Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2006. / "April 2006." Thesis directed by Alvin Plantinga and Ted A. Warfield for the Department of Philosophy. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 187-192).

Thesis (M.A.)--Boston University / PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you. / This thesis examines the relation of various areas of Bertrand Russell's epistemology to his theory of truth. It has been held that the correspondence theory of truth is the key to Russell's epistemological realism. Russell himself defines knowledge in terms of truth, and not truth in terms of knowledge. After an introductory chapter, Russell's Theory of Mind is e xamined in Chapter One. Chapter Two deals with his Theory of Matter. Chapter Three treats his Theory of Language. The fourth and concluding chapter compares Russell's correspondence theory of truth with two alternative theories of truth: the coher ence theory of truth and the pragmatic theory of truth; and summarizes the three basic meanings of correspondence in Russell's theory of truth. Since Russell defines truth as some sort of correspondence between belief and facts, and derivatively in terms of the sentences expressing beliefs, it was felt that a tracing of the development of Russell's Theories of Mind (belief), Matter (facts), and Language (sentences) would best illuminate a study of his theory of truth. Russell's Theory of Mind runs the gamut from a mindmatter dualism, to a neutral monism, to a view of mind as "perspective." The progress of his Theory of Mind involves a move in the theory of belief from an "act" of belief, to a "propositional attitude," to a "feeling." In no case is truth predicated of the subjective factor in belief, but rather of "judgment," "propositions," or "content" of belief, except in the case where what a sentence indicates is a state of mind of the believer. Russell's Theory of Matter has changed in a fashion paralleling his Theory of Mind. Thus, he begins by inferring physical objects from sense-data, and he constructs physical objects from the class of all their appearances, and finally he says that we may infer the structure of physical events on the basis of non-demonstrable principles of inference. The world of facts is in every period considered to be a pluralistic world, and hence relations among facts are external relations. Russell's Theory of Language underwent a similar evolution. In the beginning of his thought on an ideal language, as suggested in Principia, he followed Wittgenstein in holding that logic has an atomic structure which mirrors a world of atomic facts. Later, Russell comes to feel that the "picture" theory of language is inadequate. Finally, he holds that language mirrors the world in that both words and objects are universals. In conclusion, a comparison was made between alternative theories of truth, and the correspondence theory of truth was summarized. The writer of this thesis holds that Russell's correspondence theory of truth is to be preferred over the alternatives presented. / 2999-01-01

Thesis (Ph.D.)--York University, 2004. Graduate Programme in Social and Political Thought. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 168-173). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pNQ99248

Thesis (M. Div.)--Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, South Hamilton, MA, 2002. / Abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [84]-86).

Thesis (M. Div.)--Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, South Hamilton, MA, 2002. / Abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [84]-86).

Thesis (M. Div.)--Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, South Hamilton, MA, 2002. / Abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [84]-86).

In contemporary formal theory of truth, model-theoretic and non-classical approaches have been dominant. I rather pursue the so-called classical axiomatic approaches toward truth and my dissertation begins by arguing for the classical axiomatic approach and against the others. The classical axiomatic approach inevitably leads to abandonment of the nave conception of truth and revision of the basic principles of truth derived from that nave conception such as the full T-schema. In the absence of the general guiding principles based on that nave conception, we need to conduct tedious but down-to-earth eld works' of various theories of truth by examining and comparing them from various points of view in searching for satisfactory theories of truth. As such attempt, I raise two new criteria for comparison of truth theories, make a proof-theoretic study of them in connection to the foundation of mathematics.

Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 2005. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 118-120).

Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 2005. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 118-120).

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The main objective of this work consists in investigating the relationship between Frege s conception of truth and the so called Identity Theory of Truth . An identity theory of truth is described in literature as the thesis sustaining that truth consists, fundamentally, in the identity between the content of a judgment or proposition and a fact. The proposition expressed by a sentence, as in Aristotle was a disciple of Plato , is true if, and only if, it is a fact that Aristotle was a disciple of Plato. Thus, the contents of the sentences would be in a relation of identity towards the facts, and would not be in a relation of correspondence, as classic theories of truth sustain. In Der Gedanke, published in 1918, Frege seems to sustain this theory, even though his conception of truth is much larger than that. On the article, he explicitly affirms that a fact is a thought that is true. Such affirmation fits perfectly in the identity theory of truth s slogan. Nevertheless, there s plenty of discussion on the subject in secondary literature. Authors such as Baldwin, Dodd, Kemp, Horsnby and Sluga have discussed the identification between facts and true thoughts, and have given explanations that are sometimes rather antagonistic. That is why it is of great value the reconstruction and the discussion of such interpretations, in the attempt to clarify Frege s purpose on the referred affirmation. Along with that, it is necessary to review other aspects of Frege s philosophy, since his conception of truth in general, and, particularly, the identity theory of truth, are connected to the whole of his philosophy. / A presente dissertação tem como objetivo central investigar a relação entre a concepção fregeana de verdade e a chamada teoria da verdade como identidade (Identity Theory of Truth). Uma teoria da verdade como identidade é caracterizada na literatura como a tese segundo a qual verdade consistiria, fundamentalmente, na identidade entre o conteúdo de um juízo ou proposição e um fato. A proposição expressa por uma sentença, como Aristóteles foi discípulo de Platão , é verdadeira se, e somente se, é um fato que Aristóteles foi discípulo de Platão. Assim sendo, os conteúdos das sentenças estariam em uma relação de identidade com fatos e não em uma relação de correspondência, como as teorias clássicas da verdade irão defender. Em Der Gedanke de 1918, Frege parece defender essa teoria, mesmo que a concepção fregeana de verdade seja muito mais ampla do que isso. Neste artigo, ele explicitamente afirma que um fato é um pensamento que é verdadeiro. E tal afirmação encaixa-se perfeitamente no slogan da teoria da verdade como identidade. Não obstante, na literatura secundária existe uma série de discussões sobre esse tópico. Autores como Baldwin, Dodd, Kemp, Horsnby e Sluga irão discutir essa identificação entre fatos e pensamentos verdadeiros dando respostas por vezes antagônicas. Por isso, é de grande importância reconstruir e discutir essas interpretações na tentativa de esclarecer o propósito de Frege ao fazer tal afirmação. Conjuntamente, outros aspectos da filosofia fregeana necessitam ser explicitados, pois a concepção fregeana de verdade em geral e a teoria da verdade como identidade, em particular, estão ligadas ao restante de sua filosofia.