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The assessment of the motivational value of rewards in the world of work is interesting but difficult to understand. Variations in research reports and inadequate comprehension of the efficiency and motivational value of rewards have brought about confusions, controversies and contradictions among authors, researchers, consultants and practitioners in the field of Industrial and Organisational Psychology (Mangham, 2007; Muula, 2006; Muula & Maseko, 2005; Palmer, 2006; World Bank, 2004). As a consequence, organisations are applying theories and models of motivation selectively depending on their beliefs, ideological framework of values and assumptions (Dzimbiri, 2009). The study was therefore carried out as a positive contribution to the existing knowledge and debate on the motivational value of rewards for health professionals in the public health sectors of the developing countries. Through a systematic sampling method, 571 health professionals were sampled for the study. Data were collected through the use of a self-administered questionnaire which was composed based on the data collected from desk research/literature review, focus group discussions and interviews. The findings of the study revealed that the Malawi‟s Ministry of Health (MoH) is failing to attract, motivate and retain health professionals; there is perception of inequity of the rewards among the health professionals; health professionals develop coping strategies to supplement their monthly financial rewards; health professionals engage in corrupt practices to supplement their monthly financial rewards; and there is erosion of industrial democracy in the Malawi‟s Public Health Sector. While the statistical testing of the hypothesized model proved a lack of fit between the variables, the statistical testing of the re-specified model suggests that there is a positive relationship between financial rewards and reward-related problems being faced by health professionals in the Malawi‟s MoH. Through the Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) exercise, an inverse (negative) relationship between financial and non-financial rewards was deduced, and scientifically and graphically demonstrated. Both the re-specified and graphical models symbolize a pragmatic departure from the theoretical model whose authors (Franco, Bennett, Kanfer & Stubblebine, 2004) are largely inclined to the use of non-financial rewards and suggest that financial rewards should be used with caution. These findings also reject the Herzberg‟s two factor theory (Herzberg, 1960) which claims that financial rewards (salaries) are not a motivator. The major recommendations of the study are that the Franco et al.‟s (2004) model should be adopted and adapted in the Malawi‟s MoH with the view that the value of both financial and non-financial rewards (as motivators) varies from individual to individual due to individual differences and prevailing factors/forces in both the work environment and wider society in which the MoH operates; a hybrid reward system combining the strengths of time-based, performance-based and competence-based reward systems should be developed and implemented; the results of scientifically testing the re-specified model and the inverse (causal) relationship established between financial and non-financial rewards (as demonstrated in a graphic model) should be re-tested with other samples in the public health sectors of the developing countries; and the motivational value of non-financial rewards should be scientifically established and compared with the motivational value of financial rewards used independent of each other in business organisations to make an objective conclusion on the rewards-motivation debate.

In the last decade South Africa saw the introduction of s 8C into the Income Tax Act, no.58 of 1962, the introduction of IFRS 2 into the International Financial Reporting Standards and the promulgation of the 2008 Companies Act. Each of these changes is relevant to and impact on the consequences flowing from executive share incentive schemes, from the perspective of both the employer company offering the scheme and the employee participating in the scheme. The aim of this study was to analyse, from the employer company’s perspective, the implications of each discipline in isolation, as well as the interrelationship of the three disciplines. The further aims of this study were to utilise the findings from the analyses to identify where legislative amendment is required to close loopholes or ensure equitable results, to identify where the interrelationship of the three disciplines result in unintended consequences, and to provide recommendations on how to avoid these adverse consequences. The most significant findings of this study are summarised below. Due to the legal precedent created by the Supreme Court of Appeal in the Labat case, the mode of settlement – cash or equity – will be the determining factor as regards the availability of an income tax deduction in the hands of the employer company. It is submitted that legislative amendment is required to rectify this inequitable result. Where payment by the employer pursuant to a share appreciation rights scheme occurs in a year of assessment subsequent to the year of assessment in which vesting occurred, changes in the value of the underlying equity instrument from the vesting date to the payment date could result in adverse income tax consequences to the employer and/or the fiscus. To address this, it is recommended that the Income Tax Act should be amended to expressly bring cash-settled executive share incentive schemes within the scope of s 7B and to align the provisions of s 7B and 8C in order to avoid anomalies existing between these two sections in so far as the income tax consequences in the hands of the participating employees are concerned.

This dissertation consists of three separate essays. The first two essays focus on real estate brokerage; one studies the conditions for efficient employment in the real estate brokerage industry under fixed commission rates and the other examines the role of real estate agents in buyer-seller bargaining. The third essay presents an integrated analysis of housing investment and consumption choices that takes into account both the uncertainty in investment returns and liquidity constraints. Essay one presents a model of real estate trading with brokerage that integrates sequential search, two-sided matching, and the competitive entry and effort choice of real estate agents. The equilibrium employment pattern of the model helps to explain the observation that the number of agents is more sensitive to the expected transaction price than to the transaction volume. The condition for efficient employment requires the commission to be proportional to the opportunity cost of search time and the expected trading gain, with the proportion determined by the productivity of brokerage employment. Efficient employment also requires regulating the entry so as to achieve the productivity balance between the number of agents and individual effort. Essay two examines asymmetric information and bargaining within the model of real estate trading developed in essay one. The equilibrium outcomes of bargaining with and without information asymmetry are characterized with the help of mechanism design methodology, and the associated welfare levels are compared. The analysis is applied to evaluating the role of real estate agents in the bargaining. Agents seek compromises between the buyer and seller by providing credible information to both parties. Such a role is welfare improving when the scale economy of brokerage with respect to the stock of buyers and sellers is not strong and brokerage employment is sufficient. In essay three, Pratt's certainty-equivalent approximation is applied to the Henderson-Ioannides (1983) housing tenure choice model. The key trade-offs for housing investment and consumption choices induced by the uncertainty and liquidity constraints are clearly illustrated and the implications for tenure choice examined against the existing empirical evidence. / Business, Sauder School of / Graduate

This study examined the effects of switching from an incentive pay system solely based on productivity to a scorecard-based incentive pay system. Performance of staff and senior accountants was analyzed across three departments for a two-year baseline and a three-year intervention period. Results showed that percent of charge hour goal remained high during the study. Once the scorecard-based incentive system was implemented, performance on the other line items increased or remained at or above goal levels. Incentive payouts were generally higher under the second incentive plan than under the first for top performers. Possible explanations for data trends, weaknesses of the measures within the scorecard, measure/line item alternatives and implications for future research are also discussed.

Bibliography: pages 72-78. / Apart from its current application in the process of transformation of South Africa's education system, interestingly, the term rationalisation is absent from the international literature. The high level of impact that the economics of education has in the provision of education presupposes that, in the "Global Village", world trends and access to international financial markets to fund transformation in education will inform the national policy making process. In South Africa macro education policy is set by the National ministry. In this regard teacher I learner ratios and funding to the provinces have been set at the highest level of government. In terms of this, it is understandable that national imperatives will influence and in many cases determine provincial policy making and the implementation thereof. This study examines educator responses to the way in which the rationalisation of teacher numbers is being applied in the Western Cape Education Department (WCED). The investigation takes into cognisance the particular historical, political and social background of the Western Cape Province. In doing so this study recognises the influence that these factors have had on the way teachers view the rationalisation policies and, more importantly, their implementation. In the apartheid era education was organised, according to "race", into four different departments. Thus the Department of Education (DET) controlled "Black" education, the Cape Education Department (CED) controlled "White" education, the House of Representatives (HOR) controlled "Coloured" education and the House of Delegates (HOD) was responsible for "Indian" education. Since the number of HOD teachers in the WCED only constitutes 0,47% of the total [WCED, November 1995], they were not taken into consideration for this study. While there is a convergence of opinion by educators of the three ex departments on many issues regarding rationalisation there is also a noticeable divergence underpinned by historical difference in funding and human and physical resourcing. Conclusions drawn point to the fact that there is a general acceptance of the policy of the rationalisation of teacher numbers in the Western Cape. Yet, while this policy might promote equality of numbers, its merit as a means to assuage the demand for the equitable redressing of the injustices of the apartheid era remains questionable.

This dissertation focuses on three different aspects of physician pricing. The first is the use of the assumption in formal modeling that physicians have the same type of costs for different types of patients. The second aspect of physician pricing investigated here is physicians’ ability to change the name of a service in response to a fee cap without actually changing the price of the service. The third aspect investigated in this dissertation is the effect of posting physician prices on patient-initiated demand for physician services. All three of these aspects have potential implications for the discussion on health care reform. In Chapter One, I examine physician price response to fee ceilings set by third party payers. I use the realistic assumptions that physician’s have the same cost function for all their patients and physicians have increasing marginal cost. Using these assumptions, I find that, in theory, a third party payer that uses fixed fees benefits from including every physician in the community. In chapter two, I use the medical claims data from a Fortune 500 firm (Firm) to evaluate physician pricing response to the Firm’s institution of fee ceilings. I find that physicians who are constrained by the fee ceiling systematically record a more expensive office visit code than physicians who were not constrained by the fee ceiling. This result has implications for private insurers as well as government programs that fix physician fees. In chapter three I use a model of patient-initiated demand under uncertainty to examine the effect of posting physician prices on the demand for physician services. I find that requiring physicians with monopoly power to post all or some of their prices has no effect on the total patient cost associated with physician consultations, including the cost of untreated disease. If physicians compete in a Bertrand fashion, then requiring a physician to post the prices of all types of consultations results in lower total patient cost than posting only some prices. / Ph. D.

This study provides a survey of local school board members in the Commonwealth of Virginia which investigates attitudes and perceptions of merit pay for teachers. In addition, criteria considered important components of a merit pay program for teachers in Virginia are identified. Case studies of selected school systems in Virginia provide a comparison of the criteria with the characteristics of merit pay programs which are now or have been operational at sometime since 1960 in school systems in Virginia. Findings indicate that the variables of sex, educational level, occupational status, length of service on the school board, and the location of the school system served significantly effect school board member attitude and perceptions of merit pay for teachers. In addition, the case studies indicate a relationship between school board members' perceptions of merit pay and the actual operational characteristics of merit pay programs. / Ed. D.

The purposes of this descriptive investigation were (l) to construct a reliable instrument for assessing attitudes toward teaching of high school teachers, and (2) to determine if there was a difference in attitudes toward teaching between those high school teachers who were and those who were not involved in a career ladder/merit pay pilot program. Frederick Herzberg's Motivation-Hygiene Theory served as the theoretical basis for the investigation. Analysis of work motivation indicates that motivation factors may be classified in two categories, intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic motivation emanates from needs within the individual. Intrinsic motivators include the following: achievement, recognition, responsibility, advancement and growth possibilities. Extrinsic motivators include the following: organizational policies, salary, working conditions, status, job security, effects on personal life, and interpersonal relations. / Ed. D.

Virginia Tech Engineering graduates of 1975 were surveyed to determine if salary differences existed between matched groups of co-op and non co-op graduates and to determine if selected variables were related to salaries. The average salary for co-ops was higher for both first and current positions (six years after graduation). These differences were significant at the .0545 level for first salary and at .0845 after six years. Several variables had significant relationships to salaries. Location for both groups, undergraduate major for non co-ops and type of employer for co-ops were related to first salary. Four variables were related to current salary: type of employer for co-ops and undergraduate major, job function and fathers' Socio-Economic Index for non co-ops. For most of these variables with significant relationships with salary, the significance levels were similar for both groups, and these probably had little effect on salary differences between groups. Co-ops probably had higher first salaries because of their co-op experience. Two variables with possible effects on salary differences were undergraduate major (which was related to current salary for non co-ops) and type of employer (which was related to current salary for co-ops). These two variables may have undetermined effects on salary differences between the groups. The effect of fathers' socio-economic attributes (educational level and occupational prestige) seems to increase with time, with closer relationships to current salaries than to first ones. / Master of Arts