This thesis explores the role of the concept of equality in John Rawls' theory of justice. Rawls argues that the Kantian idea of the moral equality of persons translates into a primary principle of equal basic liberties, followed by a principle of fair equality of opportunity that addresses the moral arbitrariness of social and natural contingencies. Furthermore, the "difference principle" specifies that social and economic inequalities are only justified if they benefit the worst-off group. Libertarian critics such as Robert Nozick argue that Rawls' "difference principle" is inconsistent with a Kantian respect for the moral equality of persons as ends in themselves. Communitarians such as Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor argue that Rawls' egalitarian commitments are not supportable via a Kantian conception of the moral subject of justice as an autonomous pre-social self. This thesis defends Rawls' theory of justice against these challenges.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Zugl.: Mainz, Univ., Magisterarbeit, 2006 u.d.T.: Stei, Erik: John Rawls' Gerechtigkeitsprinzipien

Thesis (M.A.). / Written for the Dept. of Political Science. Title from title page of PDF (viewed 2008/01/11). Includes bibliographical references.

Zugl.: Hannover, Univ., Diss., 2008

Konstanz, Univ., Diplomarb., 2001.

Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 2003. / Also available in print.

Master-Arbeit Univ. St. Gallen, 2004.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--McMaster University, 2001 / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 336-362). Also available via World Wide Web.

Giessen, Universiẗat, Diss., 2005.