This thesis is concerned with the debate between absolutists and relativists about generality. Absolutists about quantification contend that we can quantify over absolutely everything; relativists deny this. The introduction motivates and elucidates the dispute. More familiar, restrictionist versions of relativism, according to which the range of quantifiers is always subject to restriction, are distinguished from the view defended in this thesis, an expansionist version of relativism, according to which the range of quantifiers is always open to expansion. The remainder of the thesis is split into three parts. Part I focuses on generality. Chapter 2 is concerned with the semantics of quantifiers. Unlike the restrictionist, the expansionist need not disagree with the absolutist about the semantics of quantifier domain restriction. It is argued that the threat of a certain form of semantic pessimism, used as an objection against restrictionism, also arises, in some cases, for absolutism, but is avoided by expansionism. Chapter 3 is primarily engaged in a defensive project, responding to a number of objections in the literature: the objection that the relativist is unable to coherently state her view, the objection that absolute generality is needed in logic and philosophy, and the objection that relativism is unable to accommodate ‘kind generalisations’. To meet these objections, suitable schematic and modal resources are introduced and relativism is given a precise formulation. Part II concerns issues in the philosophy of mathematics pertinent to the absolutism/relativism debate. Chapter 4 draws on the modal and schematic resources introduced in the previous chapter to regiment and generalise the key argument for relativism based on the set-theoretic paradoxes. Chapter 5 argues that relativism permits a natural motivation for Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. A new, bi-modal axiomatisation of the iterative conception of set is presented. It is argued that such a theory improves on both its non-modal and modal rivals. Part III aims to meet a thus far unfulfilled explanatory burden facing expansionist relativism. The final chapter draws on principles from metasemantics to offer a positive account of how universes of discourse may be expanded, and assesses the prospects for a novel argument for relativism on this basis.

This  thesis  consists  of two papers  and  a summary.  The  papers  both  deal with  affine algebraic complex  varieties,  and  in particular such  varieties  in dimension  three  that have a non-trivial action  of one of the  one-dimensional  algebraic  groups  Ga   :=  (C, +) and  Gm  :=  (C*, ·).  The methods  used  involve  blowing up  of subvarieties, the correspondances between  Ga - and  Gm - actions  on an affine variety  X with locally nilpotent derivations  and Z-gradings  respectively  on O(X) and passing from a filtered algebra  A to its associated graded  algebra  gr(A). In Paper  I, we study  Russell’s hypersurface  X , i.e. the affine variety  in the affine space A4 given by the equation  x + x2y + z3 + t2 = 0. We reprove by geometric means Makar-Limanov’s result which states  that X is not isomorphic to A3 – a result which was crucial to Koras-Russell’s proof of the linearization conjecture  for Gm -actions on A3. Our method consist in realizing X as an open part  of a blowup M  −→ A3 and to show that each Ga -action on X descends to A3 . This follows from considerations of the graded  algebra  associated to O(X ) with respect  to a certain filtration. In Paper  II, we study  Ga-threefolds X  which have  as their  algebraic  quotient  the  affine plane  A2  = Sp(C[x, y]) and  are a principal  bundle  above the  punctured plane  A2  :=  A2 \ {0}. Equivalently, we study  affine Ga -varieties  Pˆ  that extend  a principal  bundle  P over A2, being P together  with an extra  fiber over the origin in A2. First  the trivial  bundle  is studied,  and some examples of extensions  are given (including  smooth  ones which are not isomorphic  to A2 × A). The  most  basic among  the  non-trivial  principal  bundles  over A2 is SL2 (C)  −→ A2, A  1→  Ae1 where e1  denotes  the first unit  vector,  and we show that any non-trivial  bundle  can be realized as a pullback  of this  bundle  with  respect  to  a morphism  A2  −→ A2. Therefore  the  attention is then  restricted to extensions  of SL2(C)  and  find two families of such extensions  via a study of the  graded  algebras  associated  with  the  coordinate  rings  O(Pˆ)  '→ O(P ) with  respect  to  a filtration  which is defined in terms  of the Ga -actions  on P and Pˆ  respectively.

My thesis aims at contributing to classifying the Liar-like paradoxes (and related Truth-teller-like expressions) by clarifying distinctions and relationships between these expressions and arguments. Such a classification is worthwhile, firstly, because it makes some progress towards reducing a potential infinity of versions into a finite classification; secondly, because it identifies a number of new paradoxes, and thirdly and most significantly, because it corrects the historically misplaced distinction between semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes. I emphasize the third result because the distinction made by Peano [1906] and supported by Ramsey [1925] has been used to warrant different responses to the semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes. I find two types among the paradoxes of truth, satisfaction and membership, but the division is shifted from where it has historically been drawn. This new distinction is, I believe, more fundamental than the Peano-Ramsey distinction between semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes. The distinction I investigate is ultimately exemplified in a difference between the logical principles necessary to prove the Liar and those necessary to prove Grelling’s and Russell’s paradoxes. The difference relates to proofs of the inconsistency of naive truth and satisfaction; in the end, we will have two associated ways of proving each result. ¶ Another principled division is intuitively anticipated. I coin the term 'hypodox' (adj.: 'hypodoxical') for a generalization of Truth-tellers across paradoxes of truth, satisfaction, membership, reference, and where else it may find applicability. I make and investigate a conjecture about paradox and hypodox duality: that each paradox (at least those in the scope of the classification) has a dual hypodox.¶ In my investigation, I focus on paradoxes that might intuitively be thought to be relatives of the Liar paradox, including Grelling’s (which I present as a paradox of satisfaction) and, by analogy with Grelling’s paradox, Russell’s paradox. I extend these into truth-functional and some non-truth-functional variations, beginning with the Epimenides, Curry’s paradox, and similar variations. There are circular and infinite variations, which I relate via lists. In short, I focus on paradoxes of truth, satisfaction and some paradoxes of membership. ¶ Among the new paradoxes, three are notable in advance. The first is a non-truth functional variation on the Epimenides. This helps put the Epimenides on a par with Curry’s as a paradox in its own right and not just a lesser version of the Liar. I find the second paradox by working through truth-functional variants of the paradoxes. This new paradox, call it ‘the ESP’, can be either true or false, but can still be used to prove some other arbitrary statement. The third new paradox is another paradox of satisfaction, distinctly different from Grelling’s paradox. On this basis, I make and investigate the new distinction between two different types of paradox of satisfaction, and map one type back by direct analogy to the Liar, and the other by direct analogy to Russell's paradox.