The Public-Private Partnership (P3 or PPP) model has been proposed as an alternative delivery system to address funding shortage problems associated with large-scale projects. Appropriately allocating and managing risks among project participants is critically important for a P3 project's success. This thesis focuses on one of the tools to manage revenue risk, the revenue guarantee, where a guarantor compensates a concessionaire with a predetermined amount of revenue in the event of a revenue shortfall. It is a form of real option—specifically a put option if a premium is paid for the downside protection or a collar option if potential upside revenue is traded for the protection. Previous research has explored the purpose and valuation of revenue guarantee options. This study focuses on the feasibility of utilizing a guarantee in US P3 highway projects through preparatory study and field investigation. In the preparatory phase, the work examines existing revenue risk management methods and how revenue guarantee options supplement them while also proposing an implementation framework. Additionally, it discusses a new option type,a collar option, including its concept, benefits, applicability, and valuation. In the field investigation phase, the preparatory work is synthesized into interview protocols that are used to seek market perspectives on revenue risks and revenue guarantee feasibility. Twenty people representing government officials, concessionaires, financial advisors and lending institutions were interviewed. The interview results indicated that a revenue guarantee shows promise as a viable tool, and the government should be willing to provide one. The decision to utilize a revenue guarantee depends on funding method selection, a public agency's institutional capacity, and the effectiveness of alternative risk mitigation approaches. Suggestions for implementation, such as applicable projects and a guarantee triggering criterion, are also provided. / Ph. D.

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have become a significant global phenomenon and governments are utilizing them more frequently to deliver projects that satisfy increasing societal demands in infrastructure sectors such as highways. Compared to traditional project delivery approaches, PPPs are long-term contracts between the public and the private sectors, where the private sector is engaged in more project tasks and accepts more risks. However, due to their long-term and complex nature, PPP contracts face many issues. Consequently, each project's contract becomes vital to project success because it: allocates risks, governs project relationships, and can align parties' interests. This dissertation examined 21 project contracts in the US highway PPP market to investigate risk allocation; contract designs and risk sharing mechanisms; and revenue risk guarantees. Using a content analysis framework, the allocation of 31 risks associated with highway PPPs was determined. These risks were mostly transferred to the private sector or shared between public and private parties, and project context had a significant influence on risk allocation. Assessment of contract designs indicated that the public sector imposes extensive monitoring and retains a majority of the decision rights to preclude opportunistic actions by the private sector; further, risk sharing mechanisms were complex and largely dependent on resolution during project implementation, which likely increases ex post transaction costs. Finally, revenue guarantees, commonly structured as standard options to mitigate revenue risk, were redesigned to incorporate exotic option features; quantitative analysis revealed that exotic structures can better serve chief PPP stakeholders' interests through increased robustness and flexibility. / Ph. D.