As a consequence of the increased incidence of collaborative arrangements between firms, the competitive environment characterising many industries has undergone profound change. It is suggested that rivalry is not necessarily enacted by individual firms according to the traditional mechanisms of direct confrontation in factor and product markets, but rather as collaborative orchestration between a number of participants or network members. Strategic networks are recognised as sets of firms within an industry that exhibit denser strategic linkages among themselves than other firms within the same industry. Based on this, strategic networks are determined according to evidence of strategic alliances between firms comprising the industry. As a result, a single strategic network represents a group of firms closely linked according to collaborative ties. Arguably, the collective outcome of these strategic relationships engineered between firms suggest that the collaborative benefits attributed to interorganisational relationships require closer examination in respect to their propensity to influence rivalry in intraindustry environments. Derived in large from the social sciences, network theory allows for the micro and macro examination of the opportunities and constraints inherent in the structure of relationships in strategic networks, establishing a relational approach upon which the conduct and performance of firms can be more fully understood. Research to date has yet to empirically investigate the relationship between strategic networks and rivalry. The limited research that has been completed utilising a network rationale to investigate competitive patterns in contemporary industry environments has been characterised by a failure to directly measure rivalry. Further, this prior research has typically embedded investigation in industry settings dominated by technological or regulatory imperatives, such as the microprocessor and airline industries. These industries, due to the presence of such imperatives, are arguably more inclined to support the realisation of network rivalry, through subscription to prescribed technological standards (eg., microprocessor industry) or by being bound by regulatory constraints dictating operation within particular market segments (airline industry). In order to counter these weaknesses, the proposition guiding research - Are patterns of rivalry predicted by strategic network membership? – is embedded in the United States Light Vehicles Industry, an industry not dominated by technological or regulatory imperatives. Further, rivalry is directly measured and utilised in research, thus distinguishing this investigation from prior research efforts. The timeframe of investigation is 1993 – 1999, with all research data derived from secondary sources. Strategic networks were defined within the United States Light Vehicles Industry based on evidence of horizontal strategic relationships between firms comprising the industry. The measure of rivalry used to directly ascertain the competitive patterns of industry participants was derived from the traditional Herfindahl Index, modified to account for patterns of rivalry observed at the market segment level. Statistical analyses of the strategic network and rivalry constructs found little evidence to support the contention of network rivalry; indeed, greater levels of rivalry were observed between firms comprising the same strategic network than between firms participating in opposing network structures. Based on these results, patterns of rivalry evidenced in the United States Light Vehicle Industry over the period 1993 – 1999 were not found to be predicted by strategic network membership. The findings generated by this research are in contrast to current theorising in the strategic network – rivalry realm. In this respect, these findings are surprising. The relevance of industry type, in conjunction with prevailing network methodology, provides the basis upon which these findings are contemplated. Overall, this study raises some important questions in relation to the relevancy of the network rivalry rationale, establishing a fruitful avenue for further research.

Thesis (M.A. in anthropology)--Washington State University, May 2009. / Title from PDF title page (viewed on June 8, 2009). "Department of Anthropology." Includes bibliographical references (p. 40-45).

Binocular rivalry allows for the unique examination of the neural processes associated with binocular vision by instigating a disruption of normal stereoscopic vision. Although binocular rivalry has been examined extensively in young adults, we know relatively little about its developmental trajectory across the human lifespan. This thesis provides a foundation for characterizing perceptual alternations during binocular rivalry in children and older adults, with a specific emphasis on expanding our understanding of binocular rivalry in older adults. From a theoretical perspective, my studies on aging and binocular rivalry have a specific significance, because unique changes that are known to occur with aging to certain neural mechanisms often associated with characteristics of perceptual alternations allows for the study of aging to serve as a test for many of the current models of binocular rivalry. Overall, my studies provide evidence for a significant transitional period in the binocular visual system at the age of 70 and older, and highlights the developmental trajectories of specific characteristics of binocular rivalry from childhood to senescence. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Thesis (M.S.)--Boston University

Thesis (M.Sc.)--University of the Witwatersrand, 1961.

­^¤åºK­n I/O, resource-based theory ,or strategic group are usually used for analyzing the competition in industries in the past., but they seldom show the tiny reciprocal interaction between companies. So this research use case study to demonstrate the rivalry between companies in an industry. This research take TV-game machine companies as research targets. The scope starts from Nintendo entering this industry in 1983 to SEGA leaving this industry in 2001. Because the relative researches for TV-game machine were quite few, therefore this research starts from the information gathering about this industry, that trying to mention the outline and nature of TV-game machine industry. Then analyze this industry by rivalry theory. At last, according to the theories and the real competition between companies, this research infers the propositions and findings. The findings are: The TV-game machine industry is greatly influenced by three components; they are the TV-game machine companies, software companies, and consumers. Thanks to that the software companies have to give money to the TV-game machine companies, so TV-game machine companies profit from not only the consumers, but also the software companies. And the willing for consumers to buy a TV-game machine is affected by the function of the machine itself and the amount of games issued by the software companies. From the history of the TV-game machine, this research finds the issue of TV-game machines has the phenomenon of discontinuous invention. From 8 digital, 16 digital, 32 digital, 64 digital, to 128 digital, companies penetrate market by issuing more powerful TV-game machines. Though this discontinuous invention has the effect to raise the rank of companies, but due to the difference of specification between the new type and the old one, the new generation is not able to play the software for the old one. The environmental factors faced by the TV-game machine companies are: 1.The difference of machines between each company is not specific; 2.The entry barrier for TV-game machine industry is high; 3.The amount of sells is affected by time and software; 4.The market uncertainty often rises for the sake of low supply; 5.The market commonality is high. This research has the following findings: 1.To compare with common condition, when the life of products goes into the decline period, the monopolizing companies may take price competition as the means to increase the selling of products. 2.In monopolizing industry, companies seldom attack. But if some company takes tactic attack action, other companies will response quickly. 3.The companies will think over the reputation of other competitors in the industry before attacking, if the competitors had the records of responding strongly after being attacked, the companies may not attack; 4.In fast-cycled industry, if the companies issue new products in a hurry, the advantage of first mover is not obvious; 5.When companies don¡¦t have enough resource to take strategic action, they may take tactic action as substitute; 6.In fast-cycled industry, when companies involved in have immense scale, they can ask their suppliers to produce specific products just for them via their strong negotiation power; 7.To the contrast of initial period of industry, the entry barrier is higher in the mature period. When industry gets mature gradually, the firms have to issue specific products which have not only good quality to satisfy spoiled consumers. When industry gets into mature period, firms will take action to raise their market share.

No description available.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Alabama at Birmingham, 2007. / Additional advisors: Timothy Gawne, Richard Gray, Michael Loop, Michael Sloane, Donald Twieg. Description based on contents viewed Mar. 3, 2008; title from title screen. Includes bibliographical references (p. 88-97).

Thesis (M.A.)--Bowling Green State University, 2007. / Document formatted into pages; contains vii, 86 p. Includes bibliographical references.

No description available.