, la tercera part del treball està dedicada a criticar la noció de consens per superposició, que és la idea amb la qual el liberalisme polític pretén fer front al pluralisme sobretot èticopolític. Al meu parer, l'argument del liberalisme polític a favor del consens per superposició és un argument o bé irrellevant, o bé incoherent. A part d'això, és dubtós que hi hagi cap necessitat d'assolir aquesta mena de consens o que no hi hagi alternatives més realistes i adequades. D'altra banda, he defensat que la solució del consens per superposició no donaria cap resposta a un dels tipus de pluralisme més urgents d'abordar, com és el pluralisme nacional de molts Estats, entre ells el nostre.
54

Political liberalism and its internal critiques feminist theory, communitarianism, and republicanism /

Saenz, Carla, January 1900 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.
55

Gerechtigkeit und politischer Universalismus - John Rawls' Theorie der Gerechtigkeit eine kritische Analyse der Rechtfertigungsleistung

Stei, Erik January 2006 (has links)
Zugl.: Mainz, Univ., Magisterarbeit, 2006 u.d.T.: Stei, Erik: John Rawls' Gerechtigkeitsprinzipien
56

Patriotism, self-respect and the limits of cosmopolitanism the moral and political philosophy of Rousseau and Rawls /

Bercuson, Jeffrey. January 1900 (has links)
Thesis (M.A.). / Written for the Dept. of Political Science. Title from title page of PDF (viewed 2008/01/11). Includes bibliographical references.
57

Der Schleier des Nichtwissens im Gesetzgebungsverfahren

Heinz, Vanessa January 2008 (has links)
Zugl.: Hannover, Univ., Diss., 2008
58

Demokratie und Reflexivität ein soziologischer Beitrag zur Debatte um den Politischen Liberalismus John Rawls' /

Göttlich, Andreas. January 2001 (has links)
Konstanz, Univ., Diplomarb., 2001.
59

Comparative studies in justifying punishment

Wang, Qian, January 2002 (has links)
Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 2003. / Also available in print.
60

Der Stellenwert des Mehrheitsprinzips in John Rawls' liberaler Gerechtigkeitstheorie

Jeker, Martin. January 2004 (has links) (PDF)
Master-Arbeit Univ. St. Gallen, 2004.

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