This study utilizes farm yield data to generate the relationship between farm and county yields, and farm and crop reporting district (CRD) yields by using seemingly unrelated regression (SUR). The relationships are used to examine whether CRD level insurance is a viable alternative for county level Group Risk Plan (GRP) or Group Risk Insurance Protection (GRIP) by generating the certainty equivalent for each producer under different insurance scenarios, which includes no insurance, county level insurance and CRD level insurance under different scales and risk aversion coefficient levels. The analysis is conducted for Iowa CRD 10, Ohio CRD 10, Georgia CRD 70, Mississippi CRD 40, and Kansas CRD 30. This study also analyzes how well deep loss and shallow loss programs perform in different production regions by looking at the marginal certainty equivalent effects.

A research report submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Master of Commerce in Economics in the Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management At the University of the Witwatersrand September 2019 / The main objective of this study is to assess South Africa’s tax revenue performance. This is achieved by estimating tax capacity and tax effort from 1960 - 2017 and tax buoyancy from 1995 - 2017. The study is unique in that, it tracks tax capacity, tax effort and tax buoyancy at an aggregate level for a particular country. The 2SLS results indicate that GDP per capita and inflation have a strong positive and statistically significant impact on revenue mobilisation while population growth, trade openness and agriculture share in GDP have a strong negative and statistically significant impact on revenue mobilisation. Furthermore, we find that South Africa’s tax effort index varies between 0.92 which is below capacity and 1.10 which is above capacity. On average, the tax effort index is 1.00, implying that South Africa performs well above its potential tax capacity. Notwithstanding, the tax system was also found to be fairly buoyant, although there is still room for improvement. The ARDL results indicate that VAT revenues and custom duties grow at a faster pace than the growth in final household consumption and import value, respectively. Total tax revenue growth, however, still falls behind as the estimated coefficient is below unity, implying that the growth in total tax revenues does not match the growth of the economy. Given these findings, we conclude that South Africa’s tax revenue performance has been fairly satisfactory over the period 1960 – 2017, albeit there is still room for improvement. For the government to generate value from the rapidly growing population, adequate investments in human capital and entrepreneurial skill development need to be made. The focus should be on broadening the tax base than on hiking already high tax rates. / NG (2020)

Hotellbranschen och flygbranschen har länge använt sig av Revenue Management för att kartlägga sin efterfrågan för att på så sätt öka sina intäkter samtidigt som de ökar värdet för sina kunder och gäster. Då restaurangbranschen på många sätt liknar dessa två branscher kan det anses förbryllande och problematiskt att strategin inte implementerats i lika stor omfattning på restaurang.   Denna studie undersöker ur ett Revenue Management-perspektiv hur en medelstor restaurang belägen centralt i en medelstor svensk stad skapar och styr intäkter för att undersöka och föreslå implementering av strategier för bättre lönsamhet. Detta undersöks genom kvantitativa observationer av restaurangens gäster samt en kvalitativ intervju med vd:n för restaurangen och restaurangchefen.   Resultatet visar att restaurangens gäster erbjuds mer tid än de behöver för sitt besök, personalen kontrollerar gästers sittid genom arbetsrutiner och bokningssystem samt att ägarna gör ytliga analyser av data för att öka beläggning.   Vi ser att restaurangen använder sig av RRM-tekniker som paketering, kontroll och spridning av beläggning och sittid. De har också skapat en framgångsrik kampanj genom ytlig analys av beläggningsdata. Vi ser möjligheter för förbättring i restaurangens bordsval och användning av borden och föreslår därför att restaurangen byter ut några av sina bord samt ändrar personalens arbetsrutiner kring hur de avgränsar sina bord. Vi anser att det kan vara problematiskt att de inte analyserar all den data deras kassa- och bokningssystem erbjuder och föreslår därför att de försöker ta till vara denna för att lättare förstå sina gästers behov och beteende. På så vis kan de möjliggöra en segmentering av sina gäster som de kan skapa riktade erbjudanden till och således öka gästens uppfattade värde på restaurangbesöket. Detta för att RM bygger på att erbjuda rätt produkt, till rätt person, till rätt pris, vid rätt plats och vid rätt tillfälle.

I conduct an examination of the deferred revenue account. I provide descriptive evidence of deferred revenue both at an industry-level and a macro-level, and I examine whether managers use discretion in deferred revenue around earnings benchmarks. I develop a model to measure the normal change in short-term deferred revenue, and examine how the abnormal change varies across the pre-managed distribution of three common earnings benchmarks. My results show that managers delay recognition of revenue using deferred revenue when pre-managed earnings exceed benchmarks by a large margin, and accelerate the recognition of revenue using deferred revenue when premanaged earnings just miss or miss benchmarks by a large amount. I document the prevalence of accelerated revenue recognition, and show that meeting or just beating the annual consensus analyst forecast is where the most cases of suspected accelerated revenue recognition occur. The results are next strongest for the avoidance of earnings decrease benchmark and weakest for the avoidance of loss benchmark. I examine whether conventional abnormal accrual models reflect discretion in deferred revenue, and whether discretion in deferred revenue is associated with lower earnings quality. I show that deferred revenue changes are a leading indicator of future earnings. My results indicate that discretion in revenue can lower the predictability of sales regardless of whether it is of an aggressive or conservative nature.

The National Basketball Association (NBA) generated well over $4 billion in revenues during the 2014-15 season. I analyze the value of a win to a team in terms of revenue and examine the potential underpayment or overpayment of players and superstars throughout the league relative to their marginal revenue product (MRP). My findings suggest that players are overpaid, especially superstars. However, it is important to consider the fixed-revenue streams a team receives before assuming a player is simply overpaid compared to his MRP. In congruence with previous literature, I find that veterans are overpaid at the expense of younger players’ lower salaries. I also look at the drivers of a player’s salary and find that general managers tend to overpay for points relative to other statistics.

No description available.

The purpose of this thesis is to run a panel regression analyzing the impact of economic, legislative and social factors on corporate tax revenues, as defined by existing empiric and theoretic literature. Literature which directly addresses factors influencing corporate income tax revenues is quite limited -- in respect of number of papers as well as in respect of the range of examined countries and/or time period. The latest and key papers include among others Clausing (2007), Devereux (2006) and partly Kenny, Winer (2006) and Gropp, Kostial (2000). Presented thesis on the other hand covers observations for all OECD countries for a rather long time period 1980 -- 2006. This thesis should address all important factors having influence on corporate income tax revenues, including tax avoidance and debt financing. The results of the analysis largely correspond to existing investigations of other authors; however, presented regression is of more complex and general character -- it includes other factors of tax avoidance and data for all OECD members (except for some variables which are not available), including post-communist countries.

This thesis addresses two issues which arise in the context of airline revenue management. In the first part of the thesis, we develop an incentive mechanism to prevent revenue leakage caused by customers buying down. In the second part of the thesis, we discuss the revenue sharing problem between alliance partners and develop a mechanism by which the combined revenue can be distributed fairly among them. Situations which give rise to impossibility and possibility results are established. The practice of revenue management, employs the principle of differential pricing of a product based on various product restrictions. These product restrictions segment the market in such a manner so as to maximize the revenue. Airline industry which pioneered the practice of revenue management generally prices low for those who book early and high for those who book late for essentially the same seat. The low-fare products are targeted towards the market segment comprising of those customers who have a low valuation (reservation price) for the product (who are typically leisure customers, also called as low-fare customers).The high-fare product, on the other hand is targeted at the market segment comprising of customers who have a high valuation (reservation price) for the product (business class customers, also called as high-fare customers). However, it may happen that customers with high valuation for the product may also buy the low-fare product if it is available. This behavior of high-fare customers buying a low-fare product due to its availability is called the customer buy-down behavior. Such a customer behavior causes revenue leakage to the airline industry. Revenue management literature that primarily focuses on pricing and seat inventory control does not account for the customer buy-down behavior. In Part I of the thesis we address this issue of customer buy-down behavior. We develop an incentive mechanism in the form of a new product bundle which would attract only the high-fare customer. High fare customers such as business class customers typically have repeated travel plans, while low fare customers such as leisure travelers typically do not travel repeatedly. The proposed incentive mechanism takes advantage of this characteristic of high fare customers that distinguishes them from the low fare customers. In general, high fare product permits cancellation and does not impose any travel restrictions, and a low fare product, on the other hand does not permit cancellation and has other travel restrictions associated with them. A high fare customer with potential future travel plan might associate uncertainties with respect to travel dates and his ability to procure a low fare ticket for future travel. This uncertainty is exploited in the proposed product bundle. The new product bundle permits the customer to cancel the ticket for the future journey and relaxes the restrictions associated with the requested day and the future travel day. Such incentives would attract only the high fare customer and the low-fare customer will not be enticed by this product bundle. This is because the low fare customer is a one-off traveler. Thus, the acceptance of the product bundle by the customer reveals that he is a high-fare customer and its denial reveals that he is truly a low-fare customer. We determine the optimal price to be charged for each of the days (requested day and the future travel day) and the refund value for the future travel day. We find that multiple optimal solutions exist, and its existence indicate a win-win situation for both the customer and the seller. The customer benefits through the incentives offered and the seller benefits in the form of additional revenue that is achieved in the process of preventing revenue leakage. In Part II of the thesis, we discuss the revenue sharing problem between alliance partners of a network. Airlines form alliances and coordinate through activities such as code sharing, scheduling of flight arrival and departure times, arrival and departure gates, frequent flyer programs, airport lounges and ground facilities among several others. Code sharing is a key feature among the coordinated activities of alliance partners. Parallel code sharing refers to code sharing between carriers operating on the same route to increase frequency of services and to strengthen market position. Complementary code sharing refers to carriers using each other’s flights to provide connecting services, where they do not offer a full service on their own. The main objective of the complementary code share flights is to increase scope of the partner’s network, allowing them to supply service on markets where they did not operate before. When complementary code shared flights aim at maximizing their combined revenue, it might lead to inequitable distribution of revenue and may cause an alliance partner to lose revenue. In Part II of the thesis, we address this issue of achieving a fair division of the combined revenue generated by the alliance network. The common assumption in revenue sharing methods that are generally practiced is that airline’s valuation of seats in the alliance network is common knowledge. However, in reality it is not true. We therefore consider the valuations of the carriers of their respective products as private information and the price of the product over the entire network to be common knowledge. Under such an information environment, we formulate the problem in the bargaining framework. We discuss the implementation of two solution concepts; namely the Shapley value and the Core of a cooperative game. For the two person cooperative game, the Shapley value equally distributes the surplus among the two parties, while the core allocations of two person cooperative game consists of all possible proportions of the distribution of the surplus. In a bargaining set up, the parties communicate their valuations through sealed bids and agree upon a transfer rule. We analyze two situations. In the first situation we assume that the two parties do not associate any cost towards failure to arrive at an agreement. We determine the optimal bids for the two parties and prove that these optimal bids do not implement any desired point on the core i.e., desired proportion of the distribution of the surplus (which includes the Shapley value).This impossibility result motived the analysis of the second situation, in which we assume that the two parties associate costs towards failure to arrive at an agreement. We once again determine the optimal bids and prove that for a certain structure of the bargaining costs, any desired point on the core, including the Shapley value can be implemented by enticing the players to reveal their true valuations.

In this thesis we investigate important issues in the area of dynamic pricing for revenue management. Studying the effect of competition and strategic consumer behavior, we characterize the dynamic pricing policies for retailers who sell homogeneous goods in multi-period, discrete time, finite horizon settings. In the first essay an impatient consumer visits only one of two competing retailers in each period. If he does not purchase the good, he visits the competing retailer in the ensuing period. Compared to the corresponding single store monopoly, when the consumer’s valuation is uniformly distributed, prices decline exponentially rather than linearly, with a dramatically lower initial price, and a substantially lower system profit. The model is extended to accommodate many consumers, who may be either identical or similar, a more general valuation distribution, and situations wherein capacities are limited. The base case of a centralized two-store monopoly is also examined. In the second essay the consumer may return to the same retailer with some certain probability. This probability is either affected by market structure characteristics, or it may depend on the consumer’s experience at the last store visited. The robustness of the exponential decline of prices is reinforced. It occurs even when a strong retailer faces competition from a relatively much weaker retailer. We investigate the impact of the return probabilities on prices, profits, and consumer surplus. The model is extended to an oligopoly, and to situations with many similar consumers. The effect of strategic consumer behavior on prices and profits is revealed in the third essay. Characterizing the pricing policies arising in a two-period monopoly and duopoly settings, we find that strategic consumer behavior inflicts larger losses to a duopoly than to a monopoly. A lower strategic consumers’ discounting factor, which is beneficial to a monopoly, may be harmful to a duopoly. Ignoring strategic consumer behaviour is costly to a monopoly, but may, on the other hand, be beneficial to a duopoly. An extension to three periods is studied, and with longer horizons the model is analyzed for the case when all the consumers are strategic.

Make-to-order (MTO) systems have been traditionally popular in manufacturing industries that either seek to provide greater variety to their customers or make products that are unique to their customers. More recently, with shrinking product life cycles, there is an increasing interest in operating as MTO systems. With the tremendous success of revenue management techniques in the service industries over the last three decades, there is a growing interest in applying these techniques in MTO manufacturing industries. In the present work, we consider three problems that apply revenue management (RM) to on-date delivery MTO systems. In the first problem, we assume that all orders completed in advance of their due-dates are stored at third party warehouses and apply RM in computing efficient order acceptance and scheduling policies. We develop an optimal solution scheme, and based on the insights gained on the structural properties of the optimal solution, we develop a stochastic approximation scheme for finding efficient solutions. Through computational studies on simulated problems, we illustrate the potential of RM in improving net profits over popular practices. In our second problem, we extend the RM model to consider presence of a certain amount of first party warehousing capacity for storing the orders completed in advance of their due-dates. We study the conditions under which it is desirable to consider the holding cost aspects in the RM model. In our third problem, we develop a scheme for determining an efficient capacity of the first party warehouse that is used for storing the orders completed in advance of their due-dates at an on-date delivery MTO system. This scheme captures the completed orders storage demand resulting from a RM based order acceptance and scheduling policy. We illustrate that when booking horizon is large, considerable amount of savings in the holding costs can be made with an efficiently sized first party warehouse.