Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

Cette thèse étudie les différents aspects de la diplomatie française en Italie, pendant la période française de la guerre de Trente ans, puis pendant la guerre franco-espagnole (1635-1659). Les gouvernements de Richelieu et de Mazarin accordent une grande attention aux événements et enjeux péninsulaires. L'Italie n’est pas alors vue comme un ensemble d’Etats disparates, mais comme le lieu d’une unique géopolitique coordonnée. La première partie de ce travail s’attache à suivre les vicissitudes militaires et politiques de la présence française en Italie. La guerre contre l’Espagne et la construction de nouvelles alliances diplomatiques représentent la préoccupation constante des agents français ; des crises italiennes viennent surajouter leurs propres logiques aux enjeux européens du conflit entre les deux Couronnes. La guerre civile piémontaise, la guerre de Castro, la révolte de Naples représentent des épisodes majeurs dans lesquels les Français interviennent, malgré les réticences des princes italiens. Dans une seconde partie, les pratiques de la négociation sont étudiées. Le rôle de l’écrit et de la langue diplomatique, les difficultés à faire transiter les objets matériels que sont les dépêches d’une cour à l’autre sont évoqués. Les réseaux de parenté et de clientèle dans lesquels se trouvent impliqués les diplomates apparaissent comme des clefs de lecture intéressantes pour décrire les carrières des individus négociateurs. Loin d’intéresser un tout petit cercle de personnes, la diplomatie implique des personnages divers mais nombreux au sein des cours italiennes et française : les informations transitent, de même que les pensions et autres gratifications. Enfin, les princes italiens et leurs maisons sont étudiés. Entre les promesses et les menaces formulées par les couronnes, leurs choix sont dictés par des facteurs complexes et variables. / This doctoral thesis studies France’s diplomacy in Italy between 1635 and 1659, that is, during the French period of the Thirty Years war and the Franco-Spanish war. The governments of Richelieu and Mazarin survey the peninsular events and ventures with great attention. Italy is not seen as an ensemble of separate states, but as a single geopolitical entity. The first part of this work follows the military and political vicissitudes of the French presence in Italy. The war against Spain and the shaping of new diplomatic alliances in Italy are the constant source of preoccupation for the French representatives in the peninsula. In this context, however, several Italian crises come to add their own logic to the endeavours of the two opposing Crowns. The civil war in Piedmont, the war of Castro and the revolt of Naples are major episodes in which the French interfere notwithstanding the reluctance of the Italian princes. In the second part, the general practices used in the negotiations of the time are considered. The status of written messages, the characteristics of the diplomatic language and the difficulties sending letters from one court to another are brought up. The family links and clientele relations in which the diplomats are engaged form an essential element to the understanding of the careers of the individual negotiators. Far from concerning only a small circle of persons, diplomacy involves a number of different types of personage in both the French and Italian courts: information flow must be guaranteed as well as the payment of pensions and other remunerations. Finally, the Italian princes and their Houses are also studied. Between the promises and threats by the Crowns, the princes’ choices are made in function of a complex and variable set of factors.

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Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

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Even to contemporaries Louis XIII was an enigma, for he seemed to be the very embodiment of opposites. For example, when he overthrew his mother's Regency government in 1617, he claimed she had treated him as a child not as a son, yet the moment his 'coup' was successful he did not attempt to consolidate his authority, but sat on the floor "playing the child" he now claimed his mother had never allowed him to be. Further, he demanded the obedience of his nobility, yet continued to do things which elicited their scorn rather than their respect. After all, he fawned over court favorites, spoke with a stutter and seemed to enjoy his toy canons as much as he did the royal army he now ostensibly controlled. The purpose of this work is to show not only that Louis was a King without majesty, even though he was addressed as 'Your Majesty', but how he gradually came to acquire that majesty under the tutelage of Cardinal Richelieu. It does this first by drawing on the thought of Jean Bodin, the sixteenth century jurist, who showed that majesty flowed from sovereignty, and sovereignty meant that a ruler must not be subject to another in anything. Second, it applies this definition of sovereignty and majesty to Louis XIII, showing in detail how he did not even have control over his own life, much less over his court, country and coasts. It was Richelieu who gave him this control, making his rule unquestioned both in practice and in theory, separating him even from the scrutiny of the Catholic Church by making that Church subordinate to the state. Even more, Richelieu taught Louis how to carry himself like a King. Most of all, however, he taught Louis that the essence of majesty did not lie in demanding obedience but in exuding an authority that commanded it.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of California, May 1923. / Typewritten (carbon copy). Cover title: French colonization. Description based on print version record. Bibliography: numb. l. 158-160.