TITLE: Selected questions of normative regulation of the Czech educational system AUTHOR: Michaela Fořtová DEPARTMENT: Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy SUPERVISOR: JUDr. Stanislav Sádovský, PhD., LLM, MSc ABSTRACT: The thesis is devoted to the problems of normative regulation in the sphere of the Czech educational system. At the very beginning it defines regulation and its influence within the framework of jurisprudence in the form of normative regulation. Therefore the dissertation deals with the term of legal standard, its structure and the types of legal norms. It indicates normative regulation in practice, thus in selected laws. Thereafter it performs classification of normative instruments in education, which is made on the basis of law sources difference. The end of this thesis is dedicated to normative regulation of the educational system, which is illustrated by selected documents. Then regulation is evaluated and possibilities of its improvement suggested. KEYWORDS: school system, rule-making, law sources, self-government, inspection

In the last decade, World Trade Organization (WTO) Members have paid little attention to the WTO rulemaking processes and their functioning. Two high-levels commissions, as well as some scholars, have identified several areas of concerns with respect to the WTO rulemaking processes. Some of them have put forth proposals for their reform. However, the WTO has not proceeded with or even reflected upon any major reforms affecting the functioning of its rulemaking processes. The lack of attention by the Members regarding these issues motivated the focus of this thesis on the legitimacy of the WTO rulemaking processes. The principal research question of this thesis is: Are the WTO rulemaking processes legitimate? To what degree? Answering this first research question necessarily leads to a secondary one: How can the WTO rulemaking processes be assessed? This thesis recognizes that there is no uniform way for assessing legitimacy both at the national and international levels. It borrows from David Beetham's legitimacy conception and assesses the legitimacy of the WTO rulemaking processes from the standpoint of WTO Members. It builds a theoretical framework for assessing the legitimacy of the rulemaking processes on the basis of Members' conception of the WTO and the concepts of input and output legitimacy that have been frequently applied to the WTO and from which are derived four legitimacy criteria: legality, effectiveness, representativeness and openness. This thesis furthermore advances that legitimacy can only be effectively assessed as a matter of degree and, therefore, develops a multidimensional interval scale to allow a precise measurement of the four criteria of legitimacy as applied to the WTO rulemaking processes. In order to assess the rulemaking processes, it uses three cases that have led to the adoption of new rules or agreements. In fact, legitimacy matters even more for the processes that led to actual rules due to the fact that they generate binding outcomes. Such a methodology based on case studies arguably provides a more accurate representation of the WTO rulemaking processes than the general processes that have been described in the secondary literature.

No / What role do individual member states play in the continuing development of European Union (EU) environmental policy? Are they capable of successful intervention in the process of joint rule making to maintain their preferred national policies? On the basis of a detailed analysis of EU environmental pollution control measures adopted in the period 1972-86, some observers have argued forcefully that the United Kingdom (UK) Government successfully defended its sovereignty by systematically manipulating national and European political arenas in order to maintain its pre-existing policies. However, when other aspects of EU environmental policy are analysed over the full policy cycle, the extent of national control appears much more circumscribed. A comparison of UK Government aims with long-term political outcomes in the sphere of EU biodiversity policy (c.1970-2000) reveals evidence of firm state control in the short-term, but significant unintended consequences in the medium to long-term. These findings raise doubts about the explanatory power of intergovernmental accounts of EU environmental policy making.

A regulação financeira, especialmente a regulação bancária, tem um papel central na organização da vida social. As modernas técnicas regulatórias, altamente sofisticadas, são o resultado de décadas de evolução. Elas exigem técnicos especializados, orçamentos específicos e uma estrutura institucional complexa. Mais que isso: para promover as regulações sistêmica e prudencial, os reguladores necessitam de amplos poderes normativos uma capacidade normativa de conjuntura. A atribuição de tais competências a órgãos que não contam com a legitimidade das urnas é considerada por alguns autores uma espécie de anomalia no direito constitucional. Para outros, ao contrário, ela é um elemento necessário do desenho institucional do Estado Regulador contemporâneo. É nesse ponto que se cruzam os debates sobre o processo de burocratização da vida social e sobre o desenvolvimento dos cânones do direito ocidental, especialmente a doutrina da separação dos poderes. A juridificação das esferas sociais suscita o tema do déficit democrático da formulação de políticas pela burocracia. A presente tese desenvolve, a partir do modelo de democracia deliberativa de Jürgen Habermas, a premissa normativa segundo a qual o controle judicial é necessário para garantir a legitimidade democrática do processo administrativo normativo. Como o cidadão comum não dispõe nem do conhecimento técnico nem dos meios materiais necessários para acompanhar o processo de tomada de decisões, o controle judicial deveria funcionar como um mecanismo de controle democrático da regulação financeira. A tese analisa esse déficit democrático a partir da jurisprudência constitucional do Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) relativa à separação dos poderes e às disputas doutrinárias sobre delegação legislativa e poder regulamentar. Os estudos de caso, focados no sistema financeiro, buscam investigar se a atuação do STF tem garantido de forma adequada um equilíbrio entre a racionalidade tecnocrática e as exigências normativas de uma democracia deliberativa. / Financial regulation, specially banking regulation, plays a central role in the organization of social life. The current regulatory techniques, highly sophisticated, are the result of decades of evolution. They require well-trained public officials, specific budgets and a complex institutional framework. Moreover, in order to carry on the systemic and prudential regulations, regulators need broad rule-making powers. The assignment of such authority to non-majoritarian bodies is considered by some authors as a sort of anomaly in Constitutional Law. To others, it is seen as a necessary element of the institutional design of the contemporary Regulatory State. This is the stage where the debate about the process of bureaucratization of social life meets the intellectual concern about the current developments of western public law, namely the issue of the separation of powers. The juridification of the social spheres brings the issue of the democratic deficit of bureaucratic policymaking. Since ordinary citizens lack the expertise as well as the material and financial resources which are necessary to monitor the decision-making process, this dissertation develops the normative assumption that judicial review is necessary to ensure the democratic legitimacy of the administrative process. The dissertation analyses that democratic deficit from the viewpoint of the constitutional jurisprudence of the Brazilian Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal STF) regarding separation of powers, the rule-making authority of Brazilian non-majoritarian bodies and the doctrinal disputes about legislative delegation. The case studies show that the judicial review by STF has in practice rejected the Brazilian public law non-delegation doctrine, but has done it in a way that does not strike a balance between technocratic rationality and the normative claims of deliberative democracy.

A regulação financeira, especialmente a regulação bancária, tem um papel central na organização da vida social. As modernas técnicas regulatórias, altamente sofisticadas, são o resultado de décadas de evolução. Elas exigem técnicos especializados, orçamentos específicos e uma estrutura institucional complexa. Mais que isso: para promover as regulações sistêmica e prudencial, os reguladores necessitam de amplos poderes normativos uma capacidade normativa de conjuntura. A atribuição de tais competências a órgãos que não contam com a legitimidade das urnas é considerada por alguns autores uma espécie de anomalia no direito constitucional. Para outros, ao contrário, ela é um elemento necessário do desenho institucional do Estado Regulador contemporâneo. É nesse ponto que se cruzam os debates sobre o processo de burocratização da vida social e sobre o desenvolvimento dos cânones do direito ocidental, especialmente a doutrina da separação dos poderes. A juridificação das esferas sociais suscita o tema do déficit democrático da formulação de políticas pela burocracia. A presente tese desenvolve, a partir do modelo de democracia deliberativa de Jürgen Habermas, a premissa normativa segundo a qual o controle judicial é necessário para garantir a legitimidade democrática do processo administrativo normativo. Como o cidadão comum não dispõe nem do conhecimento técnico nem dos meios materiais necessários para acompanhar o processo de tomada de decisões, o controle judicial deveria funcionar como um mecanismo de controle democrático da regulação financeira. A tese analisa esse déficit democrático a partir da jurisprudência constitucional do Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) relativa à separação dos poderes e às disputas doutrinárias sobre delegação legislativa e poder regulamentar. Os estudos de caso, focados no sistema financeiro, buscam investigar se a atuação do STF tem garantido de forma adequada um equilíbrio entre a racionalidade tecnocrática e as exigências normativas de uma democracia deliberativa. / Financial regulation, specially banking regulation, plays a central role in the organization of social life. The current regulatory techniques, highly sophisticated, are the result of decades of evolution. They require well-trained public officials, specific budgets and a complex institutional framework. Moreover, in order to carry on the systemic and prudential regulations, regulators need broad rule-making powers. The assignment of such authority to non-majoritarian bodies is considered by some authors as a sort of anomaly in Constitutional Law. To others, it is seen as a necessary element of the institutional design of the contemporary Regulatory State. This is the stage where the debate about the process of bureaucratization of social life meets the intellectual concern about the current developments of western public law, namely the issue of the separation of powers. The juridification of the social spheres brings the issue of the democratic deficit of bureaucratic policymaking. Since ordinary citizens lack the expertise as well as the material and financial resources which are necessary to monitor the decision-making process, this dissertation develops the normative assumption that judicial review is necessary to ensure the democratic legitimacy of the administrative process. The dissertation analyses that democratic deficit from the viewpoint of the constitutional jurisprudence of the Brazilian Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal STF) regarding separation of powers, the rule-making authority of Brazilian non-majoritarian bodies and the doctrinal disputes about legislative delegation. The case studies show that the judicial review by STF has in practice rejected the Brazilian public law non-delegation doctrine, but has done it in a way that does not strike a balance between technocratic rationality and the normative claims of deliberative democracy.