The New England Puritans brought with them to America a middle way, a philosophy that balanced the extremes of religious, political, economic, and social life. Though first developed by Reformed theologians on the European Continent, the middle way made its way to England where it gained adherence among Puritan ministers who balanced pastoral and prophetic roles. The first generation of English emigrants to New England, having fully expected their zeal to flourish in the free air of America, quickly realized that theirs was not only a mission to reform society but to establish and maintain it. In such an environment, the middle way proved an essential philosophy for Massachusetts Bay's civil and ecclesiastical authorities who faced challenges from Antinomians in America and Arminians in England. This study first defines the middle way, demonstrating its particular relevance in America among emigrants who felt both the burden· of the past and the promise of the future. The first chapter offers the middle way as a philosophy of history to modern historians who, like the New England Puritans, find themselves balancing obligations to both objectivity and historicism. The second chapter explores the often contentious world of Puritan historiography through the lens of Niebuhrian irony. The third chapter approaches the first generation of New England Puritans on their own terms, drawing on their written records in order to understand the challenges, real and perceived, from both Antinomianism and Arminianism. The conclusion reflects on the middle way's legacy and continued endurance as the New England mind faced both continuity and change in later centuries.

This thesis is a context-sensitive study of key epistemological commitments and concerns presented in Philo’s two series of exegetical writings. The major conclusion advanced in this thesis is that two theological epistemologies, distinct yet related, can be detected among these writings. The first epistemology is specific to the Allegorical Commentary. The second epistemology is specific to the ‘Exposition of the Law.’ The epistemology of the Allegorical Commentary reflects a threefold conviction: the sovereignty of God, the creaturely contingency of the human mind and its inescapable limitations. In conversation with key epistemological notions of his day, Philo develops this threefold conviction in exegetical discourses that are grounded in Pentateuchal texts portraying the God of Moses as both possessing epistemic authority and aiding the aspiring mind to gain purification and perfection in the knowledge of God. Guided by this threefold conviction, Philo enlists key metaphors of his day – initiation into divine mysteries and divine inspiration, among others –in order to capture something of the essence of Moses’ twofold way of ascending to the divine, an approach which requires at times the enhancement of human reason and at other times the eviction of human reason. The epistemology of the ‘Exposition’ reflects Philo’s understanding of the Pentateuch as a perfect whole partitioned into three distinct yet inseverable parts. Philo’s knowledge discourses in the ‘creation’ part of the ‘Exposition’ reflect two primary movements of thought. The first is heavily invested with a Platonic reading of Genesis 1.27 while the second invests Genesis 2.7 with a mixture of Platonic and Stoic notions of human transformation and well-being. Philo’s discourses in the ‘patriarchs’ segment reflect an interest in portraying the three great patriarchs as exemplars of the virtues of instruction (Abraham), nature (Isaac), and practice (Jacob) which featured prominently in Greek models of education. In the ‘Moses’ segment of the ‘Exposition,’ many of Philo’s discourses on knowledge are marked by an interest in presenting Moses as the ideal king, lawgiver, prophet and priest who surpasses Plato’s paradigm of the philosopher-king. In keeping with this view, Philo insists that the written laws of Moses represent the perfect counterpart to the unwritten law of nature. The life and laws of Moses serve as the paradigm for Philo to understand his own experiences of noetic ascent and exhort readers to cultivate similar aspirational notions and practices.

This thesis places Chaucer within the tradition of philosophical poetry that begins in Plato and extends through classical and medieval Latin culture. In this Platonic tradition, poetry is a self-reflexive epistemological practice that interrogates the conditions of art in general. As such, poetry as metapoetics takes itself as its own object of inquiry in order to reinforce and generate its own definitions without regard to extrinsic considerations. It attempts to create a poetic-knowledge proper instead of one that is dependant on other modes for meaning. The particular manner in which this is expressed is according to the idea of the loss of the Golden Age. In the Augustinian context of Chaucer’s poetry, language, in its literal and historical signifying functions is an effect of the noetic fall and a deformation of an earlier symbolism. The Chaucerian poems this thesis considers concern themselves with the solution to a historical literary lament for language’s fall, a solution that suggests that the instability in language can be overcome with reference to what has been lost in language. The chapters are organized to reflect the medieval Neoplatonic ascensus. The first chapter concerns the Pardoner’s Old Man and his relationship to the literary history of Tithonus in which the renewing of youth is ironically promoted in order to perpetually delay eternity and make the current world co-eternal to the coming world. In the Miller’s Tale, more aggressive narrative strategies deploy the machinery of atheism in order to make a god-less universe the sufficient grounds for the transformation of a fallen and contingent world into the only world whatsoever. The Manciple’s Tale’s opposite strategy leaves the world intact in its current state and instead makes divine beings human. Phoebus expatriates to earth and attempts to co-mingle it with heaven in order to unify art and history into a single monistic experience. Finally, the Nun’s Priest’s Tale acts as ars poetica for the entire Chaucerian Performance and undercuts the naturalistic strategies of the first three poems by a long experiment in the philosophical conflict between art and history. By imagining art and history as epistemologically antagonistic it attempts to subdue in a definitive manner poetic strategies that would imagine human history as the necessary knowledge-condition for poetic language.

Despite its origins in England two hundred years ago, the picturesque continues to influence landscape architectural practice in late twentieth-century New Zealand. The evidence for this is derived from a close reading of the published discourse of the New Zealand Institute of Landscape Architects, particularly the now defunct professional journal, The Landscape. Through conceptualising the picturesque as a language, a model is developed which provides a framework for recording the survey results. The way in which the picturesque persists as naturalised conventions in the discourse is expressed as four landscape myths. Through extending the metaphor of language, pidgins and creoles provide an analogy for the introduction and development of the picturesque in New Zealand. Some implications for theory, practice and education follow.

This thesis argues that in order to demonstrate the possibility and sensibility of Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo's 'weak religious belief', it should be understood as the becoming uncertain of traditional, metaphysical (strong) belief. The difference between weak belief and strong belief can thereby be understood not as two distinct modes of belief, but as an event of weakening in the history of belief that has yet to be realized by those who believe with the support of metaphysical certainty. Since Vattimo aligns metaphysics with violence, and since he aligns traditional belief with metaphysics, to demonstrate and defend the possibility of Vattimo’s weak belief amounts to the reduction of violence in the world. However, the possibility and validity of weak belief has been called into question by thinkers such as Richard Rorty. In light of a review of the arguments and counter-arguments between Rorty and Vattimo, I argue that it is possible to distinguish weak belief from strong belief as long as this remains a weak distinction.