Goal setting theory has consistently found that high and specific goals lead to better performance than low and vague goals do. However, the independent effect of each of these two dimensions, difficulty and specificity, on performance is less clear. Although goal difficulty has been shown to affect performance level independent of goal specificity, evidence for an independent effect of goal specificity is mixed. In the current research, we introduce a moderator, regulatory focus, of the relationship between goal specificity and performance level. Specifically, we hypothesized that people in a promotion focus would be more motivated by aiming for wider goals that have a higher possibility of success and therefore fit an eager-approach strategy, while people in a prevention focus would be more motivated by aiming for narrower goals that have a small range of acceptable outcomes and therefore fit a vigilant-avoidance strategy. We examined this hypothesis with different hypothetical scenarios that manipulated goal width (wide versus narrow) with numerical ranges (Study 1) and visually with a bar graph (Study 2), and with different behavioural tasks that manipulated goal width in a saving strategies task (Study 3) and an anagram task (Study 4a, 4b). The findings revealed promising trends that were consistent with our hypothesis across all studies.

The intent of this research is to inform companies that the internal audit function has greater utility than just corporate governance. The internal audit function represents a resource to the business that can be used in a number of ways to help it survive, compete and establish new growth opportunities in the marketplace for the firm. The proposed project will demonstrate through an interpretive process study using case study research how the internal audit function can be a strategic business partner by highlighting its contribution ability in a dynamic, ever-changing, regulatory laden environment. This paper uses Punctuated Equilibrium Theory to explain the organizational transformation of the internal audit function from a professional bureaucracy to an adhocracy as an unintended consequence of corporate governance legislation over time. The study contributes to the literature by explaining the evolutionary change in the internal audit function from scorekeeper-and-watchdog to business-partner-and-change agent. This study analyzes how senior management benefits from utilizing the internal auditors’ experience as an organizational tool to address threats and opportunities.

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This thesis examines the theoretical properties of different price cap schemes that have been applied in the UK and the USA. The objective is to assess the consequences for price structures and welfare of different ways of defining the regulated price index. Chapter 2 surveys the literature on regulation under asymmetric information that is related to price caps. Chapter 3 presents a general analysis of five main types of price cap when the regulated firm sets linear tariffs. The schemes are the Tariff Basket (TB) scheme, the Fixed Weights (F) scheme, the Average Revenue (AR) scheme, the Average Revenue (Lagged) scheme, and the Paasche Price Index (PPI) scheme. The TB and PPI schemes generate efficient price structures in the long run, whereas prices are inefficient under the other schemes. In Chapter 4 the consequences of allowing freedom to set different prices, relative to the case of uniform prices, are analyzed. The conditions for price freedom to be desirable are derived for the case where the price level is not regulated. When the price level is regulated it is shown that AR regulation can cause welfare to be below the level that obtains without any regulation. Chapter 5 contains an analysis of the five price caps examined in Chapter 3 for the case where the firm sets a two-part tariff. The AR and PPI schemes are dominated, and the conditions under which TB, F and ARL are optimal are established. Chapter 6 explores some issues in the regulation of nonlinear tariffs by AR and TB price caps. Chapter 7 considers some extensions of the analysis. It is shown that when quality is a choice variable, the regulator is concerned about income distribution and there is demand growth the TB scheme can be adapted and retains its desirable properties. Chapter 8 contains conclusions and suggestions for future work.

No description available.

Regulation of tubulin gene expression in embryos of the sea urchin Lytechinus pictus has been experimentally investigated by use of cloned recombinant tubulin DNA and anti-tubulin antiserum. Tubulin synthesis appears to be autogenously regulated at the level of tubulin mRNA stability by the level of unpolymerized tubulin; i.e., the more unpolymerized tubulin, the less stable the tubulin mRNA. Destabilization of tubulin mRNA requires continued protein synthesis. Most of tubulin stored in eggs is unpolymerized; during embryogenesis the mass of tubulin per embryo changes little, but unpolymerized tubulin is increasingly polymerized into microtubules. There is a transcriptional stimulation of tubulin genes at the time of ciliogenesis but thereafter autoregulation by the ontogenetic decrease of the level of unpolymerized tubulin plays a predominant role for an increasing accumulation of tubulin mRNA. Deciliation results in a transient enhancement of transcription of tubulin genes, which is independent of the level of unpolymerized tubulin and does not require protein synthesis.

This dissertation investigates the causes and effects of the decentralization of environmental regulation. In Chapter 1, I provide an historical overview of air pollution regulation in the U.S., which serves as the context for this dissertation. Chapter 2 develops a model of interjurisdictional environmental regulation where economic and pollution spillovers may arise. I show that these spillovers may cause local jurisdictions to seek decentralized regulatory control, which in turn generates inefficient outcomes. Chapter 3 investigates empirically whether the decentralization of air pollution regulation in the U.S. during 1971-1990 caused an increase in transboundary air pollution. I find that the transfer of regulatory authority from the federal government to an individual state generated a significant increase in air pollution observed at monitors in downwind states. These findings vary with distance to those states creating transboundary spillovers and across pollutants with different atmospheric lifetimes. This is consistent with the notion that local governments do not account for externalities that their policies generate. The final chapter estimates a model of interjurisdictional environmental regulation that allows for transboundary pollution and competition for firms. The interdependence in jurisdictions’ regulatory choices from the spillovers creates a challenging identification problem, which I address using exclusion restrictions derived from the atmospheric physics of pollution propagation. For total suspended particulates, transboundary pollution will typically occur only between contiguous neighbours in the direction of the wind. This implies that exogenous factors affecting pollution dispersion (such as wind velocity) in distant jurisdictions can serve as instruments for neighbours' endogenous policy choices: they do not affect a given jurisdiction's regulatory choice directly, but directly affect the choices of that jurisdiction's neighbours. I find that a shift from centralized to state regulatory control causes significant increases in the number of polluting firms that locate in that state and decreases elsewhere; the same shift increases ambient air pollution at home and in other states. I also find that state regulatory choices respond much more to changes in the number of firms than to pollution. Further, I show that the degree of decentralization and the observed pollution outcomes are far from the counterfactual efficient levels.

This dissertation investigates the causes and effects of the decentralization of environmental regulation. In Chapter 1, I provide an historical overview of air pollution regulation in the U.S., which serves as the context for this dissertation. Chapter 2 develops a model of interjurisdictional environmental regulation where economic and pollution spillovers may arise. I show that these spillovers may cause local jurisdictions to seek decentralized regulatory control, which in turn generates inefficient outcomes. Chapter 3 investigates empirically whether the decentralization of air pollution regulation in the U.S. during 1971-1990 caused an increase in transboundary air pollution. I find that the transfer of regulatory authority from the federal government to an individual state generated a significant increase in air pollution observed at monitors in downwind states. These findings vary with distance to those states creating transboundary spillovers and across pollutants with different atmospheric lifetimes. This is consistent with the notion that local governments do not account for externalities that their policies generate. The final chapter estimates a model of interjurisdictional environmental regulation that allows for transboundary pollution and competition for firms. The interdependence in jurisdictions’ regulatory choices from the spillovers creates a challenging identification problem, which I address using exclusion restrictions derived from the atmospheric physics of pollution propagation. For total suspended particulates, transboundary pollution will typically occur only between contiguous neighbours in the direction of the wind. This implies that exogenous factors affecting pollution dispersion (such as wind velocity) in distant jurisdictions can serve as instruments for neighbours' endogenous policy choices: they do not affect a given jurisdiction's regulatory choice directly, but directly affect the choices of that jurisdiction's neighbours. I find that a shift from centralized to state regulatory control causes significant increases in the number of polluting firms that locate in that state and decreases elsewhere; the same shift increases ambient air pollution at home and in other states. I also find that state regulatory choices respond much more to changes in the number of firms than to pollution. Further, I show that the degree of decentralization and the observed pollution outcomes are far from the counterfactual efficient levels.

In this thesis, I investigate the concept of Internet regulation and its implementation by examining the Convention on Cybercrime, which regulates the European Union (EU) and non EU countries. I examine the approaches taken toward the Convention on Cybercrime in two different socio-economic and political systems: Canada, a modern democracy that only signed the Convention, and Romania, an ex-communist democracy that both signed and ratified it. With this Convention, the Council of Europe has claimed that one model of global Internet regulation is appropriate for all countries. I argue that the infrastructure and legal, economic, and socio-cultural aspects of local cultures make the global homogenous regulation of the Internet impractical, therefore regulation on a national level would be more effective. I also try to contribute to current research by studying the complexity of the global regulation of Internet crimes by demonstrating: the importance of democracy and technology for public policy frameworks for cybercrime, by describing; the limitations of the model represented by the global monolithic Convention on Cybercrime, and by suggesting that a universal democratic model of global Internet regulation is utopian and does not address the individual needs of each country.

Although auditor-client interaction is considered an important determinant of financial reporting outcomes, concerns often arise that close working relationships between auditors and client managers can impair auditor independence. Several high-profile accounting scandals have intensified these concerns, impaired investors’ confidence in the financial reporting process and motivated regulators to respond with reforms to enhance auditors’ responsibility for maintaining financial reporting quality. Subsequent reports from the financial press indicate that these reforms had a chilling effect on the auditor-client relationship, but academic research has not examined the influence of regulatory scrutiny on the resolution of material accounting issues between auditors and managers. This study contributes to the literature by investigating the impact of regulatory scrutiny on auditors’ approach to resolving material accounting issues with managers and examining whether this impact is moderated by managers’ commitment to their preferred accounting. Auditors’ interaction approach involves developing arguments and recommendations in response to managers’ accounting preferences in an attempt to persuade managers to adopt more appropriate accounting. The results of an experiment with experienced auditors indicate that regulatory scrutiny and managers’ commitment to their preferred accounting interact to influence auditors’ interaction approach. Specifically, when regulatory scrutiny is low, reciprocity norms determine auditors’ interaction approach but, as regulatory scrutiny increases, accountability demands dominate auditors’ reciprocity motivations and modify auditors’ responses to managers’ accounting preferences. These results provide evidence that regulatory scrutiny introduces tension into the auditor-client relationship, but the effects of this tension on the resolution of material accounting issues is contingent on the interpersonal context. / Accounting