This study asks anew the question: can faith lead to knowledge? The received view about the relationship between faith and evidentialism is that, because faith involves belief without evidence (by definition), and evidentialism requires evidence for knowledge (by definition), evidentialism unequivocally finds faith epistemically valueless. I argue that this conclusion is mistaken on both counts: the concept of faith is too diverse to be encapsulated as belief without evidence, and evidentialism leaves much room for different kinds of evidential processes to be recognized. In other words, depending on what “faith” means in any given case, evidentialism might be more accommodating than is typically thought. This study pursues this conclusion by developing an evidentialist theory of knowledge, rejecting the major alternative of externalism along the way, while defending the continued use of the concept of belief in religious studies discourse, necessary to conducting evidentialist epistemology. It then examines the concept of faith by considering its formal structure, and by cataloguing and comparing many discrete conceptions of faith from historical literatures on this topic, across cultures. Finally, it draws on the typology developed to propose seven ways that faith might be conducive to knowledge under the strict rules of evidentialism, contrary to the received view.

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