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Joseph Schacht has devoted a considerable part of his career to study the early history and development of Islamic juristic thought. His thesis about the formation of Islamic law in which the Prophetic traditions played a decisive role has constituted a basis for subsequent research on the subject; and, what is more, it possesses all the attributes of originality and profound thought. / Some responses, sometimes severely critical, have been addressed to Schacht's thesis. Some even accuse him of fostering a "misconception" of the position of law in Islam and of paying little attention to the Qur'anic legislation. It is no wonder, they maintain, that Schacht upholds a view which clearly deviates from the common belief of the majority of Muslims. / On the other hand, certain scholars have thought highly of Schacht's thesis. The broad outlines of his thesis, his e silentio argument and his backward-projection and common link theories, have won high acclaim among leading scholars, both Orientalists and non-Orientalists. It is not an exaggeration therefore when Hourani writes: "Joseph Schacht resurrected the intellectual life of Medieval Islam by his powerful intelligence, learning and concentration."

The Common-Link Theory, invented by Joseph Schacht and widely accepted in modern scholarship, argues that ḥadith authorities knowingly and purposefully placed traditions in circulation with little care to support these ḥadiths with satisfactory isnads. G. H. A. Juynboll, Michael Cook and other Schachtians subsequently embraced and elaborated upon this theory. This dissertation challenges the accuracy of Schacht's founding theory. / The first chapter traces back and elucidates the formation of Schacht's Common-Link Theory, demonstrating how it is related to his other theories. The second chapter examines the responses to Schacht's theory, arguing that its proponents do no more than either expand upon it, or apply it to other fields of Islamic studies. The third chapter employs a critical technique in examining the evidence cited by Schacht and Juynboll, which not only shows the theory's deficiency, but also confirms its flawed nature by the very evidence they use. Two other critical approaches are demonstrated in the fourth chapter. The first rests on an analysis of relevant terms and rules employed by muḥaddiths, thereby offering a workable alternative to Schacht's faulty hypothesis. The second demonstrates the flaws of Schacht's methodology through a synthesis of multiple critiques developed here as well as by other scholars. The last chapter elucidates how Schacht's other theories would collapse as a result of the faultiness of the Common-Link Theory. / Because of the interconnectedness of Schacht's many theses about ḥadith and Islamic law, the findings of this dissertation will not only challenge the significant Common-Link Theory in legal ḥadith studies, but will, perforce, also open the door for scholars to question other important theories held by Schacht and his followers with regard to larger issues in Islamic legal history.

Essen, Universiẗat, Diss., 2002.

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In this project, I develop Nietzsche's account of truth based on the two perspectives of nihilism and health and conclude that his varied analyses and comments from the early and late periods of his writing are compatible. Nietzsche's discussions of truth are divided into two parts. First, the discussion of the concept of truth. Second, he analyzes modern culture that considers the highest type the one that seeks truth. His discussion of the concept of truth involves a critique of the thing-in-itself and Correspondence Theory. The subtle point to get is that Nietzsche never denies the existence of a real world in which we live. However, his critique is of human's ability to arrive at this truth. I argue that his attack on the concept of the thing-in-itself in the late notebooks is aimed at showing the metaphysical incoherence of the concepts of thinghood and self-identity and not on the concept of an unknown grounding existence. As for the second discussion, I argue that Nietzsche condemns truth-seeking insofar as it is held as the highest ideal in a culture. When this occurs, the will to truth in cultures and individuals becomes tyrannical and stems the growth of the person as a complete self, with varied drives and impulses. Finally, I conclude that Nietzsche hopes to overcome nihilism by breaking the tyranny that has taken over society which is governed by a will to nothingness, which depreciates the value of life. He understands the immensity of the task of overcoming this will, and understands that he can only be part of a larger context of combating nihilism. Accordingly, he sees his role as reintroducing man to his body and his physiology and to bring back the experimentation and playful seriousness in the art of living life as opposed to the life-sacrificing and life-denying type that thinks of the pursuit of truth as a relinquishment of life.

In this project, I develop Nietzsche’s account of truth based on the two perspectives of nihilism and health and conclude that his varied analyses and comments from the early and late periods of his writing are compatible. Nietzsche’s discussions of truth are divided into two parts. First, the discussion of the concept of truth. Second, he analyzes modern culture that considers the highest type the one that seeks truth. His discussion of the concept of truth involves a critique of the thing-in-itself and Correspondence Theory. The subtle point to get is that Nietzsche never denies the existence of a real world in which we live. However, his critique is of human’s ability to arrive at this truth. I argue that his attack on the concept of the thing-in-itself in the late notebooks is aimed at showing the metaphysical incoherence of the concepts of thinghood and self-identity and not on the concept of an unknown grounding existence. As for the second discussion, I argue that Nietzsche condemns truth-seeking insofar as it is held as the highest ideal in a culture. When this occurs, the will to truth in cultures and individuals becomes tyrannical and stems the growth of the person as a complete self, with varied drives and impulses. Finally, I conclude that Nietzsche hopes to overcome nihilism by breaking the tyranny that has taken over society which is governed by a will to nothingness, which depreciates the value of life. He understands the immensity of the task of overcoming this will, and understands that he can only be part of a larger context of combating nihilism. Accordingly, he sees his role as reintroducing man to his body and his physiology and to bring back the experimentation and playful seriousness in the art of living life as opposed to the life-sacrificing and life-denying type that thinks of the pursuit of truth as a relinquishment of life.

In this project, I develop Nietzsche’s account of truth based on the two perspectives of nihilism and health and conclude that his varied analyses and comments from the early and late periods of his writing are compatible. Nietzsche’s discussions of truth are divided into two parts. First, the discussion of the concept of truth. Second, he analyzes modern culture that considers the highest type the one that seeks truth. His discussion of the concept of truth involves a critique of the thing-in-itself and Correspondence Theory. The subtle point to get is that Nietzsche never denies the existence of a real world in which we live. However, his critique is of human’s ability to arrive at this truth. I argue that his attack on the concept of the thing-in-itself in the late notebooks is aimed at showing the metaphysical incoherence of the concepts of thinghood and self-identity and not on the concept of an unknown grounding existence. As for the second discussion, I argue that Nietzsche condemns truth-seeking insofar as it is held as the highest ideal in a culture. When this occurs, the will to truth in cultures and individuals becomes tyrannical and stems the growth of the person as a complete self, with varied drives and impulses. Finally, I conclude that Nietzsche hopes to overcome nihilism by breaking the tyranny that has taken over society which is governed by a will to nothingness, which depreciates the value of life. He understands the immensity of the task of overcoming this will, and understands that he can only be part of a larger context of combating nihilism. Accordingly, he sees his role as reintroducing man to his body and his physiology and to bring back the experimentation and playful seriousness in the art of living life as opposed to the life-sacrificing and life-denying type that thinks of the pursuit of truth as a relinquishment of life.

In this project, I develop Nietzsche's account of truth based on the two perspectives of nihilism and health and conclude that his varied analyses and comments from the early and late periods of his writing are compatible. Nietzsche's discussions of truth are divided into two parts. First, the discussion of the concept of truth. Second, he analyzes modern culture that considers the highest type the one that seeks truth. His discussion of the concept of truth involves a critique of the thing-in-itself and Correspondence Theory. The subtle point to get is that Nietzsche never denies the existence of a real world in which we live. However, his critique is of human's ability to arrive at this truth. I argue that his attack on the concept of the thing-in-itself in the late notebooks is aimed at showing the metaphysical incoherence of the concepts of thinghood and self-identity and not on the concept of an unknown grounding existence. As for the second discussion, I argue that Nietzsche condemns truth-seeking insofar as it is held as the highest ideal in a culture. When this occurs, the will to truth in cultures and individuals becomes tyrannical and stems the growth of the person as a complete self, with varied drives and impulses. Finally, I conclude that Nietzsche hopes to overcome nihilism by breaking the tyranny that has taken over society which is governed by a will to nothingness, which depreciates the value of life. He understands the immensity of the task of overcoming this will, and understands that he can only be part of a larger context of combating nihilism. Accordingly, he sees his role as reintroducing man to his body and his physiology and to bring back the experimentation and playful seriousness in the art of living life as opposed to the life-sacrificing and life-denying type that thinks of the pursuit of truth as a relinquishment of life.

The dissertation consists of four recitals: repertoire consisting of solo compositions, music for clarinet alone, chamber music, and one lecture recital. The repertoire of these programs was chosen with the intention of demonstrating the capability of the performer to deal with problems arising in works of varying types and of different historical periods. The lecture recital, The D Major Clarinet Concerto by Theodor von Schacht, discusses background for the development of the clarinet in different pitches and gives pertinent bibliographical and historical information on the life and works of Theodor von Schacht. A formal and stylistic analysis is then followed by a short discussion of the problems involved in the transcription and performance of the work: possibly the first solo concerto ever written for the clarinet in A. The lecture concludes with the first performance of The D Major Clarinet Concerto for clarinet in A with orchestral accompaniment reduced for piano.